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ThE PREVAILING ECoNomIC STAGE 
The U.S. economy is slowly recovering from what has been the lon-
gest and arguably the most severe economic downturn since the Great 
Depression. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates 
this recession as having lasted from December 2007 to June 2009—a 
period of 18 months.1 The civilian unemployment rate rose over that 
period from 5 percent to 9.5 percent, and it increased to and remained 
at a double-digit level throughout the rest of 2009.2 
The George W. Bush administration, with the support of the U.S. 
Congress, took some immediate steps to strengthen the economy. The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public Law [P.L.] 110-
343), signed in October 2008, permitted the government to purchase 
failing bank assets in an effort to stabilize financial markets in the wake 
of the subprime mortgage crisis and to pay for these assets through the 
newly created Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 
(P.L. 111-5), also known as the Recovery Act, was signed by newly 
inaugurated President Barack Obama in February 2009. The premise of 
this fiscal stimulus was that government spending would quickly lead 
to business investments and subsequent consumer spending, thus miti-
gating the current recession.3 Two of the stated purposes of ARRA are 
to “preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery.” Another 
stated purpose of the act is to “provide investments needed to increase 
economic efficiency by spurring technological advances,” and through-
out the act there is an emphasis on small-business investment.4 
In September 2009, the National Economic Council (2009) released 
A Strategy for American Innovation: Driving towards Sustainable 
Growth and Quality Jobs. The report, put out by the Executive Office 
of the President, lays “the foundation for the innovation economy of the 




	 	 	 	
 




2 Link and Scott 
of the American people and a dynamic private sector to ensure that the 
next [economic] expansion is more solid, broad-based, and beneficial 
than previous ones” (p. i). Under the heading “A Vision for Innovation, 
Growth, and Jobs,” the report states that “innovation is essential for 
creating new jobs in both high-tech and traditional sectors . . . A more 
innovative economy is a more productive and faster growing economy, 
with higher returns to workers and increases in living standards . . . 
Innovation is the key to global competitiveness, new and better jobs 
[emphasis added], a resilient economy, and the attainment of essential 
national goals” (p. 4). 
To accomplish this, A Strategy for American Innovation empha-
sizes that the economy must invest in the building blocks of American 
innovation by, among other things, restoring American leadership in 
fundamental research. Such building blocks will promote competitive 
markets that spur productive entrepreneurship, and that in turn will cat-
alyze breakthroughs for national priorities. 
Three broad and related themes are evident from the economic 
policies of the past several years: 1) public-sector and private-sector in-
vestments in research and development (R&D) support the innovation 
process; 2) innovation is closely tied to entrepreneurial activity, and 
new and existing small firms are more entrepreneurial than large firms; 
and 3) entrepreneurship and innovation are the drivers of competitive-
ness, new jobs, productivity growth, and overall economic well-being. 
The Obama administration is not the first to embrace these themes 
in response to an economic crisis. In the early 1970s, and then again in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, productivity growth in the U.S. indus-
trial economy declined precipitously, thus rendering many sectors of the 
economy vulnerable to global competitive forces. While many expla-
nations have been offered as to the cause of the so-called productivity 
slowdown, one clear policy response was to increase the level, effec-
tiveness, and diffusion of private-sector industrial R&D and innovative 
activity through a series of policy initiatives.5 These initiatives included 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980; the R&E Tax Credit of 
1981;6 the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, which 
created the Small Business Innovation Research program (the empiri-










AN INNoVATIoN-BASED ECoNomIC GRowTh STRATEGy 
The three themes listed above are not without an academic founda-
tion. Before we discuss the related literature, some initial definitions 
might be in order. First, invention is the creation of new knowledge, 
technology is the application of new knowledge, and innovation is 
the commercialization of the new technology—innovation puts a new 
technology to general use. And second, entrepreneurship involves 
the perception of new opportunities and the ability to act on those 
perceptions.8 
The premise that the rise of technology leads to productivity growth 
can be traced historically to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. A
careful reading of his argument leads one to conclude that improve-
ments in technology result from the division of labor, and a greater 
division of labor stimulates productivity growth. Productivity growth 
in turn leads to overall economic growth. 
Abramovitz (1956) showed, through his pioneering analysis of 
aggregate economic activity in the post–Civil War economy (cover-
ing from 1869–1878 to 1944–1953), that productivity growth at the 
aggregate level was not due to an increase in the availability and use 
of resources but rather to growth in the stock of knowledge, which in 
turn was due to research and education. Following Abramovitz, Solow 
(1957) formalized the study of productivity growth, and he concluded 
that between 1909 and 1949 gross output per man-hour doubled, with 
nearly 90 percent of the increase due to technical change. This pio-
neering Solow study has motivated volumes of research. Nearly all 
of that literature substantiates the impact of investments in technol-
ogy— research and development (R&D) investments in particular—on 
productivity growth.9 
Regarding the role of small firms, we first focus on the scholarship 
of Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (1958). They were among the first 
scholars to shed light on industrial R&D as a source of technological 
progress. Of the 61 important inventions they name that were made in 
the United States and Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth 
century, more than half could be attributed to entrepreneurs working 
on their own (i.e., as small firms) without the research resources of 
large firms or laboratories. More recently, in research more focused on 
  







4 Link and Scott 
small- versus large-firm behavior, Acs and Audretsch (1990) show that 
the average number of innovations per 1,000 employees made by small 
firms (i.e., firms with fewer than 500 employees) in the U.S. manufac-
turing sector in 1982 was 0.309, compared to 0.202 for large firms.10 
In that same vein, the National Science Foundation’s (NSF’s) Sur-
vey of Industrial Research and Development, as summarized by Rausch 
(2010), shows that small R&D firms invest more in R&D relative to 
their size than do larger firms.11 In 2007, the ratio of R&D to firm sales 
in small R&D firms was 8.6 percent, compared to 3.4 percent in large 
firms.12 
Finally, a study by Breitzman and Hicks (2008) under the spon-
sorship of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Office of 
Advocacy concludes that small technology firms obtain more patents 
per employee than large firms. Over the 2002–2006 period, small tech-
nology firms received 26.5 patents per 100 employees, compared to 
1.7 for large firms. On a patent-per-employee basis, the ratio was 1.89 
for technology firms with fewer than 25 employees and 0.014 for firms 
with 25,000 or more employees. 
At a nonstatistical level, Baumol, Litan, and Schramm (2007) em-
phasize the creative individual—the entrepreneur, which to many is 
synonymous with a newly created firm—as the originating force behind 
innovation. They suggest that “if the United States wishes to continue 
enjoying rapid growth, it must find a way both to launch and promote 
the growth of innovative entrepreneurial enterprises and to ensure that 
the successful entrepreneurs who grow their [small] businesses into 
large firms continue to innovate. We believe that this requires policies 
that encourage what we call ‘productive entrepreneurship’” (p. 2). 
Introducing a more nuanced and balanced view, Baumol (1990,
p. 3) has also argued that not all entrepreneurial efforts are productive. 
He writes the following: 
Entrepreneurs are always with us and always play some substantial 
role. But there are a variety of roles among which the entrepre-
neur’s efforts can be reallocated, and some of those roles do not 
follow the constructive and innovative script that is conventionally 
attributed to that person. Indeed, at times the entrepreneur may 
even lead a parasitical existence that is actually damaging to the 
economy. How the entrepreneur acts at a given time and place de-





the economy—that happen to prevail. Thus . . . it is the set of rules 
and not the supply of entrepreneurs or the nature of their objectives 
that undergoes significant changes from one period to another and 
helps to dictate the ultimate effect on the economy via the alloca-
tion of entrepreneurial resources. 
Baumol, Litan, and Schramm (2007) argue for policies to encour-
age productive entrepreneurship by suggesting a number of policy 
initiatives that should be considered, including everything from tax 
policies to encourage risk taking, to reform of bankruptcy laws to pro-
mote the formation of new businesses, to revision of the patent system. 
Such policy actions will “adjust the rules of the game to induce a more 
felicitous allocation of entrepreneurial resources” (Baumol 1990, p. 4). 
It should be noted that not all are in agreement with Baumol and 
his colleagues. Friedman (2007, p. 4), for example, is critical of this 
point of view, and he has argued that “implementation of changing 
technologies shifts the balance of skills demanded in the market for 
heterogeneous labor, and if the change is sufficiently rapid the mix of 
skills that the labor force supplies cannot keep pace. [And], advancing 
technology is also rendering an ever wider array of goods and services 
conveniently tradable across international boundaries, thereby exposing 
American workers to the actual or incipient threat of competition from 
workers willing to accept extremely low wages compared to American 
standards.” 
Academic and empirical evidence aside, there is also a well-
developed theoretical foundation for government support of innova-
tion, as is discussed next. 
GoVERNmENT’S RoLE IN INNoVATIoN 
One theoretical basis for government’s role in market activity is 
the concept of market failure. Market failure is typically attributed to 
market power, imperfect information, externalities, and public goods. 
The explicit application of market failure to justify government’s role in 
innovation—in R&D activity in particular—is a relatively recent phe-




	 	 	 	  
 
 
	 	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	 	  
	 	 	 	  
 
 
6 Link and Scott 
Public interest in innovation can be traced back to President Wash-
ington’s address to Congress in 1790: “The advancement of agriculture, 
commerce, and manufactures, by all proper means, will not, I trust, 
need recommendation; but I cannot forbear intimating to you the expe-
diency of giving effectual encouragement, as well to the introduction of 
new and useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and 
genius in producing them at home . . . ” (PBS 2002).13 
Still, many point to the first President Bush’s Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, which issued a document titled U.S. Technology 
Policy in 1990 as the United States’ first formal domestic technology 
policy statement. While it was an important initial policy effort, it failed 
to articulate a foundation for government’s role in technology and in-
novation. Rather, it implicitly assumed that government had a role, and 
then set forth the general statement, “The goal of U.S. technology policy 
is to make the best use of technology in achieving the national goals of 
improved quality of life for all Americans, continued economic growth, 
and national security” (Executive Office of the President 1990, p. 2). 
President Clinton took a major step forward from the 1990 policy 
statement in his 1994 Economic Report of the President by articulating 
first principles about why government should be involved in the tech-
nological process (Council of Economic Advisers 1994, p. 191): “The 
goal of technology policy is not to substitute the government’s judg-
ment for that of private industry in deciding which potential ‘winners’
to back. Rather, the point is to correct market failure.”14 
Subsequent Executive Office policy statements have echoed this 
theme; Science in the National Interest (Clinton and Gore 1994) and 
Science and Technology: Shaping the Twenty-First Century (Execu-
tive Office of the President 1997) are among the examples. President 
Clinton’s 2000 Economic Report of the President elaborated upon the 
concept of market failure as part of U.S. technology policy: “Rather 
than support technologies that have clear and immediate commercial 
potential (which would likely be developed by the private sector with-
out government support), government should seek out new technologies 
that will create benefits with large spillovers to society at large” (Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers 2000, p. 99).
Related to this, Martin and Scott (2000, p. 438) observed that “lim-
ited appropriability, financial market failure, external benefits to the 






on a market system will result in underinvestment in innovation, rela-
tive to the socially desirable level. This creates a prima facie case in 
favor of public intervention to promote innovative activity.” 
Market failure, as we address it, could be termed “technological or 
innovation market failure.” Such market failure refers to the market— 
including both the R&D-investing producers of a technology and the 
users of the technology—underinvesting, from society’s standpoint, in a 
particular technology. Such underinvestment occurs because conditions 
exist that prevent organizations from fully realizing or appropriating the 
benefits created by their investments. 
The following explanation of market failure and the reasons for 
market failure follow closely from Arrow’s seminal work, in which he 
identifies three sources of market failure related to knowledge-based 
innovative activity: “indivisibilities, inappropriability, and uncertainty” 
(Arrow 1962b, p. 609).15 
Consider a marketable technology to be produced through an R&D 
process where conditions prevent the R&D-investing firm from fully 
appropriating the benefits from technological advancement. Other firms 
in the market or in related markets will realize some of the profits from 
the innovation, and consumers will typically place a higher value on 
a product than the price paid for it. The R&D-investing firm will then 
calculate, because of such conditions, that the marginal benefits it can 
receive from investment in such R&D will be less than could be earned 
in the absence of the conditions reducing the appropriated benefits of 
R&D below their potential—namely, the full social benefits. Thus, 
the R&D-investing firm might underinvest in R&D relative to what it 
would have chosen as its investment in the absence of the conditions. 
Stated alternatively, the R&D-investing firm might determine that its 
private rate of return is less than its private hurdle rate and therefore 
would not undertake socially valuable R&D. 
This basic concept can be illustrated with Figure 1.1, which fol-
lows from Tassey (1997) and Jaffe (1998). The social rate of return 
is measured on the vertical axis, along with society’s hurdle rate on 
investments in R&D. The private rate of return is measured on the hori-
zontal axis, along with the private hurdle rate on R&D. A 45-degree line 
(dashed) is imposed on the figure under the assumption that the social 
rate of return from an R&D investment will at least equal the private 
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are labeled as Project A and Project B. Each is shown, for illustrative 
purposes only, with the same social rate of return. 
For Project A, the private rate of return is less than the private hur-
dle rate because of barriers to innovation and technology (discussed 
below). As such, the private firm will not choose to invest in Project 
A, although the social benefits from undertaking Project A would be 
substantial (i.e., above the social hurdle rate). 
The principle of market failure illustrated in the figure relates to 
appropriability of returns to investment. The vertical distance shown 
with the double arrow for Project A is called the spillover gap; it results 
from the additional value society would receive above what the private 
firm would receive if Project A were undertaken. What the firm would 
receive is less than its hurdle rate because the firm is unable to appro-
priate all of the returns that spill over to society. Project A is the type of 
project in which public resources should be invested to ensure that the 







In comparison, Project B yields the same social rate of return as 
Project A, but most of that return can be appropriated by the innova-
tor, and the private rate of return is greater than the private hurdle rate. 
Hence, Project B is one for which the private sector has an incentive to 
invest on its own, even though the social rate of return is greater than 
the private rate of return. Or, alternatively stated, there is no economic 
justification for public resources being allocated to support Project B. 
For projects of Type A, where significant spillovers occur, govern-
ment’s role has typically been to provide direct funding or technology 
infrastructure through public research institutions, which lowers the 
marginal cost of investment so that the marginal private rate of return 
exceeds the private hurdle rate. 
Note that the private hurdle rate is greater than the social hurdle 
rate in the figure. This is primarily because of management’s (and em-
ployees’) risk aversion and issues related to the availability and cost 
of capital. These factors represent an additional source of market fail-
ure that is related to uncertainty. For example, because most private 
firms are risk-averse (i.e., the penalty from lower-than-expected returns 
is weighted more heavily than the benefits from greater-than-expected 
returns), they require a higher-hurdle rate of return compared to society 
as a whole, which is closer to being risk-neutral.16 
To reduce market failures associated with inappropriability and 
uncertainty, government typically engages in activities to reduce 
technical and market risk (actual and perceived). There are several cir-
cumstances—termed barriers to technology and innovation—that cause 
market failure and an underinvestment in R&D.17 Stated differently, 
there are a number of factors that explain why a firm will perceive that 
its expected private rate of return will fall below its hurdle rate, even 
when the social rate of return exceeds the social hurdle rate.18 Indi-
viduals will differ about a listing of such factors, not only because they 
are not generally mutually exclusive, but also because of the relative 
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AN oVERVIEw oF ThE Book 
While the literature-based arguments supporting an innovation-based 
economic growth strategy are clear, many if not most of the empiri-
cal studies to date have narrowly focused on the aggregate relationship 
between R&D (or innovative activity) and productivity (or economic 
growth).19 The more micro relationship between innovation and employ-
ment has largely been ignored by scholars to date, although in the current 
economic environment—that of a record federal deficit and unemploy-
ment only slightly below 10 percent—job growth is one issue that is 
raised in connection with nearly every public-sector expenditure.
In subsequent chapters we statistically examine employment growth 
associated with public support of R&D in small, entrepreneurial firms 
through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The 
SBIR program, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is a public/ 
private partnership that provides research grants to small firms to fund 
projects that are expected to result in commercialized innovations. Any 
government agency with an extramural research budget in excess of 
$100 million must set aside 2.5 percent of that budget to fund small-
firm research that is aligned with the research mission of the agency. 
While the objective of the SBIR program is, generally, to stimulate in-
novation activity, it is reasonable to expect that employment growth at 
some level will follow from such public support of R&D. Our emphasis 
on employment growth is motivated not only by the academic literature 
but also by the current policy emphasis on job growth, especially as it 
relates to public support of innovation in small firms. 
Our empirical analysis is based on information assembled by the 
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies in re-
sponse to a congressional charge for it to make recommendations for 
changes in the SBIR program. As we discuss in Chapter 3, to meet 
this charge, the NRC assembled what is arguably the most complete 
database available for studying employment issues in innovative small 
firms; it is used for the empirical analyses presented in the following 
chapters. 
As requested by Congress, the scope of the NRC database is limited 
to Phase II SBIR awards by the five largest agencies: the Department 











Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of En-
ergy (DOE), and the National Science Foundation (NSF).20 In Chapter 
3, we give an overview of the history of the database, and we discuss 
the methodological approach used by the NRC to construct it. Firm-
level and project-level variables in the data that are used in the statistical 
analysis in subsequent chapters are defined, and descriptive statistics on 
all variables are presented. 
Chapter 4 is the first of three chapters specifically focused on em-
ployment impacts associated with SBIR funding. Its emphasis is on 
project-specific impacts, and the emphasis of Chapters 5 and 6 is on 
firm-wide impacts. That said, one might reasonably liken our empiri-
cal investigation into the innovation-employment relationship to a hunt 
for a Heffalump.21 The reason for this is that previous research on the 
economic impact of R&D, entrepreneurship, and innovation on produc-
tivity and economic growth has been at an aggregate level. Whether 
an innovation-employment relationship will show up in the data at the 
project or even the firm level is an empirical issue, but logic suggests 
that the relationship might be there at least for some firms. A firm in-
vests in R&D and, given time, that research results in a new technology. 
The firm then commercializes the innovation. To meet the market 
demand for the innovation, assuming the firm plans to sell its innovation 
in the marketplace, the firm will likely hire new workers to produce it. 
However, if the firm innovates only with the intent of selling or licens-
ing its innovation to others, job growth might not be present. Moreover, 
a lack of substantial job growth in the small firms conducting the R&D 
leading to innovation might even be expected, given that the theoretical 
foundation of public policy to stimulate innovation is based on market 
failure grounded in spillovers of value created by the innovating firms 
but appropriated by others. In any case, the innovation-employment
relationship has yet to be studied systematically at any level of 
aggregation. 
In Chapter 4, we identify at the SBIR project level variables that 
are correlated with the number of employees retained as a result of the 
technology developed during the SBIR-funded project. This descrip-
tive analysis is narrow in its focus. It relates only to the direct, narrowly 
focused, and project-specific employment effects that occur from an 
SBIR project. Anticipating our findings, we know that SBIR-funded 
projects typically retain very few employees—on average, one to two 
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employees—after the completion of the funded project to pursue the 
technology that was developed. In our findings, just over two-fifths of 
all completed projects retained no employees, and over one-third re-
tained only one or two employees. Among many other findings, we see 
from the data that the number of retained employees is greater when the 
government actually uses the technology created with the SBIR award, 
thereby providing a clear commercial goal and ultimately creating a 
market for the commercialized result of the SBIR project. 
Chapters 5 and 6, in contrast, focus on the broader, longer-term 
employment impact on the firm as a whole (as opposed to only the 
funded project) from SBIR funding. We argue that this broader focus 
is an appropriate next step for understanding more completely the 
employment impacts associated with these public investments in inno-
vation. The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 is based on an economic growth 
model suited to the data limitations in the NRC database, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. Our model, which is counterfactual in construction and 
implementation, allows us to make direct causal inferences about the 
impact of the SBIR-funded innovative activity on overall firm employ-
ment growth. 
Specifically, in Chapter 5, we estimate the employment impact 
of SBIR funding on our sample of firms. We compare a firm’s actual 
level of employment after receipt of an SBIR award and completion of 
the research project to the level of employment predicted by the firm’s 
characteristics prior to receiving the award. In other words, our analy-
sis focuses on a comparison of the firm’s actual employment with the 
firm’s predicted employment had the firm not received the SBIR fund-
ing for the sampled project. We find, on average among firms funded 
by the DoD, NIH, NASA, and DOE (but not by the NSF), that the dif-
ference between actual employment growth and predicted employment 
growth is positive. (The data in the NRC database relate to the year 
2005.) For the DoD and NIH samples, the positive employment impact 
of a sampled award is statistically significant for several of the awards. 
However, the average difference between actual employment and pre-
dicted employment absent the award is not statistically different from 
zero for any of these agencies. We cannot conclude that, on average, 
SBIR awards generate a permanent long-run employment benefit to the 




there are average employment gains that appear quite substantial, the 
average gains are not statistically significant. 
Despite the lack of statistical significance in the average em-
ployment gains for firms after receiving a sampled award, there are 
numerous individual cases of significant gains (statistically and eco-
nomically) and large ranges in significance of the gains in the individual 
cases for all agencies. In Chapter 6, we build on those ranges in the 
results from Chapter 5 and posit an exploratory model to identify the 
variables related to SBIR-induced employment growth for the firm as 
a whole—that is, the variables related to the difference between actual 
employment for the firm and its predicted employment without the sup-
port of the SBIR award. We find, across agency projects, that there is 
considerable variation in the group of covariates associated with actual 
employment growth above predicted employment growth. The single 
covariate that is important, for SBIR-induced employment growth, 
across all agency samples is the presence of firm investments in intel-
lectual property. 
In Chapter 7, we explore the possibility of employment effects be-
yond the firm. Specifically, we examine descriptively the extent to which 
SBIR-funded projects result in commercial agreements with other U.S. 
firms or investors, comparing the extent of agreements made with for-
eign firms or investors. This inquiry builds on the empirically based 
discussion in Chapters 4 through 6 regarding such agreements. Our de-
scription shows that SBIR funds, and the associated technologies and 
employment growth, are benefiting not only U.S. firms and investors, 
but also foreign firms and investors through commercial agreements. 
To our knowledge, our analysis is the first to use a counterfactual 
model to quantify the magnitude of the relationship between invest-
ments in innovation through public support of R&D and the resulting 
employment growth. As such, we view our empirical analysis of the 
employment growth in the small firms performing the R&D sup-
ported with SBIR funds as somewhat exploratory both in scope and in 
specification. 
Our analyses in Chapters 5–7 represent an evaluation of one aspect 
of the SBIR program, namely employment growth, and such evalua-
tions have attracted the administration’s attention. Specifically, Peter 
Orszag, then the director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
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departments and agencies on the subject of increased emphasis on 
program evaluation, “Rigorous . . . program evaluations can be a key 
resource in determining whether government programs are achieving 
their intended outcomes . . . and at the lowest cost. Evaluations . . . can 
help the Administration determine how to spend taxpayer dollars effec-
tively and efficiently . . .” (Orszag 2009).22 
Finally, in Chapter 8 we conclude with a brief summary of our find-
ings, and we reiterate our view of their possible importance for future 
public policy. Our study of the NRC database reveals that the public’s 
support of R&D in SBIR firms results at best in only modest employ-
ment gains within the SBIR firms themselves. However, our evidence 
supports the expectation that the accomplishments of these small firms 
will have employment effects that show up elsewhere in the U.S. econ-
omy and in foreign markets. Such employment effects beyond the SBIR 
firms themselves result from commercial agreements, such as the sale 
of technology rights to other firms, and through the spillovers of value 
from the R&D that the SBIR firms do not appropriate at all. As we have 
explained in this introductory chapter, such spillovers are at the heart of 
the market failure, which is the raison d’être for the public support of 
R&D in small, entrepreneurial firms. 
Notes 
1. The NBER dates the Great Depression as having lasted from August 1929 to March 
1933, a period of 43 months. See http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. 
2. These unemployment statistics come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE. 
3. The Council of Economic Advisers, as part of accountability and transparency pro-
visions in ARRA, has released quarterly reports assessing the economic impact of 
ARRA. 
4. The policy emphasis in ARRA on jobs, especially innovation-based jobs, can be 
traced back at least to the National Academy of Sciences report Rising above the 
Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Better Economic Fu-
ture (Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy 2007). This report was the 
foundation for the America COMPETES Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-69), which was 
reauthorized as the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 in January 
2011. 
5. See Link (1987) and Link and Siegel (2003) for the literature related to culprits of 















6. R&E refers to research and experimentation activity. Experimentation is a more 
narrowly defined activity than development, according to National Science Foun-
dation reporting definitions. 
7. See Scott (2008) for a review of the literature about the history and effectiveness 
of the National Cooperative Research Act. 
8. Hébert and Link (1988, 2009) provide an overview of the intellectual history of 
thought on who the entrepreneur is and what he or she does. 
9. See, Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010) for a survey of this literature. 
10. The Small Business Administration defines small firms as those having fewer than 
500 employees. In the Acs and Audretsch (1990) study, innovations were defined 
by a contracted data-collecting firm as the number of new products reported in 
technology, engineering, and trade journals. Baldwin and Scott (1987) provide a 
review of the earlier literature about the relative innovativeness of small versus 
large firms. 
11. The comparison does not necessarily mean that the smaller firms are more ef-
fective at producing innovations. Comparisons across firms of different sizes of 
their proportions of sales taken by R&D expenditures have been criticized be-
cause economies in large-scale use of R&D resources could imply that larger, less 
R&D-intensive firms are more effective at producing innovations than smaller, 
more R&D-intensive firms. Kohn and Scott (1982) establish the conditions for the 
possible relationships between the distributions of R&D across firm sizes and the 
distributions of their R&D output. Importantly, if R&D increased more than pro-
portionately with firm size, then that would imply that the output of R&D activity 
also increased more than proportionately. However, the reverse relation does not 
hold. We do have evidence about the distribution of R&D output across firm sizes, 
however, and much of that supports the relative effectiveness of the smaller firms’
R&D investments. 
12. The ratio of R&D to firm sales was 15.8 percent for R&D firms with fewer than 25 
employees and 3.1 percent for firms with more than 25,000 employees. 
13. Were it not for Kahin and Hill (2010), we would not have known about this 
statement. 
14. The conceptual importance of identifying market failure for policy is also empha-
sized, although without any operational guidance, in Office of Management and 
Budget (1996). 
15. Although Arrow does not elaborate on indivisibilities and inappropriability in his 
paper, the concepts are well understood in the innovation literature. Recalling that 
Arrow (1962b, p. 609) defines innovation “as the production of knowledge,” we 
know that the market does not price knowledge in discrete bundles, and thus be-
cause of such indivisibilities market prices may not send appropriate signals for 
economic units to make marginal decisions correctly. 
16. There are two parts to the answer to the twin questions of how the social hurdle rate 
is determined and why it is represented as being less than the private hurdle rate. 
The first is grounded in the practice of evaluations, and the second is grounded in 
the theory of public policies to address market failure. 
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1) Regarding practice, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
mandated that a specified real rate of return be used as the rate for evaluation stud-
ies—that is, the rate to be considered the opportunity cost for the use of the public 
funds in the investment projects. The OMB (1992, p. 9) has stated that “constant-
dollar benefit-cost analyses of proposed investments and regulations should report 
net present value and other outcomes determined using a real discount rate of 7 per-
cent.” That real rate of return (and the related nominal rates derived by accounting for 
expected inflation rates in various periods of analysis) has been far less than what the 
respondents in case studies have reported (Link and Scott 2011) as the private hurdle 
rate for comparable investment projects in industry during comparable time periods.
2) Regarding theory, when we evaluate public investment projects, we are in-
variably looking at cases where there has been some sort of market failure. To 
improve upon the market solution, the government has become involved (in a va-
riety of ways, in practice) with an investment project. Just as market solutions 
for the prices of goods may not reflect the social costs for the goods (because of 
market failure stemming from market power, imperfect information, externalities, 
or public goods), the private hurdle rates that reflect market solutions for the price 
of funds—the opportunity cost of funds to the private firms—might not reflect the 
social cost of the funds. The government might decide that the appropriate social 
cost—the opportunity cost for the public funds to be invested—differs from the 
market solution. Typically, in practice, for the public R&D projects we have stud-
ied, the government evidently believes that it faces less risk than the private sector 
firms doing similar investments; hence it will believe a lower yield is satisfactory 
because the public is bearing less risk than the private sector firm going it alone 
with a similar investment. More generally, government must decide what the op-
portunity costs of its public funds will be in various uses, and in general that will 
not be the same as the market rate. However, all that having been said, clearly we 
know from Arrow’s thinking about social choice that the government’s decision 
about what the rate should be cannot possibly reflect the diversity of opinion in 
the private sector regarding the decision (Arrow 1963). Consequently, as a logical 
matter, one could not prove that the government’s choice of the right hurdle rate is 
obviously correct, because diversity of opinion about the correct rate will not be 
reflected in the government’s choice. 
17. These factors are not independent of each other. They include high technical risk 
associated with the underlying R&D, high capital costs to perform the underlying 
R&D with high market risk, length of time to complete the R&D and commercial-
ize the resulting technology, the fact that underlying R&D spills over to multiple 
markets and is not appropriable, that market success of the technology depends on 
technologies in different industries, that property rights cannot be assigned to the 
underlying R&D, that resulting technology must be compatible and interoperable 
with other technologies, and the high risk of opportunistic behavior when sharing 
information about the technology. 
18. As Arrow (1962b) explains, investments in knowledge entail uncertainty of two 







may be very poor, or perhaps considerably better than the expected outcome. Thus, 
a firm is justifiably concerned about the risk that its R&D investment will fail, 
technically or for any other reason. Or, if technically successful, the R&D invest-
ment output may not pass the market test for profitability. Furthermore, the firm’s 
private expected return typically falls short of the expected social return, as previ-
ously discussed. This concept of downside risk is elaborated upon below and in 
Link and Scott (2001). 
19. This global view is logical in the sense that aggregate economic growth is the over-
riding long-term objective of most public policies. 
20. DOE, as opposed to the other abbreviations of departments here, has a capital “O” 
because of a departmental policy that capitalized it to distinguish the Department 
of Energy from the Department of Education. 
21. A Heffalump is an imaginary elephant in the dreams of Piglet in the book Winnie-
the-Pooh. The Heffalump gained academic notoriety through the writings of Kilby 
(1971), who wrote, “The search for the source of dynamic entrepreneurial perfor-
mance has much in common with hunting the Heffalump . . . He has been hunted 
by many individuals using various ingenious trapping devices, but no one so far 
has succeeded in capturing him. All who claim to have caught sight of him report 
that he is enormous, but they disagree on his particularities . . . [But] the search 
goes on” (p. 1). 
22. Hearings before the Senate Budget Committee were held on October 29, 2009, 
in support of Orszag’s point of view. Also, two chapters about program evalua-
tion have been included in the Fiscal Year 2011 and the Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 
of the U.S. Government; see http://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2011/assets/spec.pdf and http://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2012/assets/spec.pdf. Chapter 8 is on program evaluation and Chapter 9 is on 
benefit-cost analysis (OMB 2010). 

 









EVoLuTIoN oF A PoLICy EmPhASIS oN INNoVATIoN IN
SmALL FIRmS 
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, productivity growth in the United 
States fell during the early 1970s and then again during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, as it did in many industrialized nations. The evidence 
shows that total factor productivity growth during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s was less than one-half of that during previous decades.1 
While there have been many ex post explanations for the slowdown, 
such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil 
crisis in 1973 and industry’s slow adjustment to it, there seems to have 
been a general agreement at that time and shortly thereafter that public 
policy aimed at stimulating innovation would be effective for stimulat-
ing economic growth. As a result, the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 
1980,2 and the R&E tax credit was passed in 1981.3 
In addition to the broad-based emphasis on innovation (i.e., the 
diffusion of patented technologies and the increase in R&D invest-
ments from these two legislative initiatives, respectively), a research 
report from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Neighborhood 
and Regional Change program was independently and coincidently 
published in 1979. Birch (1979, 1981) concludes in that report that 
three-fifths of the net new jobs between 1969 and 1976 were created 
by small firms with 20 or fewer employees. According to Birch (1979, 
p. 29), “On the average about 60 percent of all jobs in the U.S. are 
generated by firms with 20 or fewer employees, about 50 percent of 
all jobs are created by independent, small entrepreneurs. Large firms 
(those with over 500 employees) generate less than 15 percent of all 
net new jobs.” Also, Birch (1979) reports that approximately 80 percent 











20 Link and Scott 
Birch’s writings became the genesis for a new research field related to 
the economics of small businesses.5 
Reflecting more broadly than on the productivity slowdown in the 
1970s—a period of economic disequilibrium—Schultz (1980, p. 443) 
notes that “disequilibria are inevitable in [a] dynamic economy. These 
disequilibria cannot be eliminated by law, by public policy, and surely 
not by rhetoric. A modern dynamic economy would fall apart if not for 
the entrepreneurial actions of a wide array of human agents who reallo-
cate their resources [to form new combinations] and thereby bring their 
part of the economy back into equilibrium.” 
It could be argued that this constant readjustment toward equilib-
rium by enterprises stimulates economic growth.6 
One might think of the productivity recovery that began in the early 
1980s in terms of entrepreneurial responses to disequilibria.7 Or, us-
ing the terms of Audretsch and Thurik (2001, 2004), the recovery from 
the productivity slowdown reflects the end of the era of the “Managed 
Economy” (with predictable outputs coming from an established manu-
facturing sector) and the emergence of the “Entrepreneurial Economy.” 
In the Entrepreneurial Economy, characterized by the emergence of 
economic agents embodied with entrepreneurial capital, smaller firms 
have a greater ability to be innovative, or to adopt and adapt others’ new 
technologies and ideas, and thus quickly and efficiently appropriate in-
vestments in new knowledge that are made externally.8 Entrepreneurial 
capital engenders growth in new enterprises, and enterprise growth aug-
ments economic growth. Entrepreneurial capital also provides diversity 
among firms.9 According to Audretsch and Thurik (2004, p. 144), with 
an emphasis on small firms within the Entrepreneurial Economy, “en-
trepreneurship has emerged [during the late 1970s] as the engine of 
economic and social development throughout the world.” As a result, it 
is perhaps not surprising that policymakers toward the end of the 1970s 
embraced small firms as engines of future economic growth. 
Carlsson (1992) offers two explanations for this shift in policy 
emphasis toward small, entrepreneurial firms. First, there had been 
a fundamental change in the world economy beginning in the mid-
1970s.10 Global competition was increasing, markets were becoming 
less fragmented, and the determinants of future economic growth were 
uncertain. Thus, entrepreneurial leadership adjusted to this disequilib-
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throughout the manufacturing sector, thus reducing economies of scale 
as a barrier for entry into many markets and thereby opening the door 
for smaller, entrepreneurial firms to enter and succeed. 
It is not surprising, then, that the policy environment in the late 
1970s and early 1980s was receptive to the establishment of the SBIR 
program. 
ThE CREATIoN oF ThE SBIR PRoGRAm 
The program created as Small Business Innovation Research is a 
public/private partnership that provides grants to fund private-sector 
R&D projects. It aims to help fulfill the government’s mission to en-
hance private-sector R&D and to commercialize the results of federal 
research.11 
A prototype of the SBIR program began at the NSF in 1977 
(Tibbetts 1999). At that time, the goal of the program was to encourage 
small businesses—increasingly recognized by the policy community 
as a source of innovation and employment in the U.S. economy—to 
participate in NSF-sponsored research, especially research with com-
mercial potential. Because of the early success of the program at the 
NSF, Congress passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act 
of 1982 (P.L. 97-219; hereafter, the 1982 act).12 
The 1982 act required all government departments and agencies 
with external research programs of greater than $100 million to es-
tablish their own SBIR program and to set aside funds equal to 0.20 
percent of the external research budget.13 In 1983, that set-aside totaled 
$45 million. 
The 1982 act stated that the objectives of the program included the 
following four: 
1) to stimulate technological innovation, 
2) to use small business to meet federal research and development 
needs, 
3) to foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvan-
taged persons in technological innovation, and 
4) to increase private sector commercialization of innovations
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It is important to point out that employment growth was not a 
stated objective of the SBIR program in the 1982 act, or in subsequent 
reauthorizations. 
As part of the 1982 act, SBIR program awards were structured 
and defined by three phases (Wessner 2004). Phase I awards were 
small, generally less than $50,000 for the six-month award period.14 
The purpose of Phase I awards is to assist businesses as they assess the 
feasibility of an idea’s scientific and commercial potential in response 
to the funding agency’s objectives.15 Phase II awards were capped at 
$500,000; they generally last for two years. These awards are for the 
business to develop further its proposed research, ideally leading to a 
commercializable product, process, or service.16 The Phase II awards 
of public funds for development are sometimes augmented by outside 
private funding (Wessner 2000). Further work on the projects launched 
through the SBIR program occurs in what is called Phase III, which 
does not involve SBIR funds.17 At this stage, firms needing additional 
financing to ensure that the product, process, or service can move into 
the marketplace are expected to obtain it from sources other than the 
SBIR program. 
As stated in the 1982 act, to be eligible for an SBIR award, the 
small business must have the following six characteristics: 
1) It must be independently owned and operated. 
2) It must not be the dominant firm in the field in which it is pro-
posing to carry out SBIR projects. 
3) It must be organized and operated for profit. 
4) It must be the employer of no more than 500 employees, in-
cluding employees of subsidiaries and affiliates. 
5) It must be the primary source of employment for the project’s 
principal investigator at the time of the award and during the 
period when the research is conducted. 
6) It must be at least 51 percent owned by U.S. citizens or lawfully 
admitted permanent resident aliens. 
In 1986, the 1982 act was extended through 1992 (P.L. 99-443). In 
1992, the SBIR program was reauthorized again until 2000 through the 
Small Business Research and Development Enactment Act (P.L. 102-
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the 1992 reauthorization raised that amount over time to 2.5 percent 
and reemphasized the commercialization intent of SBIR-funded tech-
nologies (see point 4 of the 1982 act, above).18 The reauthorization also 
increased Phase I awards to $100,000 and Phase II awards to $750,000.19 
The 1992 reauthorization broadened objective 3, above, to focus also 
on women: “to provide for enhanced outreach efforts to increase the 
participation of . . . small businesses that are 51 percent owned and 
controlled by women.” 
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554) 
extended the SBIR program until September 30, 2008. It retained the 
2.5 percent set-aside and did not increase the amounts of Phase I and 
Phase II awards.20 
Congress did not reauthorize the SBIR program by the legislated 
date of September 30, 2008; rather, Congress temporarily extended the 
program until March 20, 2009 (P.L. 110-235). The Senate version of the 
reauthorization bill (S. 3029) included among other things an increase 
in Phase I funding to $150,000 and an increase in Phase II funding to 
$1,000,000, with provisions for these funding guidelines to be exceeded 
by 50 percent. Also, the current 2.5 percent set-aside would increase to 
3.5 percent at a rate of 0.1 percent per year over 10 years, except for 
the National Institutes of Health, which would stay at 2.5 percent. On 
March 19, 2009, the House and Senate reauthorized the SBIR program 
until July 31, 2009 (P.L. 110-10); it was again reauthorized through 
September 30, 2009, through a Senate continuing resolution (S. 1513). 
On September 23, 2009, a House bill (H.R. 3614) extended SBIR until 
October 31, 2009. A Senate bill (S. 1929) again extended the program 
until April 30, 2010; then another Senate bill (S. 3253) extended the 
program to July 31. Another House bill (H.R. 5849) extended the pro-
gram to September 30, 2010; more recent bills (S. 3839 and H.R. 366) 
extended the program to January 31 and then May 31, 2011, respectively.21 
Still to be decided are whether the existing Phase I, Phase II, and Phase 
III processes should remain, whether the dollar amount of Phase I and 
Phase II awards should be changed, and whether venture capitalists 
should be involved in the SBIR process.22 While this debate lingers 
in Congress, the Small Business Administration (SBA) on March 30, 
2010, amended the SBIR policy directive to allow the threshold amount 
to increase to $150,000 for Phase I awards and to $1,000,000 for Phase 
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bill). As of this writing, the program has been temporarily reauthorized 
until December 16, 2011 (H.R. 2112). 
Eleven agencies currently participate in the SBIR program. Be-
sides NASA, the NSF, the DoD, and the DOE, mentioned in Chapter 
1, the other seven are the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DoC), Education 
(ED), Health and Human Services (HHS, particularly the NIH, which 
is also mentioned in Chapter 1), Transportation (DoT), and, most re-
cently, Homeland Security (DHS). In 2005 (the year of the survey from 
which the data analyzed herein come, as discussed in Chapter 3), the 
DoD maintained the largest program, awarding about 51 percent of total 
dollars and funding about 57 percent of total awards in that year. Five 
agencies—the DoD, HHS, NASA, DOE, and NSF—account for nearly 
97 percent of the program’s expenditures, with the HHS (which includes 
the NIH) being the second most important, accounting for 30 percent of 
total dollars and 19 percent of awards in 2005 (Table 2.1). SBIR Phase II 
awards from these five agencies are studied in the subsequent chapters. 
ECoNomIC RoLE oF ThE SBIR PRoGRAm 
The general model of the spillover gap between social and private 
rates of return in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, which was introduced as a 
pedagogical device to support the argument for government’s role in 
the innovation process, is expanded here in Figure 2.1 with specific 
reference to the SBIR program. For Project Awithout SBIR in Figure 2.1, 
the private rate of return is less than the private hurdle rate because 
of barriers to technology. As such, the private firm will not choose to 
invest in Project Awithout SBIR , although the social benefits from undertak-
ing the project would be great. The vertical distance measured by the 
distance from isocial to the 45-degree line at iprivate for Project Awithout SBIR 
is the spillover gap; it results from the additional value society would 
receive above what the private firm would receive if Project Awithout SBIR 
were undertaken. Project Awithout SBIR is precisely the type of project in 
which the public should invest, namely one in which the private sector 
would not invest because of market failure and one from which society 
would greatly benefit. 
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Table 2.1  SBIR Awards and Dollars, Fiscal year 2005 
Agency Phase I awards Phase I dollars Phase II awards Phase II dollars Total awards Total dollars 
DoD 2,344 $213,482,152 998 $729,285,508 3,342 $942,767,660 
HHSa 732 $149,584,038 369 $412,504,975 1,101 $562,089,013 
DOE 259 $25,757,637 101 $77,852,565 360 $103,610,202 
NASA 290 $20,183,648 139 $83,014,853 429 $103,198,501 
NSF 152 $15,054,750 132 $64,101,179 284 $79,155,929 
USDA 91 $7,195,211 40 $11,738,536 131 $18,933,747 
DHS 62 $6,158,240 13 $10,241,202 75 $16,399,442 
ED 22 $1,646,603 14 $6,749,980 36 $8,396,583 
DoC 34 $2,373,433 19 $5,469,846 53 $7,843,279 
EPA 38 $2,652,216 14 $3,540,251 52 $6,192,467 
DoT 7 $679,154 3 $1,765,468 10 $2,444,622 
Total 4,031 $444,767,082 1,842 $1,406,264,363 5,873 $1,851,031,445 
a The National Institutes of Health (NIH) organization is under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations using SBA data found at http://web.sba.gov/tech-net/public/dsp_search.cfm.
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Figure 2.1  Spillover Gap between Social and Private Rates of Return to 
SBIR-Funded Research 
45º 




















Private rate of return 
NOTE: i* is the expected private rate of return with the SBIR support, while i is the 
expected private rate of return without the support. 
SOURCE: Link and Scott (2010). 
In Figure 2.2, we alternatively illustrate that reduction in risk in 
terms of a rightward shift in the distribution of the rate of return for 
the private firms.23 The rightward shift of the distribution, and the con-
cept of reducing the probability of returns to a likelihood lower than 
what would be acceptable to the private investors, applies equally well 
to the absolute level of net return (absolute return minus private in-
vestment) expected from the project. As shown in Figure 2.1, SBIR 
support increases the firm’s expected private rate of return and thereby 
reduces the downside risk associated with undertaking R&D.24 For each 
distribution—without SBIR funding (left distribution) and with SBIR 
funding (right distribution)—the expected rate of return is shown.25 As 
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Figure 2.2  Private Risk Reduction Resulting from SBIR Funding 
0 
Expected rate of return without SBIR funding 
Hurdle rate Expected rate of return with SBIR funding 
r = rate of return 
f(r) 
Without SBIR funding 
With SBIR funding 
Shaded area: risk with SBIR funding—the
probability that private participants will fail to 
receive their required (hurdle) rate of return 
SOURCE: Link and Scott (2009). 
variance in the private rate of return from the research project will in-
crease. One can generalize that this will always be the case.26 
Consider the left distribution—the distribution of the rate of return 
for the private firm without SBIR funding. As drawn, the private hurdle 
rate is to the right of the expected rate of return without SBIR funding, 
meaning that the private firm will not undertake this research because 
the firm will not receive its required rate of return. The risk of the proj-
ect equals the area under this without-SBIR distribution that is to the 
left of the private hurdle rate. For those used to thinking of the variance 
of the distribution as the measure of risk, the downside risk—which is 
the probability of a rate of return less than the hurdle rate—might seem 
unusual. Variance measures the possibility that outcomes can differ 
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ability of an outcome departing to the downside of the hurdle rate. Note 
that the technical risk and the market risk for the project are reflected in 
the variance of the distribution: the technical goals may exceed or fall 
short of expectations, and market acceptance of the project’s technical 
outcomes could do the same. The downside risk refers to the outcomes 
that fall short of the hurdle rate. 
Now consider the distribution on the right in Figure 2.2—the distri-
bution of the rate of return for the private firm with SBIR funding. With 
SBIR funding, the private firm will expect a return greater than its hur-
dle rate; thus the expected private rate of return with SBIR funding is 
drawn to the right of the private hurdle rate.27 While SBIR funding will 
not itself increase the probability that the research will be successful, 
assuming hypothetically that it were undertaken absent SBIR funding, it 
will reduce private risk by increasing the expected private rate of return, 
because the expected rate of return will be based on a smaller private 
outlay.28 Hence, SBIR funding leverages the private firm’s investment, 
as illustrated by a greater expected return and a greater variance in the 
distribution, as explained above. 
The shaded area in Figure 2.2 is what we call the downside risk 
of the project—that is, it is the probability that the project will yield a 
rate of return less than the private hurdle rate, even with SBIR fund-
ing. Hence, the amount of downside risk with SBIR funding is visually 
less than the downside risk associated with the research project in the 
without-SBIR funding case. 
Although we will conclude that SBIR funding reduces risk, as 
defined operationally in terms of reducing the probability of a rate of 
return below the private hurdle rate, we emphasize that our analysis 
below is in no way wed to any particular measure of risk or any par-
ticular model of capital asset pricing with associated systematic and 
nonsystematic risk. Instead, our treatment encompasses any and all 
such models because the relevant risk, however it is perceived by pri-
vate firms, is captured in the private hurdle rate, and the distributions of 
returns are otherwise represented by their expected values. In describ-
ing the effect of SBIR funding on the distribution of private rates of 
return, we are describing an underlying reality that would be reflected 
in the private hurdle rate—as determined by some model—and in the 
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EmPLoymENT GRowTh AND ThE SBIR PRoGRAm 
Although employment growth is not a stated objective of the SBIR 
program, it is reasonable to assume that future reauthorizations of the 
program will consider employment issues, explicitly or implicitly. We 
are of this opinion for three reasons, all of which were alluded to in 
Chapter 1. 
First, the administration’s view toward sustained economic growth 
is focused on job creation and employment growth, as reflected in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. 
Second, while ARRA was legislated in the aftermath of what was 
the longest and most severe recession since the Great Depression, 
there are indicators that an emphasis on innovation-based employment 
growth will become an integral part, if not a centerpiece, of the imple-
mentation of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, 
signed into law in January 2011. Stine (2009, pp. 2–3) writes, “For the 
nation to maintain economic growth and a high standard of living, the 
United States must be competitive in a global economy. To be com-
petitive, U.S. companies must engage in trade, retain market shares, 
and offer high quality products, processes, and services. Scientific and 
technological advances can further economic growth because they con-
tribute to the creation of new goods, services, jobs, and capital . . .” 
Stine (2009, p. 14) goes on to say that “science and engineering 
research is important to U.S. competitiveness because of its influence 
on U.S. economic growth . . . Additional federal funding of basic sci-
ence and engineering research will make the nation more competitive 
by creating whole new industries and the related jobs, [as well as by] 
enhancing existing ones.” 
Continued support for science and engineering research is a major 
part of the 2010 budget (Sargent 2010), the 2011 budget, and likely of 
future budgets. 
Third, the Office of Management and Budget is focusing on program 
evaluation as part of the administration’s emphasis on accountability. 
Certainly, an economic evaluation of the SBIR program will be broader 
than an assessment of its enabling legislation’s stated objectives, and 
it could focus on, among other things, job creation and employment 
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Notes 
1. Kendrick and Grossman (1980) report annual total factor productivity growth in 
the private business sector from 1948 to 1966 to have been 2.9 percent, but only 
1.4 percent from 1966 to 1976. See Link (1987) and Link and Siegel (2003, 2007) 
for an overview of the productivity slowdown literature. 
2. The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, also known as 
the Bayh-Dole Act, reformed federal patent policy by providing incentives for the 
diffusion of federally funded innovation results. Universities in particular were 
permitted to obtain titles to innovations developed with government funds. See 
Stevens (2004) for a historical account of the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
3. The Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) included a tax credit for 
qualified R&E expenditures in excess of the average amount spent in previous 
years. See Atkinson (2007) and Tassey (2007) for an overview of the past effec-
tiveness and current state of the R&E tax credit. 
4. In subsequent research, Birch (1987) finds that small businesses with fewer than 
20 employees accounted for 88 percent of all net new jobs over the 1981–1985 
time period. Also, according to Birch (1981, p. 7), “Smaller businesses more than 
offset their higher failure rates with their capacity to start up and expand rapidly.” 
5. Some disagree with Birch’s analyses and the findings of others who reached simi-
lar conclusions from analyses of firm and aggregated data. See, in particular, 
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). 
6. According to Klein (1979), the slowdown in productivity growth in the 1970s can 
be viewed in terms of a decline in businessmen’s ability, or perhaps their desire, to 
deal with disequilibria. 
7. Innovation and entrepreneurship are closely related concepts, as noted in Chap-
ter 1. For Schumpeter (1934), the entrepreneur is the persona causa of economic 
development. The process of “creative destruction” is the essence of economic 
development and growth, writes Schumpeter (1950); it is a process defined by car-
rying out new combinations in production. An underlying hypothesis in the exami-
nation of employment growth in this book is that the Schumpeterian process of 
creative destruction is instigated in substantial part by small, entrepreneurial firms. 
The impact of the SBIR program on the process is explored. 
8. Relatedly, the NSF and the SBA released the Gellman Report in 1976. It showed 
that small firms over the 1953–1973 period were more innovative per employee 
than were larger firms. This finding complements the more systematic research of 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) referenced in Chapter 1. 
9. “It is the exchange of complementary knowledge across diverse firms and economic 
agents that yields an important return on new economic knowledge” (Thurik 2009, 
p. 10). 
10. See Link and Tassey (1987) for documentation of this shift. 
11. This section draws on Audretsch, Link, and Scott (2002); Link and Scott (2000); 
and Wessner (2000, 2004, 2008). For a taxonomy of public/private partnerships, 
















Small Business Innovation Research Program 31 
12. The 1982 act amended the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 85-536), which estab-
lished the Small Business Administration. 
13. SBIR is a set-aside program; it redirects existing R&D funds for competitive 
awards to small businesses rather than appropriating new monies for R&D. The 
1982 act allowed for this percentage to increase over time. 
14. The $50,000 amount and the $500,000 amount below are not stated in the 1982 act. 
They originally came from a policy directive to the Small Business Act of 1953, to 
which the 1982 act was an amendment. Both amounts are referenced explicitly in 
Senate Report 110-447 (U.S. Senate 2008). 
15. “The objective of Phase I is to establish the technical merit and feasibility and po-
tential for commercialization of the proposed R/R&D efforts and to determine the 
quality of performance of the small business awardee organization prior to provid-
ing further Federal support in Phase II.” See http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/ 
sbirsttr_programs.htm, p. 1. 
16. “The objective of Phase II is to continue the R/R&D efforts initiated in Phase I. 
Funding is based on the results achieved in Phase I and the scientific and technical 
merit and commercial potential of the project proposed in Phase II.” See http:// 
grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr_programs.htm, p. 1. 
17. “The objective of Phase III, where appropriate, is for the small business concern to 
pursue with non-SBIR funds the commercialization objectives resulting from the 
outcomes of the research or R&D funded in Phases I and II.” See http://grants.nih
.gov/grants/funding/SBIRContract/PHS2008-1.pdf, p. 1. 
18. The percentage increased to 1.5 in 1993 and 1994, 2.0 in 1995, and 2.5 in 1997. 
19. The reauthorization also stated that there should be an “adjustment of such amounts 
once every 5 years to reflect economic adjustments and economic considerations.” 
20. It is not uncommon for Phase II awards to exceed the $750,000 threshold. 
21. On October 7, 2009, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees recom-
mended that the DoD SBIR program be reauthorized for a year, until September 
30, 2010. This recommendation became part of the DoD 2010 authorization. 
22. See Schacht (2011) for a detailed overview of the reauthorization efforts. 
23. This figure follows from Link and Scott (2001, 2010). Obviously, because we have 
shown a shift in a probability distribution, we have not thereby characterized a 
reduction in the most general notion of uncertainty following the distinction as-
sociated with Knight (1921). Alternatively, for those thinking of the more general 
notion of uncertainty in terms of subjective probability distributions for which dif-
ferent individuals might well have very different subjective prior beliefs, the figure 
could be said to illustrate a reduction in a more general notion of uncertainty than 
what is expressed by the frequency view of the distributions and risk. 
24. We use a definition of risk that is focused on the operational concern with the 
downside outcomes for an investment. The shortfalls of the private expected out-
comes from society’s expected returns reflect appropriability problems. There are 
several related technological and market factors that will cause private firms to 
appropriate less return and to face greater risk than society faces. These factors un-
derlie what Arrow (1962b) identifies as the nonexclusivity and public-good charac-
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appropriation of social returns in the context of technical and market risk can make 
risk in its operational sense unacceptably large for the private firm considering an 
investment. Operationally and with reference to Figures 2.1 and 2.2, Tassey (1992, 
1997, 2003, 2005), for example, defines risk as the probability that a project’s rate 
of return falls below a required, private rate of return or private hurdle rate (as 
opposed to simply deviating from an expected return). As illustrated in Link and 
Scott (2001), for many socially desirable investments, the private firm faces an 
unacceptably large probability of a rate of return that falls short of its private hurdle 
rate. Yet from society’s perspective, the probability of a rate of return that is less 
than the social hurdle rate is sufficiently small that the project is still worthwhile. 
25. Note that the expected rate of return does not necessarily correspond to the greatest 
frequency or probability density because the distribution of rates of return need not 
be symmetrical. 
26. To capture the idea of limited liability for investors, we bound their return below by 
zero. Thus, the rate of return can be quite negative when the return falls below the 
amount invested, but because the return is bounded below at zero, the rate of return 
is bounded below by –100 percent. The expected private rate of return with SBIR 
support is: r = [return − (total project cost − SBIR funding)] / [total project cost 
− SBIR funding]. Let Z = (total project cost − SBIR funding). Then, r = (return − 
Z)/Z = [(return/Z) − 1]. The variance of r is: [(1/Z)2 Var(return)], and it is a general 
proposition that as SBIR funding increases (and hence Z decreases) the variance 
in the private rate of return increases (since (1/Z) gets larger). It is also a general 
proposition that the expected private rate of return, which equals E[(return/Z) − 1], 
must increase for the same reason. Furthermore, neither the expected social rate of 
return nor the variance in the social rate of return change at all. The social cost is 
the same, and the social return is the same. 
27. SBIR funding need not affect the firm’s private hurdle rate; that rate is set by cor-
porate policy in most cases. Conceivably, because the operational measure of risk 
falls, the hurdle rate might fall as well in the presence of SBIR funding, and the 
stimulative effect of SBIR funding would hold a fortiori. 
28. Also, in general it is possible that, apart from the funding itself, the support and 
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Database 
BACkGRouND oN ThE DATABASE 
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 mandated that, 
among other things, the NRC conduct “an evaluation of the economic 
benefits achieved by the SBIR program” and make recommendations 
to Congress for improvements to the program. In its evaluation of the 
SBIR program, the NRC steering committee charged with the study 
took several approaches, including multiple surveys, interviews, and 
more than 100 case studies.1 The results of the NRC’s survey approach 
are described in this chapter. 
The NRC conducted an extensive and balanced survey in 2005 
based on a population of 11,214 projects completed from Phase II 
awards made between 1992 and 2001 by five agencies: 1) the DoD,
2) NIH (within the HHS), 3) NASA, 4) DOE, and 5) NSF. It was as-
sumed as part of the NRC’s sampling methodology that Phase II awards 
made in 2001 would be completed by 2005. 
The five agencies surveyed accounted for nearly 97 percent of the 
program’s expenditures in 2005, as was shown in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the population of 11,214 projects by 
funding agency, as well as the percentage of the 11,214 projects funded 
by each agency. The total number of projects surveyed from the 11,214 
projects was 6,408. 
The number and percentage of respondents from these 6,408 sur-
veyed projects is shown in Table 3.2.2 The total number of responding 
projects was 1,916, and the average response rate across all five agen-
cies was 30 percent. 
Also shown in Table 3.2 is the total number of projects in the final 
random sample of completed Phase II projects, by agency. For ease of 
reference, definitions of the variables from the survey and descriptive 
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Table 3.1  Population of SBIR Phase II Projects, 1992–2001 
Completed Phase II 
Agency projects Percentage 
DoD 5,650 50.38 
NIH 2,497 22.27 
NASA 1,488 13.27 
DOE 808 7.21 
NSF 771 6.88 
All agencies 11,214 100.00 
NOTE: “Percentage” column does not sum to 100.00 because of rounding. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
The NRC surveyed a number of nonrandomly selected projects 
because they were projects that had realized significant commercializa-
tion and the NRC wanted to be able to describe such interesting success 
stories. These nonrandomly selected projects are not considered herein. 
The data reduction process that was applied to each agency to arrive at 
the final random sample is in Table B.1 in the Technical Appendix, also 
found at the end of the book. 
VARIABLES IN ThE DATABASE 
Three employment variables in the NRC database are the focal vari-
ables in the chapters that follow.4 The variables, using 2005 data, include 
1) number of employees, 
2) number of employees hired as a result of the SBIR award, and 
3) number of employees who, as a result of the award, were re-
tained after the SBIR project was completed.5 
Detailed information about types of employees is not available 
from the NRC survey, and this is not surprising. In small research firms, 
employees are technical workers, and they each wear many hats. As 
has been documented in previous case studies of Department of De-
fense SBIR projects (e.g., Wessner 2000), a given employee could be 
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Table 3.2  Descriptive Statistics on the National Research Council Survey 
of Phase II Awards 
Phase II Response Random 
Agency sample size Respondents rate (%) sample 
DoD 3,055 920 30 891 
NIH 1,678 496 30 495 
NASA 779 181 23 177 
DOE 439 157 36 154 
NSF 457 162 35 161 
All agencies 6,408 1,916 30 1,878 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
The size of the SBIR awardee firms, as measured by the number 
of employees in the firm in the year of the survey, 2005, varies across 
firms and across agencies from a mean low of 41 employees among the 
141 NSF firms in the random sample to a high of 63 employees among 
the 155 NASA firms. See the descriptive statistics in the Glossary of 
Variables. However, the range of firm sizes in 2005 is from 1 employee 
to 4,001.6 
ISSuES oF SAmPLE SELECTIoN BIAS 
The NRC database does not contain information on projects that 
were not funded by SBIR, and it does not contain information on proj-
ects for which a firm applied for SBIR support but was declined, or on 
comparable projects in firms that did not seek SBIR support. This lack 
of so-called matched pairs has been viewed by some (e.g., Wallsten 
2000) as a long-standing shortcoming of SBIR data collected either by 
the NRC as part of its 2000 congressional mandate or at any other time, 
or by any of the agencies that participate in the SBIR program. How-
ever—and the NRC is aware of this—any effort to construct matched 
pairs would be flawed, and thus the NRC has not undertaken this task. 
Firms that receive SBIR awards are small and unique in their 
research and organizational structure. Although Lerner (1999) has 
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ing that the SBIR recipients have higher employment growth, Lerner 
and Kegler (2000, p. 321) explain that it is difficult with the matched 
pairs analysis “to disentangle whether the superior performance of the 
awardees is due to the selection of better firms or the positive impact of 
the awards.” 
Anticipating our analysis of possible employment growth in Chapter 
5, our structural model provides a solution to the customary complaint 
about working with SBIR project data, namely the need for a control 
group. Our model provides a counterfactual control by its prediction of 
employment, based on preaward information only, to be compared to 
actual employment. 
CRoSS-AGENCy ANALySES 
In the chapters that follow, we examine, by agency, a number of em-
ployment issues using the NRC database. According to Wessner (2008, 
p. 109), “Comparisons between SBIR programs at different agencies . . . 
must be regarded with considerable caution . . . Widely differing agency 
missions have shaped the agency SBIR programs, focusing them on dif-
ferent objectives and on different mechanisms and approaches.” 
Throughout the remaining chapters, we compare our empirical 
findings across agencies, but we do not do so within the context of as-
sessing or evaluating the relative performance of one agency’s SBIR 
program against another’s. 
The primary goal of the DoD’s SBIR program is the provision of 
technologies that are used as part of our nation’s defense system, which 
is the mission of the DoD. In contrast, the NIH’s primary mission for 
its SBIR program is the development of fundamental knowledge and 
its application for improving health. Pioneering the future of space ex-
ploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautical research is the mission 
of NASA and its SBIR program. The SBIR program within the DOE 
supports technical knowledge related to the agency’s program areas. 
Finally, the National Science Foundation’s SBIR program promotes 
science and the commercialization of science.7 Table 3.3 provides a de-
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We do, however, discuss cross-agency differences in the econo-
metric results in the following chapters. By doing so, we are only 
emphasizing behavioral and descriptive differences in agency projects; 
we are certainly not advocating that our findings are a motivation for re-
structuring one agency’s program based on results for another agency’s 
program. Wessner’s statement above about the caution needed when 
making comparisons, however, points out that a priori we do not ex-
pect to be able to make many generalizations—holding across all of the 
agencies’ SBIR programs—about the factors determining the employ-
ment impact of SBIR awards. 
CoNDuCTING RESEARCh IN ThE ABSENCE oF
SBIR FuNDING 
In Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 we offered a theoretical rationale for the 
SBIR program. Namely, we concluded from that model of downside 
risk that in general the public sector should not fund a private-sector 
project with a private rate of return above the private hurdle rate even 
if the social rate of return is above the social hurdle rate.8 The data in 
the NRC database allow us to provide some descriptive information in 
support of this argument. 
As part of the NRC survey, each firm was asked, for each of its 
surveyed projects, “In the absence of this SBIR award, would your firm 
have undertaken this project?” Responses to this counterfactual ques-
tion are summarized in Table 3.4, by agency. In every instance, over 50 
percent of those surveyed responded “probably not” or “definitely not.” 
And in every instance, less than 20 percent of those surveyed responded 
“probably yes” or “definitely yes.” Also, such information is retrospec-
tive; it is not inconsistent with the policy prescriptions suggested by 
Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, where the rates of return are the prospective 
expected rates of return. We view the responses in Table 3.4 as sugges-
tive evidence in support of our behavioral model. 
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Table 3.3  Examples of SBIR Phase II Awards 
Funding agency Project description 
DoD In 2010, the DoD awarded $499,982 to SA Photonics, 
a California-based company, for a project titled “Ana-
log to Information (A2I) Sensing for Software-Defined 
Receivers.” 
Compressive sensing is based on the notion that the in-
formation content of a signal may be much less than its 
instantaneous bandwidth, and that this signal “sparseness” 
can be exploited directly during the sensing operation. 
When applied to the sampling of pulsed radar signals, 
compressive sensing can allow radar signals to be sampled 
below the Nyquist rate, allowing for a very small yet flexi-
ble software-defined Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). This 
compressive-based RWR can detect and parameterize un-
known received radar signals over a frequency range from 
0.1 to 20.0 GHz and can provide parameter estimation of 
the received power, carrier frequency, PRF, and pulse. With 
this information, available bandwidth can be determined. 
In this Phase II we will develop a prototype compressive-
based RWR in order to validate its performance against 
simulated radar signals. 
NIH In 2009, the NIH awarded $518,708 to Edvotek Inc., a 
Maryland-based company, for a project titled “Science 
Education of Alcohol Metabolism.” 
Human consumption of alcohol is ubiquitous. While it is 
reported that 90 percent of the population consumes various 
amounts of alcohol, only a small but sizable minority of the 
population abuses alcohol consumption. It is estimated that 
10–20 percent of males and 3–10 percent of females develop 
persistent alcohol-related problems. Alcohol use by youth 
continues to be an important health focus for our nation. 
Alcohol misuse among adolescents is on the increase, and 
excessive drinking is associated with psychological, social, 
and physical harm to the individual, family, and society. 
During the Phase II award period, the company researched 
and tested new experiments and reagents in workshop and 
classroom settings prior to the marketing experiments for 
grades 7 to 12 on understanding how alcohol is metabolized. 
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Table 3.3  (continued) 
Funding agency Project description 
NASA In 2009, NASA awarded $599,996 in a Phase II project 
to Spectra Research Inc., an Ohio-based company, for a 
project titled “Dual Polarization Multi-Frequency Antenna 
Array.” 
NASA employs various passive microwave and millimeter-
wave instruments, such as spectral radiometers, for a wide 
variety of remote sensing applications, from measurements 
of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere to cosmic back-
ground emissions. These instruments, such as the HIRAD 
(Hurricane Intensity Radiometer), SFMR (Stepped Fre-
quency Microwave Radiometer), and LRR (Lightweight 
Rainfall Radiometer), provide unique data accumulation 
capabilities for observing sea-surface wind, temperature, 
and rainfall and significantly enhance the understanding 
and predictability of hurricane intensity. These microwave 
instruments require extremely efficient wideband or mul-
tiband antennas. For the Phase I SBIR program, Spectra 
Research Inc. teamed with scientists from the Georgia 
Tech Research Institute (GTRI) to apply new technologi-
cal antenna advances and new antenna design tools toward 
solving the challenge of designing small, multifunction 
antennas that reduce the space, weight, and drag demand 
on the platform. 
DOE In 2003, the DOE awarded $749,845 to APS Technology 
Inc., a Connecticut-based company, for a project titled “Ro-
tary Steerable Motor System for Deep Gas Drilling.” 
This project will develop a new drilling tool that allows 
greater power to be delivered to the drill bit while allowing 
the drill bit to be continuously oriented in the desired di-
rection, thereby eliminating “crooked” holes, which cause 
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Table 3.3  (continued) 
Funding agency Project description 
NSF In 2010, the NSF awarded $471,495 to App2You Inc., a 
California-based company, for a project titled “Do-It-
Yourself Database-Driven Web Applications from High-
Level Specifications.” 
This project will enable nonprogrammers to rapidly create 
and evolve fully custom-hosted, forms-driven workflow 
applications where users with different roles and rights 
interact. Such a platform will have a broad impact on 
organizations of all sizes by empowering nonprogram-
mer business-process owners to quickly and easily deploy 
applications that capture the business processes of their 
organizations. The platform has the maximum impact on 
enabling externally facing customer relationship manage-
ment (CRM) for small and medium businesses (SMBs), 
which use the applications to facilitate and streamline 
interactions with customers and partners, achieve lower 
process-management and customer/partner servicing costs, 
increase customer/partner satisfaction, and grow revenues. 
SOURCE: Web sites of the funding agencies. 
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Table 3.4  Responses to the Counterfactual Question, “In your opinion, 
in the absence of this SBIR award, would your firm have 
undertaken this project?” 
Percentage Number 
Answers from 593 DoD projects: 
Definitely yes 3.04 18 
Probably yes 9.61 57 
Uncertain 17.71 105 
Probably not 32.72 194 
Definitely not 36.93 219 
Total 100.00 593 
Answers from 338 NIH projects: 
Definitely yes 5.03 17 
Probably yes 7.69 26 
Uncertain 13.61 46 
Probably not 27.81 94 
Definitely not 45.86 155 
Total 100.00 338 
Answers from 111 NASA projects: 
Definitely yes 2.70 3 
Probably yes 15.32 17 
Uncertain 14.41 16 
Probably not 35.14 39 
Definitely not 32.43 36 
Total 100.00 111 
Answers from 114 DOE projects: 
Definitely yes 0.00 0 
Probably yes 3.51 4 
Uncertain 13.16 15 
Probably not 44.74 51 
Definitely not 38.60 44 
Total 100.00 114 
Answers from 121 NSF projects: 
Definitely yes 3.31 4 
Probably yes 12.40 15 
Uncertain 18.18 22 
Probably not 42.15 51 
Definitely not 23.97 29 
Total 100.00 121 
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100.00 because of rounding. 
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PRojECT-SPECIFIC EmPLoymENT GRowTh FRom
SBIR AwARDS 
As described above, the NRC database contains information on 
three employment variables. In Chapter 4, we focus narrowly on the 
third of these three variables, namely the number of employees in 2005 
who, as a result of the award, were retained after the SBIR project 
was completed. We find that the project-specific employment effects 
are small. SBIR-funded projects in the NRC sample typically retain 
very few employees.9 This result thus motivates subsequent chapters, 
wherein we investigate not project-specific effects but rather firm-wide 
effects and aggregate effects. 
Notes 
1. See Wessner (2008) for an overview of the findings from the case studies. 
2. We thank Charles Wessner of the NRC for making these data available to us for 
this project. 
3. As an aside, these descriptive statistics offer some interesting insights into the 
character of SBIR recipients and into the focus of their projects. While we do not 
discuss these points with reference to our analysis of employment growth, other 
than to hold them constant within our regression models, these points do provide 
some background about SBIR firms. First, more than half of all SBIR recipients 
are located in either the Northeast or the West, regardless of which was the funding 
agency. Second, when asked, “How did you (or do you expect to) commercialize 
your SBIR award?” about 40 percent of all firms that were funded by the DoD, 
NASA, DOE, or NSF responded “as hardware (final product, component, or inter-
mediate hardware product).” Only firms funded by the NIH were more diversified: 
nearly 75 percent responded that their output was or is expected to be equally 
divided among hardware, software (i.e., for diagnostic purposes), or as a research 
tool. These details come from descriptive statistics that we developed and then 
presented in Table A.2. 
4. The NRC did not systematically address employment issues as part of its mandated 
study. Rather, much of its focus was on case studies. 
5. The exact wording of two relevant NRC survey questions is as follows: 1) “Num-
ber of current employees who were hired as a result of the technology developed 
during the Phase II project,” and 2) “Number of current employees who were re-
tained as a result of the technology developed during the Phase II project.” As the 
mean values in Table A.2 suggest, the number of employees who were retained is 
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it could have been the case that x employees were hired but that y employees 
(y > x) were retained who would have been let go had it not been that the Phase II 
project was successful. 
6. Obviously, a firm with 4,001 employees is not a small firm by definition from the 
SBIR guidelines—500 or fewer employees. However, this is the number of em-
ployees in this particular firm in 2005, which is obviously far greater than the num-
ber of employees in that firm in the year that it received its SBIR award. Hence, 
dramatic employment growth occurred in this particular case. 
7. These missions and goals are elaborated on in Wessner (2008). 
8. Of course, these rates of return are expected rates of return. 
9. To belabor our elephantidae metaphor from Chapter 1, Heffalumps are rarely 







     
4 
Project-Specific Employment
Effects from SBIR Awards 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS oN RETAINED EmPLoyEES 
We noted in the previous chapter that the NRC database contains 
information on three employment variables, by agency: 
1) the 2005 number of employees in the firm, which we refer to in 
Chapters 5 and 6 as the actual number of employees in 2005; 
2) the 2005 number of employees who were hired as a result of the 
technology developed during the funded Phase II SBIR project; and 
3) the 2005 number of employees who were retained as a result of 
the technology developed during that same project. 
Descriptive statistics on these variables, and all others, are in the 
Glossary of Variables. 
Here we focus narrowly and exclusively on the third project-specific 
employment variable, employees retained by the firm as a result of the 
technology developed during the SBIR-funded project. In our opinion, 
focusing on retained employees is more relevant for a policy interpreta-
tion of our findings than focusing on hired employees, because retained 
employees reflect more permanent project-specific employment ben-
efits from SBIR funding.1 
As shown in Table 4.1, on average over two-fifths of all completed 
projects retained no employees after completion and over one-third 
retained only one or two employees. Thus, on average, the direct 
project-specific impact of SBIR-funded projects on employment is 
small, especially when compared to the mean number of employees in 
the firm in 2005, a number that ranged from 41 employees on average in 
NIH-funded firms to 63 employees on average in NASA-funded firms 
(see the descriptive statistics in the Glossary of Variables and Descrip-
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Table 4.1  Percentage of Projects with Firms Retaining the Stated 
Numbers of Employees after Completion of Phase II Projects 
0 1–2 3–4 5–10 > 10 
Agency n employees employees employees employees employees 
DoD 755 44.0 36.3 10.5 6.8 2.5 
NIH 391 41.2 37.9 12.3 6.4 2.3 
NASA 155 52.3 34.2 7.1 3.9 2.6 
DOE 140 45.0 37.9 11.4 5.0 0.7 
NSF 141 41.1 34.0 12.8 7.8 4.3 
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation from National Research Council database. 
INTERPRETATIoN oF ThE FINDINGS 
Our interpretation of the patterns in Table 4.1 is, so to speak, the 
bottom line for the project-specific employment effects attributable to 
the SBIR award. SBIR-funded projects in this NRC sample typically 
retain very few employees—in absolute terms or as a percentage of the 
firm’s total employment—to continue to pursue the technology devel-
oped in the funded project. 
In the absence of a counterfactual model or a non-SBIR-funded 
sample of projects, we are unable to say from the data in Table 4.1 
that SBIR-funded projects retain more employees than comparable 
non-SBIR-funded projects. However, when one takes a longer view 
and examines the employment effects on the firm as a whole (not just 
the employment effects on the funded project) within a counterfactual 
model, as we do for the next step, in Chapter 5, the empirical evidence 
still suggests that the employment impact of SBIR over time on the 
overall firm is, on average, small. Our model cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no long-run employment effects on average across the 
randomly sampled SBIR projects. However, for four of the five agen-
cies studied, the average effects on employment are positive and not 
insubstantial in their size. Also, there are a number of individual cases 
of statistically significant employment growth for firms winning SBIR 
awards as compared to the counterfactual prediction for employment in 
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STATIC moDEL oF RETAINED EmPLoyEES 
We explore here cross-project differences in the number of retained 
employees (retainees).3 Because the number of retained employees as-
sociated with the project as of 2005 is a count variable, we estimate a 
negative binomial model with the expected incident rate, ratej , for the 
number of retained employees in project j as being 
β0 + β1x1j+...+βkxkj(4.1) ratej = e 
for k explanatory variables. The number of years the project has existed— 
the project’s age—is the exposure, Ej . Exposure is greater because with 
each year that passes since the Phase II project was funded there is the 
renewed chance the project will be seen as supporting a commercially 
viable expansion of the firm and additional permanent employees. Thus, 
the expected number of retained employees is 
β0 + β1x1j+...+βkxkj 1n(Ej) + β0 + β1x1j+...+βkxkj(4.2) retaineesj = Eje = e , 
where retainees is the 2005 number of employees who were retained 
as a result of the technology developed during the Phase II project, and 
where exposure is included in the model as a natural logarithm with its 
coefficient constrained to be 1. The x’s are firm and project characteris-
tics related to the hypotheses below. 
Our empirical analysis is descriptive; we are asking how the number 
of employees retained as a result of the technology developed during 
the Phase II project varies with the particular circumstances of the firm 
and the project.4 Thus, our intent is to estimate cross-project differences 
in the number of employees who were retained as a result of Phase II– 
developed technology as a function of various explanatory variables. 
The explanatory variables considered in this econometric strategy are 
divided into eight groups, as categorized in the Glossary of Variables 
and Descriptive Statistics, Table A.1.5 
Equation (4.2) was estimated as a negative binomial model, and the 
results are reported in Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Technical Appendix. 
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tially reduces the sample sizes, Table B.2 estimates the model for the 
larger samples available for each agency without those variables (here-
after referred to as the larger samples); Table B.3 then reestimates the 
model for the smaller samples for which the commercial agreement 
variables are available (hereafter referred to as the smaller samples). 
Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters by firm because 
for some firms multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled.6 The clus-
tering allows for intragroup correlation in the errors for the multiple 
projects of a firm. Our interpretations of the regression results rely on 
calculated marginal effects.7 Although exploratory, there are several in-
teresting results in the estimated model. 
To discuss the results, we begin with the SBIR research variables. 
Regarding whether a university was involved in the Phase II research 
(univpartcptn), the variable is a 0/1 qualitative variable, and the pro-
portion of projects having university participation ranges widely over 
the samples, from a low of 0.26 for the DoD to a high of 0.53 for the 
NIH. Using the estimation of the larger samples, we see that univer-
sity involvement has a significant effect on retained employees in only 
two cases. For the DoD, the significant effect is positive, while for the 
NIH, it is negative. Adding university participation to a DoD project is 
expected to increase the number of retained employees to 1.32 (e0.275), 
or by 132 percent of the level in the absence of university involvement 
with the project. For the NIH, adding university participation decreases 
the expected number of retained employees to 0.646 (e−0.437), or 64.6 per-
cent of the level without university involvement. Perhaps this negative 
result for NIH projects with university participation reflects that those 
projects focus on contributions for which commercializable results can 
make use of the firms’ existing production, marketing, and technology 
licensing staffs.8 For the smaller samples in Table B.3, the same pattern 
exists. For the DoD sample the effect of university participation is posi-
tive and significant; for the NIH sample it is negative and significant. 
The percentage of the firm’s total R&D effort devoted to SBIR 
activities (sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d) has a significant effect on retained 
employees in three of the five agency samples. These effects are all 
positive, thus supporting the belief that commercialization potential— 
which requires a larger number of permanent employees—is greater 
for firms with more of their R&D devoted to SBIR projects. Increasing 
SBIR R&D support by a single percentage point is associated with an 
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increase in the number of retained employees to 1.004 (e0.00384), or by 
100.4 percent of the previous level for the DoD, to 1.011, or 101.1 per-
cent of the previous level for the NIH, and to 1.006, or 100.6 percent of 
the previous level for the NSF. 
Typically, an SBIR award is about 40 percent of a firm’s total R&D 
(see the descriptive statistics in the Glossary of Variables and Descrip-
tive Statistics, Table A.1). Thus, the estimated effect is not insubstantial, 
because a single percentage-point increase from a base of about 40 
percent is a small increase with a large effect. For example, a 10-
percentage-point increase would be associated with an increase in 
retained employees to 1.039 (e0.00384×10), or 103.9 percent of the level 
without the increase. For the smaller samples, this pattern does not uni-
formly hold. In the DoD, NASA, DOE, and NSF samples the estimated 
impact is not significant. Only in the NIH sample is there a significant 
relationship, and that relationship is positive and of approximately the 
same magnitude as in the larger NIH sample. 
Regarding the effect of the number of patents that resulted from the 
firm’s SBIR-funded research (sbirpatents) on retained employees, the 
expected directional impact is ambiguous. Firms holding a large num-
ber of patents may already have personnel capable of developing such 
intellectual property, and thus may not have needed to retain additional 
employees to conduct the research on the current SBIR project. Follow-
ing that argument, the estimated effect of patents on retained employees 
would be negative. For the larger samples, this finding is the case in the 
DoD, NIH, DOE, and NSF samples. 
For the larger samples for the DoD, NIH, DOE, and NSF, the mag-
nitude of the absolute value of the estimated coefficients on the number 
of SBIR patents is similar across agencies. While the estimated impact 
of this variable is statistically significant, it may not necessarily be eco-
nomically significant. Across agencies, the mean value of the number 
of previous SBIR patents is 7.30. Thus, a one-unit increase represents 
on average a 14 percent increase in patents referenced to the mean. An 
increase of one SBIR patent reduces the expected number of retained 
employees to 99.4 percent (e−0.0060) of the expected number of retained 
employees for the larger DoD sample. For the other three agencies, the 
percentages of expected number of retained employees are also close 
to 100 percent of what is expected without increasing the number of 
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retained employees expected, relative to the expected number without 
the change, is 98.5 percent for the NIH (e−0.015), 98.0 percent for the 
DOE (e−0.020), and 99.1 percent for the NSF (e−0.0088). For the smaller 
samples, the estimated impacts are also typically statistically significant 
but again not very economically significant. 
Contrary to the foregoing argument and evidence for a negative ef-
fect, the effect is positive in the NASA sample, and the effect is roughly 
the same absolute magnitude. Possibly, previous experience in patent-
ing results from SBIR awards increases the marginal value of additional 
employees, resulting in the positive coefficient for that agency. Using 
the model estimated for the larger NASA sample, we calculate the mar-
ginal effect of an increase of one patent held by the firm from previous 
SBIR awards. Holding constant all the explanatory variables except 
for the number of previous SBIR patents, the expected number of re-
tained employees given a one-unit increase in SBIR patents, relative 
to the expected number of retained employees without that change, is 
1.00845 (e0.00841)—an increase in expected retained employees of about 
0.8 percent. 
For the smaller samples, the same pattern is present, and the magni-
tude of the estimated coefficients is comparable. In any case, the effects 
here are not large. 
The remaining SBIR research variable is the number of firm’s pre-
vious Phase II awards that are related to the current Phase II project 
(rldphII). On the one hand, the need to retain additional employees from 
the current SBIR project might lessen as the number of complementary 
research projects the firm has undertaken grows greater, because the 
necessary employees might already be available within the firm. Thus, 
the estimated coefficient on this variable could be negative. On the other 
hand, through previously funded related research the firm might have 
built internal expertise in the form of human and technical capital that 
could, with a marginal employee, ensure successful commercialization 
from the current SBIR project. Thus, the estimated coefficient on this 
variable could be positive because the marginal value of an additional 
employee will be greater for the firm. In the larger samples, its esti-
mated impact on retained employees is positive and significant in the 
DoD, DOE, and NSF samples, and negative and significant in the NIH 
sample. A one-unit change in the number of previous awards reduces 
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what it would otherwise be for the NIH sample, and increases the ex-
pected number of retained employees to 1.17, or 117 percent of what it 
would otherwise be for the DoD sample, to 1.21, or 121 percent for the 
DOE sample, and to 1.32, or 132 percent for the NSF sample. At least 
based on the descriptive history of the employment experience for NSF 
awards, for example, it appears that a straightforward way to improve 
the employment trajectory for the NSF awards would be to focus them 
on firms with related Phase II experience. For the smaller samples, this 
same sign and significance pattern is present. 
For the market variables, the result for the relationship between the 
presence of existing federal procurement (i.e., a federal system or ac-
quisition program using the technology from the Phase II project so that 
fedacq equals 1.0—as is more often the case with DoD-funded projects 
than with those funded by other agencies) supports Nelson’s observa-
tions. As Nelson (1982) observed in his case studies, such circumstances 
have historically been especially likely to foster commercializable re-
sults from privately performed, government-financed R&D. 
Commercialization is especially likely because the government 
provides a market for commercialized results from the R&D, and also 
because the government has an active interest that can guide develop-
ments toward well-defined needs. Using the larger samples estimation, 
three of the five agencies show a significant effect for the existence 
of a federal acquisitions market, and all three are positive effects. The 
coefficients for the DoD, DOE, and NSF are 0.433, 0.594, and 0.837, 
respectively. For these agencies, when the federal government procure-
ment is present, the numbers of retained employees are respectively 
154 percent, 181 percent, and 231 percent of their levels without federal 
acquisitions programs using the Phase II technology. For the smaller 
samples, the same pattern exists, with the exception that the coefficient 
for NSF is nearly twice as large. 
In the larger samples, none of the five agencies shows a significant 
effect for firms with a policy of a late evaluation of the commercial 
potential of the project (lateeval), although two of the effects are mar-
ginally significant and with different signs. On the one hand, a late 
evaluation of a project’s commercial prospects allows better assessment 
of the commercial potential. On the other, the firm may be less likely to 
find such potential in the Phase II project’s results. For the smaller sam-
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There are many significant differences in the number of retained 
employees for projects of different commercial types, and there are 
some significant differences across geographic regions. For example, 
in the larger NSF sample, projects in the Northeast are expected, other 
things being the same, to have 116 percent (100 × [e0.769 − 1]) more re-
tained employees than those in the West. The result in the smaller NSF 
sample is similar. 
For both the larger and smaller samples, in every agency’s sample 
at least one of the intellectual property variables—number of patents 
(patents), number of copyrights (copyrights), number of trademarks 
(trademarks), and number of publications (publications) from the 
technology developed from the Phase II project—is positive and signif-
icantly related to employee retention. Moreover, in only one case—the 
smaller NSF sample and copyrights—is there a significantly negative 
relationship between an intellectual property variable and retention. 
Patents, trademarks, and copyrights are private goods, and publications 
are a public good. More often than not, statistically significant effects on 
employees retained are observed when the project results in intellectual 
property, which with the exception of publications would be considered 
to be a private good rather than a public good. The intellectual property, 
when it has the attributes of a private good, is commercially valuable. 
The public good, publications, has a significant positive effect on reten-
tions for just one of the five agencies’ samples of projects. For NSF 
projects, at least, the presence of publications is a signal of commer-
cially valuable intellectual property.
In the larger samples, the significant intellectual property effects 
are as follows. For the DoD, the mean number of patents is 0.91. Other 
things being the same, an increase of one patent is associated with an 
increase in expected retained employees to 1.03 (e0.0307), or by 103 per-
cent of the level otherwise. For the NSF, the effect is much larger; the 
mean number of patents is 1.04, and an additional patent increases the 
expected number of retained employees to 1.26 (e0.230), or by 126 per-
cent of the level without the extra patent. For the NIH, the mean number 
of trademarks is 0.40, ranging from 0 to 7 in the sample. These trade-
marks appear to have great commercial value; other things remaining 
constant, an additional trademark increases the expected number of re-
tained employees to 1.46 (e0.376), or by 146 percent of the level without 
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is 0.045, and the range in the sample is from 0 to 5. Copyrights are 
also associated with more retained employees. Other things being held 
constant, an additional copyright increases the expected number of 
employees to 1.51 (e0.415), or by 151 percent of the level without the ad-
ditional copyright. The mean number for the DOE is 0.143, and again 
the range in the sample is from 0 to 5. For the DOE sample of projects, 
an additional copyright increases the number of retained employees to 
1.87 (e0.626), or by 187 percent of the previous level. For the NSF, the 
mean number of publications is 1.70, and an additional publication in-
creases the expected number of retained employees to 1.11 (e0.106), or 
by 111 percent of the level without the additional publication. For the 
smaller samples, the sizes of these significant intellectual property ef-
fects are similar. 
Turning to the funding variables, in the larger samples, non-SBIR 
federal funding is associated with a greater number of retained employ-
ees for all agencies; that positive effect is statistically significant for two 
and marginally so for one of the agencies. In the smaller NSF sample, 
the effect is negative, however, and significant. Both own-firm funding 
and personal funds also show positive effects on employee retention for 
all five agencies’ projects in both the larger and smaller samples. For 
both of those funding variables in the larger samples, three of the five 
samples show effects that are statistically significant or at least mar-
ginally significant, and that is the case for two of the smaller samples. 
The only two significant positive effects for other domestic private-firm 
funding are present in both samples and are for the NIH and DOE. 
In the larger samples, for U.S. private venture capital funding (U.S.-
private-venture-capital-to-total-investment), foreign private funding 
(foreign-private-investment-to-total-investment), other private equity 
funding (other-private-equity-investment-to-total-investment), and state 
or local government funding (state-or-local-government-funding-to-
total-investment), there are statistically significant effects with differ-
ent signs in different agencies. College or university funding shows 
one large negative effect that is very marginally statistically significant. 
These cases where the statistically significant effects for funding vari-
ables have opposite signs reinforce the commonly held belief that each 
agency’s SBIR program and projects have a distinct character. Hence, 
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differ across agencies. For the smaller samples, this same generaliza-
tion applies. 
Also, the results for the funding variables support another commonly 
held belief: that commercially successful projects are more likely when 
there is financial support from outside the SBIR program. Outside fi-
nancial support signals that others who know about the commercial 
prospects are willing to invest. Also, the additional support is necessary 
for the Phase III success of a project. In both the larger and smaller 
samples, support for the importance of such outside finance is particu-
larly strong in the DoD and NIH samples. For each of the five agencies, 
at least one of the variables for outside finance had a statistically signifi-
cant positive association with retained employees. 
To provide perspective on variables with the differing signs for 
significant effects and also to illustrate the magnitude of the effects, 
consider the ratio of additional development funding during the Phase 
II project from foreign private investment to total investment in the 
Phase II project (foreign-private-investment-to-total-investment). On 
the one hand, foreign investors could eventually retain any developed 
technology and commercialize and/or use it overseas. In that case, it 
could be that the greater the extent of foreign funding, the less likely 
the awarded firm would incur, or would be allowed by its investors to 
incur, the cost of hiring and retaining additional employees. Thus, the 
estimated coefficient on this variable could be negative. On the other 
hand, if the intent of foreign investors is to transfer overseas any tech-
nology developed from the current SBIR project, then they might hire 
and retain employees to ensure that the research project is in fact suc-
cessful and to codify the basis for the developed technology. Moreover, 
they may well foresee a U.S. production presence. Thus, the estimated 
coefficient could be positive. 
In the larger samples, the estimated coefficients on foreign invest-
ments are positive for the DoD, NIH, and DOE projects and negative 
for the NASA and NSF projects. The marginal impact of an increase of 
10 percent of total funding (say, from 0.05 to 0.15) in foreign invest-
ments on the expected number of retained employees as a proportion 
of the expected number of employees retained without the increase in 
foreign private investment is the base to the natural logarithms raised to 
the power of one-tenth of the estimated foreign investment coefficient. 
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employees from increasing the percentage of the foreign private fund-
ing by 10 percent is respectively 1.314 (a 31.4 percent increase), 1.342 
(a 34.2 percent increase), and 1.384 (a 38.4 percent increase) of what 
the expectation would be without the change in foreign private invest-
ment. For NASA and the NSF, the effect is respectively 0.636 (a 36.4 
percent decrease) and 0.797 (a 20.3 percent decrease) of what would 
occur without the change in funding. The effects for the smaller sam-
ples are broadly similar. 
For another example, consider two internal funding variables, the 
ratio of additional development funding during the Phase II project 
from the SBIR firm’s own investments (own-firm-funding-to-total-
investment) and the ratio of additional funding from the principal’s own 
investments (personal-funds-to-total-investment). We expect asymme-
try of information about the potential success of a Phase II research 
project. When own-firm or personal funds are invested, reflecting the 
“inside” information of the firm and its principal, the probability may 
be especially high for success of the research project and thus the hiring 
and retention of additional employees. Therefore, the estimated coef-
ficients on own-firm and personal funding should be positive. 
For the larger samples, in all of the agency analyses, the estimated 
coefficients on own-firm and personal funding are positive, and most 
are also significant. Whenever the estimated coefficient on either of 
these variables is significant, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
is greater than the estimated coefficient on any of the other funding 
variables. The significant effects are as follows. For an increase in 
own-firm funding by 10 percent of the total funding, for the DoD, NIH, 
DOE, and NSF, respectively, the effect for expected retained employ-
ees is 1.123 (a 12.3 percent increase), 1.383 (a 38.3 percent increase), 
1.168 (a 16.8 percent increase), and 1.156 (a 15.6 percent increase) of 
what the expectation would be without the change in own-firm funding. 
For an increase in personal funds by 10 percent of the total funding, for 
the DoD, NIH, NASA, and NSF, respectively, the effect for expected 
retained employees is 1.166 (a 16.6 percent increase), 1.192 (a 19.2 
percent increase), 2.80 (a 180 percent increase), and 1.376 (a 37.6 per-
cent increase) of what the expectation would be without the change in 
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Information was available on various commercial agreements only 
for the smaller samples, as discussed above. The results in Table B.3 
show that commercial agreements are often associated with statistically 
significant differences for retained employees. Commercial agreements 
have both positive and negative effects on the retention of project-
specific employees. One effect that is especially pronounced comes 
from the sale of technology rights. In all agencies except for the DoD, 
the relationship between the sale of technology rights and retained em-
ployees is negative, and it is significant in the NIH, NASA, and NSF 
samples. Simply, when technology rights are sold, the firm no longer 
retains employees for the project to which the rights belong. But, as we 
discuss in Chapter 7, the sale of technology rights is not that prevalent, 
and it is almost nonexistent to foreign firms or investors. All of the sta-
tistically significant findings for the small samples are summarized in 
Table B.4 in the Technical Appendix. 
CoNCLuSIoNS 
In summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 show that the 
impact of SBIR funding on employment that is specifically associated 
with the SBIR project is typically small. Although there are a few cases 
where a large number of employees were retained because of their SBIR 
Phase II awards, on average the numbers of retained project employees 
have been small. What impact there is varies systematically across agen-
cies based on distinct project and firm characteristics. 
While there are cross-agency sample differences in variables that 
are related to the level of project employees retained as a result of the 
technology developed during Phase II, several general patterns are 
clear. (These patterns are summarized in Table B.4 in the Technical Ap-
pendix.) For example, the following patterns hold true: 
• Federal acquisition is positively associated with the retention 
level, other things being the same. 














Project-Specific Employment Effects from SBIR Awards  57 
• Intellectual property is consistently positively associated with 
retained employees for the projects of all five agencies. 
• Funding above and beyond the funding provided by the SBIR 
program is consistently positively associated with retained em-
ployees for projects awarded by the DoD, NIH, and DOE; it is 
consistently negatively associated with retained employees for 
the NSF’s projects. 
• Many types of commercial agreements are associated with fewer 
retained employees for at least some of the agencies’ SBIR 
projects, supporting the hypothesis that the agreements allow 
the SBIR firm to transfer the production—and hence the em-
ployment supporting that production—to other firms, using the 
technology developed in the Phase II project. An exception is 
marketing/distribution agreements, which are associated with 
greater retention, other things being the same. 
Notes 
1. Unfortunately, the NRC data are not sufficient to track employees hired into a 
funded project and then retained after the project is completed. 
2. Importantly, the employment impact is also small when compared to the employ-
ment in the firm when it applied for the Phase II project award. On average, em-
ployees in the firm at that time ranged from 21 employees for the NIH sample to 
47 employees for the NASA sample. 
3. Throughout the book we make reference to the mnemonic variable name in paren-
theses to guide the reader through the statistical tables in the Technical Appendix. 
4. We are looking at the sample of projects for descriptive patterns in the data for the 
respondents and do not control for selection in the estimation of Equation (4.2). 
The number of employees retained is essentially a commercialization decision, and 
elsewhere (Link and Scott 2009, 2010) we have shown that the commercialization 
decision is uncorrelated with selection for all but one of the five agencies’ samples 
of projects. For that one agency’s sample of projects, the error in the model of 
response is correlated with the error in equation for the commercialization model. 
The effect of selection in the error of the commercialization equation is then of 
course important for prediction of commercialization conditional on response or in 
the population for that one agency. However, even in that one case, with or without 
control for selection, the estimates of the coefficients on the explanatory variables 
are essentially the same. It is those coefficients that are important here; therefore, 
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timation of the negative binomial model for retainees and the probit model for 
selection into the sample by response. 
5. There are eight groups of variables in these tables; retainees is the only firm char-
acteristic variable used in the analysis in this chapter. 
6. We depart in Tables B.2 and B.3 from the traditional notation for significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Our prior is that the profession is poorly oriented toward 
conveying important p-value information, especially in exploratory empirical work. 
7. To describe marginal effects we use the incident rate ratio because it places the 
effect in the perspective of the outcome without the effect. From Equation (4.2), 
holding constant all variables except xi , given a change in xi , the expected number 
of retained employees relative to the expected number without that change is the 
base for the natural logarithms raised to the power of the product of the coefficient 
for xi and the change in xi . For a unit change in xi , the expression is called the inci-
dent rate ratio and is simply the base for the natural logarithms raised to the power 
equal to the coefficient for variable xi . 
8. The probability of commercialization among the selected projects is actually 
somewhat higher for the NIH projects than for the DoD projects. See Link and 




Quantifying Long-Run Employment 
Growth from SBIR Funding 
We described in Chapter 4 the project-specific employment effects 
attributable to SBIR funding in terms of the number of employees re-
tained as a result of technology developed during the funded Phase II 
project. The mean number of retained employees ranges from one to 
two across funding agencies; however, on average, over two-fifths of all 
completed projects retain no employees and over one-third retain only 
one or two employees. To our knowledge, these measures are the first to 
document the SBIR project-specific employment effects. In fact, to our 
knowledge, these findings are the first to quantify the project-specific 
employment effects from any public R&D source. Thus, there are no 
other studies of the employment impact of public support of innovation 
in small firms to which to compare these project-level findings. Future 
research will certainly reinvestigate this topic at the project level. 
In this chapter we investigate descriptively and econometrically the 
broader, longer-run impacts of SBIR funding on the overall employment 
growth of SBIR grant-recipient firms (as opposed to the employment 
growth of the recipient firm’s funded research project). In our view, this 
broader measure is the more important indicator through which to glean 
insight about the employment impact of public support of innovation. 
One methodology to evaluate the employment effects attributable 
to SBIR is to assign the awards randomly among the applicants submit-
ing acceptable proposals. Another approach could be to find firms that 
were equally worthy of the awards, except that because of limited re-
sources funds were only available for a subset, and the agency randomly 
decided which firms would receive them. Alternatively, firms could be 
ranked according to their qualifications for the award and compared to 
those below the cutoff point. These possibilities are moot because the 
NCR database only contains firms that received awards. 
We compare the firm’s actual level of employment after receipt of 
an SBIR award and completion of the research project to the level of 
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Specifically, our analysis focuses on a comparison of the firm’s ac-
tual 2005 employment—after SBIR funding for the sampled Phase II 
project—with the firm’s predicted 2005 employment had the firm not 
received the SBIR funding for the sampled project. We refer to this as a 
measure of SBIR-induced employment growth. 
Our analysis in this chapter is dynamic in the sense that it takes 
a broad and general view of the impact of an SBIR award on a firm’s 
employment trajectory over time, as opposed to the narrow look taken 
in Chapter 4 at project-specific employment gains associated with SBIR 
funding. The funding for the sampled project might, or might not, have 
enabled the firm to meet challenges and thrive at a critical juncture in 
its history; without the award those challenges might not have been met 
successfully. Thus, the firm having received the award might have been 
able then to retain employees to work not only on the funded project but 
also on other research activities unrelated to the project. 
Moreover, our analysis is innovative in that it follows from a for-
mal counterfactual model; this model is estimated taking into account 
response bias and thus addresses criticism about the lack of the com-
parative potential of the NRC database as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Econometrically, we use available information about firms prior to 
their SBIR award to predict what their employment performance would 
have been in 2005 (the year of the NRC survey and thus the last year of 
available data) absent the award. We then compare actual 2005 employ-
ment after the award was received to that prediction to see if the award 
significantly changed employment growth or performance in the firms.1 
CouNTERFACTuAL moDEL oF EmPLoymENT GRowTh 
Consider a general continuous-time growth model; apart from 
random error, the firm grows continuously.2 The number of the firm’s 
employees, y, at time t is 
(5.1) y(t) = aegteε , 
where y(t) is the number of employees t years after the firm was 
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of employees; g is the annual rate of growth of employees; and ε is a 
random error term. The growth rate of employment is a function of vari-
ous explanatory variables, x1 to xk , as 
(5.2) (∂y(t)/∂t) / y(t) = g = b0 + b1x1 + . . . + bkxk . 
We refer to Equation (5.2) as our growth model. Below we hypothesize 
particular explanatory variables to include in the model. 
From Equation (5.1), it follows that 
(5.3) lny(t) = lna + gt + ε . 
Substituting Equation (5.2) for g in Equation (5.3) yields 
(5.4) lny(t) = lna + b0t + b1x1t + . . . + bkxkt + ε . 
Equation (5.4), which we refer to as our employment model, is es-
timated using preaward firm information, and then lny(t) is predicted 
for 2005 (with preaward firm characteristics and allowing the firm to 
grow from its founding until 2005), and that prediction is compared to 
the survey data on actual postaward employees in 2005.3 Stated differ-
ently, the prediction of firm employment in 2005 is a prediction that is 
based on information about the past before the Phase II project began, 
and thus it is a prediction not using any information about the funded 
project. 
We ask if having the Phase II award (i.e., receiving SBIR research 
funding) changed the trajectory for the firm that is predicted by the 
preaward history using only firm information that does not reflect any 
knowledge about the Phase II project. Thus, the numerical difference 
between the firm’s actual employment in 2005 with the SBIR award and 
the firm’s predicted level of employment based on preaward informa-
tion used in the estimation of Equation (5.4) is the employment impact 
of SBIR funding on the firm. 
Given the data limitations of the NRC database as discussed in 
Chapter 3, and especially having data on firm employment at only two 
points in time—1) when the Phase II award was made t years after 
the firm was founded and 2) in 2005—the credibility of our approach 
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(5.4), and the accuracy of the prediction from Equation (5.4) of course 
depends on the accuracy of the specification of the growth model, g, in 
Equation (5.2). 
To increase the robustness of our model and thus to provide a 
degree of confidence about the general predictive power of Equation 
(5.4), we allow for predictions that not only vary across firms but also 
vary through time by age for each firm. 
In the following section we offer two hypotheses regarding vari-
ables to include in Equation (5.2), and we tie each variable to basic 
economic theory or to the extant academic literature.4 
TESTABLE hyPoThESES 
hypothesis 1 
The growth rate of employment, g, will eventually decrease with 
firm age, all else remaining constant. 
This hypothesis follows from the general concepts of diminishing 
returns and learning by doing (Arrow 1962a), and from the empirical 
research of Evans (1987). Following Arrow (1962a), the economic 
returns the firm can earn over time from its resources will eventually 
decline. The firm, or more specifically the firm’s entrepreneur, will 
learn over time to optimize, but unless the physical capital or the entre-
preneurial capital of the firm changes, the impact of this learning by 
doing will diminish. Recall that the average age of a funded firm, across 
agencies, is between 9 and 13 years, and it is likely that in some of the 
earlier years the firm’s revenues were $0 (see the descriptive statistics 
for the variables, Table A.2 in the appendix). 
Hypothesis 1 could also be viewed as an extension of the empirical 
work of Evans (1987), who demonstrated that among larger and older man-
ufacturing firms the growth rate of employment decreased with firm age. 
hypothesis 2 
As a complement, and perhaps as an alternative to Hypothesis 1 
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oriented firms especially may benefit from prior market and research 
experience and avoid any downturn in the growth rate of employment. 
The more experienced the firm with research—such as, for ex-
ample, any SBIR research prior to the SBIR award being studied for 
the firm in our particular sample—the greater the likelihood that the 
firm will avoid a decline in its employment growth. Of course, research 
experience can be controlled, and, given that control, the nonlinear ef-
fect of the firm’s age might still be expected. In that sense, this second 
hypothesis is a complement to the first. But it can also be considered as 
a potential alternative hypothesis here, because age itself will measure 
experience for the firm, which may allow it to avoid any decline in the 
growth rate of its employment. 
Hypothesis 2 follows from the argument that with prior experience, 
and with the learning by doing that has occurred, the entrepreneur has 
an increased base of tacit and codified knowledge to draw upon to meet 
the inherent vagaries of research and the inevitable pressures of compe-
tition, all else remaining constant. 
This follows from Jovanovic (1982, p. 649): “Firms learn about 
their efficiency as they operate in the industry. The efficient grow and 
survive; the inefficient decline and fail.” Thus, each firm in an industry 
has a level of efficiency, and that efficiency, assumed here to be corre-
lated with experience, helps to ensure that it survives and grows. (For 
the estimation of Equation [5.4], which follows from Equation [5.2], we 
are observing firms that have survived for t years.) 
ECoNomETRIC RESuLTS 
In the growth model in Equation (5.2), we quantify the x’s with the 
following variables.5 Firm age (firmage), its square, and its cube are in-
cluded in the growth model to allow for an unconstrained estimation of 
the age effect on the growth rate of employment.6 Therefore, Equation 
(5.4) contains the variable t, along with the firm age variable multiplied 
by t, firm age squared multiplied by t, and firm age cubed multiplied by 
t. In effect, Equation (5.4) has as regressors t, t2, t3, and t4. 
From Hypothesis 1, the growth rate of employment is, eventually, 
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our estimated employment growth model in Equation (5.4) to project 
the firm’s level of employment in 2005 in the counterfactual case that 
the firm had not received the SBIR award, the predicted annual rate of 
employment growth for the firm not only differs across firms, but also 
it changes for each firm as the firm ages. 
Regarding the firm’s previous market and research experience, the 
following variables were considered: a qualitative variable denoting 
whether the firm was founded at least in part as a result of the SBIR 
program (sbirfnd), the number of other firms started by the firm’s 
founder(s) (otherstarts), and the number of previous Phase II awards 
(prevphII).7 From Hypothesis 2, such experience is positively related to 
the growth rate in employment. 
Also included in Equation (5.2) are controls for the firm’s innate inno-
vative capabilities. Specifically, we control for the business (busfndrs) and 
academic (acadfndrs) background of the firm’s founder(s), and for how 
well the firm has evaluated the commercial potential of its SBIR projects 
during or after the completion of the Phase II research (lateeval).
Our argument about the importance of the origins of the firm is 
based on several strands of literature. Sociologists contend that indi-
viduals imprint their beliefs and values on situations in which they have 
control.8 The founding history or background of the firm’s founders 
establishes blueprints or organizational forms that direct, to varying 
degrees over time, the observed behavior of the organization that they 
influence.9 From an economic perspective, if the firm’s capabilities are 
influenced, if not determined, by the founder’s background, then that 
background should influence how the firm achieves its comparative 
advantage.10 And, from a management perspective, the resource-based 
view of the firm posits that firms are bundles of heterogeneous resources 
and capabilities, and that those resources and capabilities influence 
the firm’s competitive strategy. To the extent, then, that these bundles 
of heterogeneous resources and capabilities have been influenced by 
the entrepreneur’s blueprint for the firm and attendant skills within the 
firm, aspects of the firm’s or founder’s background are related to the 
firm’s performance.11 Related to the firm’s evaluation of the commer-
cial potential of its SBIR projects, comparative advantage and chosen 
competitive strategy characterize the firm’s “dynamic capabilities,” in 
the phrase of Augier and Teece (2007). We conjecture that employment 
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Finally, variables are included for the geographic region in which 
the firm operates (northeast, south, and midwest, with the effect for 
west left in the intercept) to control for regional differences in labor 
markets, in competitive environment, and in the availability of venture 
capital and other sources of external financing to assist the firm’s com-
mercialization efforts.13 
Equation (5.4) is estimated with control for response to the project 
survey; that is, it is estimated as a maximum likelihood model with se-
lection. Thus, Equation (5.4) is estimated simultaneously with a model 
of the probability of response to the project survey. The response model 
ideally captures the underlying, ultimate explanations for nonresponse 
by firms for which awards were sampled. Those ultimate explanations 
include not only behavioral stories about decisions to respond or not, 
but also include structural factors that are correlated with a lack of re-
sponse to the NRC survey because a firm no longer has valid postal or 
e-mail addresses. 
One project-specific control included in the probability of response 
model is the amount of the Phase II award (awardamt). A priori, we 
hypothesize that the amount of the Phase II award will have a posi-
tive effect on the probability of response because firms receiving larger 
awards might be more inclined to respond as a quid pro quo for the 
greater SBIR support. Moreover, the larger awards may be associated 
with firms that have stable information about how to contact them. 
The firm’s number of Phase II awards that were among the popula-
tion of 1992–2001 projects for sampling in the NRC survey (phIItsvy) is 
also held constant in the response model.14 The variable is one measure 
of firm size; a priori, firms that are larger in this dimension are hypoth-
esized to be more likely to respond to the survey because they have the 
resources available to do so and, perhaps as well, as a quid pro quo for 
greater SBIR support. Again, the variable may also be associated with 
stable contact information increasing the likelihood of successfully get-
ting a response for sampled projects. 
Also included as a regressor is the number of a firm’s Phase II proj-
ects that were surveyed by the NRC (numsvyd). On the one hand, this 
variable might have a negative effect on the probability of response if 
a larger reporting burden lowers the probability of response. On the 
other hand, firms with larger numbers of surveyed projects are those 
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respond because of that fact. Furthermore, such firms might have the 
resources at hand to respond more readily to the survey than the firms 
with fewer awards, and, again, the variable is likely to be correlated 
with the type of institutional stability that avoids a failure of the survey 
to find its recipient. 
Finally, we hypothesize that firms would be less likely to respond to 
a specific project survey as the project grew older, because institutional 
memory about the project may have faded with time or the older set 
of facts simply may have been more difficult, and hence costly, to as-
semble and report. Thus, we expect that the project’s age (prjage) will 
be negatively related to the probability of response. Also, other things 
being the same, such projects could be correlated with a loss of contact 
information needed to successfully reach the recipient of the survey. 
See Table B.5 in the Technical Appendix for descriptive statistics 
on the variables in the response model, for each agency. 
Equation (5.4) is estimated with robust standard errors to allow for 
heteroskedasticity in the errors in the equation. Also, the standard er-
rors are clustered by firm to control for correlation of the errors in the 
equation for the observations of those firms with more than one Phase 
II project in the sample.15 The estimation uses probability weights, also 
called sampling weights. The sampling weights for the reporting cat-
egories for each agency are defined and provided in Table B.1 in the 
Technical Appendix. The estimated results from Equation (5.4), with 
control for response to the survey, are in Table B.6 in the Technical Ap-
pendix. They show cross-agency differences in the coefficients’ sizes, 
signs, and levels of significance for the variables in our employment 
growth model, Equation (5.4), as discussed below.16 
INTERPRETATIoN oF ThE FINDINGS 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, for all five agencies the empirical results sup-
port the eventual decline of employment growth with the age of the firm. 
To illustrate graphically the nonlinear relationship between employment 
and age, we calculated g using only pre–Phase II award information.17 
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We interpret our econometric results and our illustrative calcula-
tions of g as support for Hypothesis 1. The DoD example is the most 
striking, with an increase in the growth rate of employment to ap-
proximately t = 20, followed by the hypothesized eventual decline to 
approximately t = 65 (see the note to Figure 5.1). The decline in the 
growth rate of employment begins immediately for the other four agen-
cies. (See Table B.6 in the Technical Appendix for details about which 
variables contribute to the reduction in growth rate as t increases.) We 
interpret this graphical support for Hypothesis 1 as empirical evidence 
of the credibility of our growth model in Equation (5.2) and thus of our 
employment model in Equation (5.4). 
Empirical support for Hypothesis 2 is mixed across agencies. 
Among DoD, NIH, DOE, and NSF firms, at least one measure of previ-
ous market and research experience is positive and significant (sbirfnd, 
otherstarts, prevphII). But one of the three experience variables has a 
negative and significant estimated coefficient among NIH, NASA, and 
NSF firms, contrary to our hypothesis. Only among NSF firms is there 
empirical evidence that the number of other firms started by the firm’s 
founder(s) is positively related to employment growth. 
Finally, considering the remaining control variables, across all 
agencies a dimension of the founders’ backgrounds—the imprint of 
their beliefs and values—is positively related to employment growth 
(busfndrs, acadfndrs). 
The survey information about actual firm employment at the time 
of the sampled award and actual firm employment in 2005 can be used 
to calculate the actual annual growth rate of employees after the firm 
receives its Phase II award, as follows:18 
(5.5) g  = [ln(emptA ) − ln(empt)] / tsa ,post 05 
where g is the postaward growth rate, emptA is the actual level of post 05 
employment in 2005, empt is the number of employees at the time of 
the award (previously defined), and tsa is the amount of time since the 
Phase II award (tsa = 2005 − year of the Phase II award; it is therefore 
equivalent to prjage). 
Table 5.1 shows the mean growth rate of firms, by agency. Across 
all agencies, the mean annual growth rate of postaward employees 
was over 8 percent, and by agency the range of mean growth rates was
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Figure 5.1  Calculation of g from Equation (5.2), by Agency 
Panel A 
A company’s estimated annual growth rate, g, as a 












NOTE: Only preaward information is used to estimate the model. Graph charts the esti-
mated annual growth rate g as a function of the company’s age, t, as of the time of the 
Phase II award for a company with sbirfnd = 0, otherstarts = 0, busfnders = 1, acad-
fnders = 1, prevphII = 8.55 (the mean for prevphII in the 755-observation sample), 
lateeval = 1, and south = 1. Note that in the DoD 755-observation sample, the age of 
the companies at the time of the Phase II award ranged from 0 to 98 years. However, 
there were only two companies with age greater than 65 years; one was 93 years old 
and the other was 98 years old, so the negative portion of the graph of the predicted 
growth rates does not correspond to any actual companies in the data. Rather it is the 
portion of the curve needed to fit the data showing growth rates for the two especially 
old companies. 
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Figure 5.1  (continued) 
Panel B 
A company’s estimated annual growth rate, g, as a function of its age, t, at the 
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t 
NOTE: Only preaward information is used to estimate the model. Graph charts the esti-
mated annual growth rate g as a function of the company’s age, t, as of the time of the 
Phase II award for a company with sbirfnd = 0, otherstarts = 0, busfnders = 1, acad-
fnders = 1, prevphII = 2.12 (the mean for prevphII in the 391-observation sample), 
lateeval = 0, and south = 1. Note that in the NIH 391-observation sample, the age of 
the companies at the time of the Phase II award ranged from 0 to 100. However, there 
were only two companies among the 391 that were older than 37 years old. 
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Figure 5.1  (continued) 
Panel C 
A company’s estimated annual growth rate, g, as a 
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t 
NOTE: Only preaward information is used to estimate the model. Graph charts the 
estimated annual growth rate g as a function of the company’s age, t, as of the time 
of the Phase II award for a company with sbirfnd = 0, otherstarts = 0, busfnders = 1, 
acadfnders = 1, prevphII = 13.75 (the mean for prevphII in the 155-observation sam-
ple), lateeval = 1, and south = 1. Note that in the NASA 155-observation sample, the 
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Figure 5.1  (continued) 
Panel D 
A company’s estimated annual growth rate, g, as a 
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NOTE: Only preaward information is used to estimate the model. Graph charts the
estimated annual growth rate g as a function of the company’s age, t, as of the time 
of the Phase II award for a company with sbirfnd = 0, otherstarts = 0, busfnders = 
1, acadfnders = 1, prevphII = 7.11 (the mean for prevphII in the 140-observation 
sample), lateeval = 1, and south = 1. Note that in the DOE 140-observation sample, 
the age of the companies at the time of the Phase II award ranged from 0 to 50 years 
for all but one of the companies. The one company with age greater than 50 years was 
97 years old. 
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Figure 5.1  (continued) 
Panel E 
A company’s estimated annual growth rate, g, as a 
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t 
NOTE: Only preaward information is used to estimate the model. Graph charts the esti-
mated annual growth rate gas a function of the company’s age, t, as of the time of the Phase 
II award for a company with sbirfnd = 0, otherstarts = 0, busfnders = 1, acadfnders = 1, 
prevphII = 4.35 (the mean for prevphII in the 141-observation sample), lateeval = 1, 
and south = 1. Note that in the NSF 141-observation sample, the age of the compa-
nies at the time of the Phase II award ranged from 0 to 50 years for all but two of the 
companies. One company with age greater than 50 years was 92, and the other was 
94 years old. 
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from 5.9 to 9.2 percent. Over 75 percent of the firms had a positive 
growth rate, by agency, with nearly 40 percent of the firms enjoying 
growth greater than the agency mean. For about 10 percent of the firms, 
employment growth after receipt of the SBIR award was exceptional 
(growth rates greater than one standard deviation above the mean), and 
those firms averaged nearly 40 percent growth in employment (with a 
range from 31 percent for DOE firms to nearly 45 percent for NASA
firms). 
Table 5.2 shows the mean level of actual (i.e., reported on the survey) 
employment in 2005 and the mean level of firm employment predicted 
(when t is redefined so that the firm has existed right up to 2005) from 
the estimated results in Table B.6 in the Technical Appendix, by agency. 
Here, “predicted” refers to the predictions of employment conditional 
on the response to the survey, because, of course, we have the actual 
employment outcomes only for those firms that responded to the survey 
and completed the questionnaires.19 
The information in Table 5.2 suggests that among firms in four agen-
cies—DoD, NIH, NASA, and DOE—there was, on average, positive 
employment growth that is attributable to the SBIR award. Although 
SBIR-induced employment growth is on average substantial, none of 
these average gains is statistically significant. As shown in Table 5.3, 
the difference between the natural logarithms of actual (A) employment 
in 2005 and predicted (P) employment, or 
diff = [ln(emptA05) − ln(empt
P
05)] , 
is, at the level of the individual projects’ effects on their sponsoring 
firms’ employment, on the whole not statistically different from 0 in any 
of these four agencies. For the NSF, where the average induced growth 
was negative, none of the individual firm cases for overall firm employ-
ment growth induced by the SBIR award is significantly different from 
zero. However, there are many individual cases for the DoD (10 cases) 
and NIH (16 cases) samples for which the positive employment growth 
attributable to the SBIR award is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level for a two-tailed test. Moreover, there is a wide range of calculated 
outcomes from negative to positive, and we explore the determinants 
of the differences in firm employment growth attributable to the SBIR 
awards in the following chapter. 
 
 
74 Table 5.1  Actual Growth Rate of Employees after the Firm Received a Phase II Award 
Number, percentage 
(in parens), and mean 
Mean growth rate of firms 
Number growth with a nonnegative 
Agency of firms rate (%) growth rate 
Number, percentage 
(in parens), and mean 
growth rate of firms 
with a growth rate 
greater than the mean 
growth rate 
Number, percentage 
(in parens), and mean 
growth rate of firms 
with a growth rate 
greater than 1 stan-
dard deviation above 
the mean growth rate 
Number, percentage 
(in parens), and mean 
growth rate of firms 
with a growth rate 
greater than 2 stan-
dard deviations above 
the mean growth rate 
DoD 755 9.2 629 (83) 294 (39) 84 (11) 35 (4.6) 
12.6 22.4 40.1 53.8 
NIH 391 8.2 323 (83) 164 (42) 39 (10) 11 (2.8) 
11.7 19.5 36.5 57.0 
NASA 155 7.3 123 (79) 59 (38) 12 (8) 5 (3.0) 
11.2 20.1 44.8 64.8 
DOE 140 5.9 106 (76) 60 (43) 15 (11) 7 (5.0) 
9.7 15.1 30.6 39.4 
NSF 141 6.7 110 (78) 59 (42) 14 (10) 5 (4.0) 
10.7 17.8 37.8 55.9 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.2  mean Actual (emptA05) and Predicted (empt
P
05) Employment in 
2005 for Phase II SBIR Award Recipients, by Agency 
Agency n Actual Predicted 
DoD 755 59.93 31.38 
NIH 391 60.41 19.10 
NASA 155 62.54 48.71 
DOE 140 55.71 34.11 
NSF 141 40.99 79.16 
N 1,582 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 5.3  Ratio of the Logarithmic metric, diff, for SBIR-Induced 
Employment Growth to the Standard Error of the Forecast 
Range for ratio DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
≥ 2.0 10 16 1 1 0 
≥ 1.5 and < 2.0 25 12 0 3 0 
≥ 1.0 and < 1.5 42 29 5 11 0 
≥ 0.0 and < 1.0 349 139 79 46 61 
≥ −1.0 and < 0.0 272 153 61 58 64 
≥ −1.5 and < −1.0 39 28 8 18 10 
≥ −2.0 and < −1.5 17 9 0 1 6 
< −2.0 1 5 1 2 0 
N 755 391 155 140 141 
NOTE: Alternatively, using the usual z-value of 2 to leave a probability of approxi-
mately 0.025 in each tail of the distribution, calculating the 95 percent confidence 
interval around each observation’s predicted employment as the antilogs of the pre-
dicted ln(employment in 2005) plus or minus the antilogs of two standard errors of 
the forecast, we would of course have the number of cases for which the actual 2005 
employment fell outside the confidence interval, as shown in the first and last rows of 
the table here, combined: 11 cases for DoD, 21 cases for NIH, 2 cases for NASA, 3 
cases for DOE, and 0 cases for NSF. Stated differently, although there are in absolute 
number several cases for DoD and NIH for which actual employment is significantly 
greater than the employment predicted by the counterfactual model, on the whole, the 
performance of the companies after winning the sampled Phase II award is not typi-
cally significantly different from what would have been predicted without the award. 
There is, nonetheless, quite a range of differences between actual and predicted em-
ployment, and we shall explore the determinants of those differences. Furthermore, 
as seen in Tables 5.2 and 5.4, the average difference between actual and predicted 
employment is positive for DoD, NIH, NASA, and DOE, although those average dif-
ferences are not statistically significant. 
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Although on the whole the economic effects, as seen in the overall 
growth in firm employment attributed to the SBIR awards, are not sta-
tistically significant, the effects are fairly large absolutely and in terms 
of the employment effects per million dollars of funding. Table 5.4 
compares, by agency, employment gains per sampled project to the level 
of funding, and Table 5.5 shows the total employment gain for all of the 
sampled SBIR recipients in each agency. As shown in Table 5.4, for the 
two agencies where the mean employment gains are largest, the mean 
Table 5.4  mean SBIR-Induced “Employment Gain” by Agency
(standard deviation) 
Mean “employment gain” 
Agency n Mean “employment gain”a per million $ awardedb 
DoD 755 28.54 (89.78) 45.53 (163.61) 
NIH 391 41.31 (291.33) 65.00 (378.47) 
NASA 155 13.83 (67.80) 24.40 (118.45) 
DOE 140 21.60 (114.91) 32.51 (182.07) 
NSF 141 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. 
a “Mean ‘employment gain’” is the average difference between actual and predicted 
employment in 2005 for Phase II SBIR award recipients (rather than the difference in 
the actual and predicted natural logarithms as given by diff). The firms with more than 
one Phase II award sampled provide multiple experiments from which to estimate 
the impact of an award on overall firm growth. However, those experiments produce 
forecasts of predicted employment in 2005 that are not independently distributed (re-
call that the errors in equation in the growth model were assumed to be correlated for 
sampled awards won by the same firm). To evaluate the significance of the average 
employment gains reported in this table, we need the standard error for the average 
forecast. It is the square root of the estimated variance of the average forecast. The 
average forecast is the weighted sum (with each weight being 1/n) of the n individual 
forecasts. The variance of the average forecast is then a double sum over the weighted 
(with each weight being 1/n2) covariances of the forecasts. Because not all of the n
forecasts are independently distributed, the standard error of the average forecast is not 
simply the square root of 1/n2 (the sum of the estimated variances for the n awards). 
Accounting for the covariances (when there are multiple projects from the same firm) 
yields a standard error for each of the average gains that is somewhat larger than the 
average gain itself; hence, the average gains are not statistically different from zero. 
b “Mean ‘employment gain’ per million $ awarded” is defined for each sampled award 
as the “employment gain” for the firm winning the award divided by the amount of the 
Phase II award in millions of dollars. 
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Table 5.5  SBIR-Induced “Employment Gain” by Agency, using just a 
Single Sampled Award for Each Firm 
Mean “employment gain” Total “employment gain” 
Agency n (standard deviation) for responding firms 
DoD 487 22.92 (90.60) 487 × 22.92 = 11,162 
NIH 290 32.40 (243.67) 290 × 32.40 = 9,396 
NASA 123 12.62 (70.75) 123 × 12.62 = 1,552 
DOE 110 19.10 (99.26) 110 × 19.10 = 2,101 
NSF 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. For the responding firms with multiple awards, just the 
first (i.e., oldest) sampled award was used in this table. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
firm employment gain per million dollars of funding estimated with 
each sampled Phase II project is 45.5 for the DoD and 65.0 for the NIH. 
In Chapter 6 we take advantage of the wide range of outcomes to 
investigate empirically variables that are correlated with induced em-
ployment growth. In other words, we ask if there are particular firm or 
project characteristics that are more likely than not to be associated with 
SBIR projects that result in positive and greater-than-predicted employ-
ment growth. 
Notes 
1. There are two employment data points in the NRC database, the number of em-
ployees at the time of the Phase II award and employment in 2005 (after the Phase 
II research is completed). 
2. This model is based on Link and Scott (2003, 2006). 
3. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of employees 
(empt), adding one for the owner/manager/founder/entrepreneur at the time of the 
Phase II award, t years after the firm was founded. We have added one to the 
number of employees to include the owner/manager or the founder; especially for 
the younger firms the addition is of substantive importance. Obviously someone 
was employed at the firm and filling out the survey forms in those firms reporting 
zero employees. We have interviewed the owner/manager/founder/entrepreneur of 
SBIR firms where that one individual was the firm’s president and CEO as well as 
the chief researcher; he or she “wore all the hats.” See Link and Scott (2000) for 
case study examples. 
4. As we stated in Chapter 1, to our knowledge our analysis is the first to use a coun-
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through public support of R&D and employment growth in firms of any size. As 
such, our empirical analysis, especially our analysis in this chapter, is exploratory 
in nature. 
5. Firm size is not a variable in the model of growth because we estimate it with 
observations at two times—the beginning, when all firms are the same size, and 
then using size at the time of the award. There is a rich literature related to testing 
Gibrat’s Law (see Sutton [1997] for a critique of this literature). Empirically, mod-
els that test Gibrat’s Law that firm growth is proportional to firm size include in 
the regression model base firm size, St , as a regressor. In our model, all firms’ base 
size, where size is measured in terms of employment, is the parameter a in Equa-
tion (5.1). Thus, with the NRC data a comparable test of Gibrat’s Law is not possible. 
6. In the growth model estimated on preaward information, the age of the firm
(firmage) at the time of the Phase II award is measured in years (t) (see the Glos-
sary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics, Table A.1). When the estimated em-
ployment model is used to predict the counterfactual employment for the firm in 
2005, the variables firm age and time are of course growing and the predicted 
annual growth rate for the firm is changing as the firm ages. 
7. The number of previous Phase II awards might be associated with types of firms 
that are especially likely to grow rapidly given previous SBIR support. Yet, alter-
natively, such experience could be associated with “SBIR mills” that may have 
more interest in receiving multiple awards than in pursuing the commercial ap-
plications of those awards (Wessner 2000). 
8. For example, Stinchcombe (1965) is often credited with the general observation 
that the founding history of an organization (e.g., a firm) directly influences the 
present structure of the organization. Baron, Hannan, and Burton’s (1999, p. 529) 
interpretation of Stinchcombe’s theory is that “founding conditions become im-
printed on organizations and mold their subsequent development.”  
9. Link and Scott (2009, p. 269) observe, “On the one hand, experience in business 
is expected to be positively associated with commercialization. Yet, on the other 
hand, the SBIR program could be seen as looking for business entrepreneurs who 
have innovative ideas yet would not (because of market failures that could in-
clude the financial market’s failure to support some entrepreneurs lacking business 
experience yet having socially desirable projects) receive sufficient R&D fund-
ing from the private sector alone. Given the SBIR support, such award recipients, 
vigorously pursuing and championing perhaps their first foray into business, may 
actually have greater success in commercializing than award winners with busi-
ness backgrounds.” 
10. Richardson (1972, p. 888) argues, “The capabilities of an organisation may depend 
upon command of some material technology . . . [and] organisations will tend 
to specialize in activities for which their capabilities offer some comparative
advantage . . . ”
11. The unique characteristics of firms, and hence their unique behaviors and perfor-
mances, even after controlling for the characteristics of the industries in which they 
operate, were first demonstrated convincingly for large samples of lines of busi-
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12. Augier and Teece (2007, p. 179) observe, “Dynamic capabilities refer to the (inimi-
table) capacity firms have to shape, reshape, configure and reconfigure the firm’s 
asset base so as to respond to changing technologies and markets. Dynamic 
capabilities relate to the firm’s ability to proactively adapt in order to generate and 
exploit internal and external firm specific competencies, and to address the firm’s 
changing environment.” 
13. See National Association of Seed and Venture Funds (2006). 
14. This variable is the firm’s number of Phase II awards in the sampling pool. 
15. The model is estimated using StataCorp (2007). 
16. An estimate (rho) of the correlation between the error in the model of employment 
and the error in the model of selection and an estimate (sigma) of the standard 
deviation of the error in the employment model are provided and subsequently 
used with the probability density and probability of selection, as well as the esti-
mates from the employment model, to provide predictions of employment condi-
tional on response to the NRC survey. 
17. The assumptions underlying this calculation are sbirfnd = 0, otherstarts = 0, 
busfndrs = 1, acadfndrs = 1, lateeval = 1, south = 1, and prevphII = mean value 
from the sample. (See the descriptive statistics for the variables, Table A.2.)
 = (empt)egpost(tsa) emptA05 . 
19. The formula for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on re-
sponse to the survey is developed and given by Greene (2003, p. 784). Briefly, 
the conditional expectation is the inner product of the values for the explanatory 
variables and the estimated parameters for the employment model plus the product 
of three things: 1) the correlation (rho) of the error in the employment model and 
the error in the selection model, 2) the estimate (sigma) of the standard deviation 
of error in the employment model, and 3) the ratio of the probability density of 
response to the probability of response. Thus, we use the “ycond” option with the 
postestimation command “predict” for the maximum likelihood Heckman selec-
tion model in StataCorp (2007). Therefore, “ycond” calculates the expected value 







Factors Related to Employment 
Growth from SBIR Funding 
In this chapter we continue our discussion of the dynamic issue 
of whether the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program 
assists small entrepreneurial firms in clearing the initial hurdles they 
face and achieving growth beyond what would be possible if they 
did not have the support of the SBIR program. Specifically, we ask, 
“What characteristics of a firm explain the difference between its ac-
tual employment achieved with the SBIR award and the counterfactual 
baseline of its predicted employment in the absence of the award?” Or, 
stated differently, “In what types of firms does SBIR funding induce 
employment growth?” 
Phrased either way, this is an important question for at least two 
reasons. First, from a policy perspective, should employment growth 
ever become an explicit objective of the SBIR program under a future 
reauthorization—or should a program similar to SBIR be initiated at 
some point to stimulate technology-based employment growth—our 
findings about firm and market characteristics that are correlated with 
greater-than-predicted employment growth might provide some award 
criteria relevant for consideration. And second, from an academic per-
spective, the analysis in Chapter 5 anticipates examining why some 
firms have grown faster than their predicted growth rate. 
To answer this question, we here examine the difference, diff, be-
tween the natural logarithms of the actual (A) employment in 2005 and 
the predicted (P) employment in that year. The prediction for employ-
ment was the outcome of the counterfactual model estimated in Chapter 
5. Thus, we estimate a model of SBIR-induced employment growth for 
each of the five agencies. Our performance model is 
(6.1) diff = f(X) , 
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For our exploratory analysis of cross-firm differences in actual em-
ployment relative to predicted employment, parsimonious models are 
estimated that, apart from including all of the commercial-type vari-
ables considered in Chapter 4, use only those variables with effects that 
are significantly different from zero.1 These parsimonious models are 
estimated for four reasons. First, the samples for the different agen-
cies differ markedly in the variables explaining induced employment 
growth. Second, many of the variables describing the firms do not have 
statistically significant effects. Third, the samples for which all of the 
explanatory variables are available are small, and reducing the number 
of parameters estimated allows models with more substantial degrees of 
freedom. Fourth, unlike the variable on retained employees studied in 
Chapter 4, our greater-than-predicted employment growth variable is a 
calculated variable rather than one coming from observed data. There-
fore, the analysis that follows is quite novel and exploratory, and the 
initial complete specifications (from which the parsimonious specifi-
cations were selected) would confront the reader with a large number 
of insignificant variables. For those insignificant variables, there is no 
strong a priori argument to expect significance, yet they are included 
in the entire collection of potential explanatory variables—character-
izations of the firms and their projects—from which the exploratory 
analysis found the significant ones. 
CoNSTRuCTIoN oF NEw SummARy VARIABLES 
For the parsimonious models estimated in this chapter, we introduce 
two summary variables that are derived from the variables introduced 
and used in the earlier chapters. 
The first of these new summary variables is the amount of outside 
finance (i.e., not provided by the firm itself or its principals, other than 
the funding provided by the SBIR program) relative to total investment 
in the Phase II project (outfintoinv).2 Note that this constructed out-
side financing variable does not include the funding from colleges and 
universities. Funding from these sources will be controlled separately 
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rect research support, rather than being simply generic funding for the 
operation of the project. 
The second of the constructed variables is derived from the 11 vari-
ables describing commercial agreements.3 The variable (dagreement) is 
a 0/1 variable that equals 1 whenever any one or more of the 11 com-
mercial agreement variables for which we have information equals 1, 
and is zero otherwise. In other words, this new summary variable sim-
ply controls for the presence of some type of commercial agreement. 
Table 6.1 provides the descriptive statistics for these two new 
summary variables for each of the five agencies. In the parsimonious 
models, the summary variables for outside funding and for commercial 
agreements are used if they have statistically significant effects. If a 
summary variable does not have a statistically significant effect, then 
variables from which the summary variable was constructed are used 
when significant.4 For some agencies, a summary variable was insig-
nificant because some of its underlying variables had significant effects 
of opposite signs. We did not employ this estimation strategy, which 
Table 6.1  Descriptive Statistics for Constructed Variables for outside 
Finance and Commercial Agreements: mean, (Std. dev.), 
{range}, [n] 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
Outside 0.1489 0.0907 0.0754 0.1496 0.2181 
financing (0.2534) (0.2233) (0.1711) (0.2593) (0.2927) 
(outfintoin) {0–0.9869}  {0–0.9952} {0–0.8000} {0–0.9698} {0–0.9796} 
[755] [389] [155] [137] [137] 
Commercial 0.6708 0.7325 0.5872 0.6789 0.8649 
agreements  (0.4703) (0.4434) (0.4946) (0.4691) (0.3434) 
(dagreement) {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
[562] [314] [109] [109] [111] 
NOTE: Here, n is for the sample for which diff and the constructed variable are both 
available. The descriptive statistics for the variables (Table A.2) show n for the un-
derlying funding variables and underlying commercial agreement variables without 
restriction to the subset for which diff is also available. In the regressions below, n is 
further restricted to the subset of those observations that not only have both diff and 
the finance and agreement variables, but also have the other explanatory variables, 
none of which were used in the growth model from which diff was derived. 
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we argue is appropriate here, in Chapter 4 because of the fourth reason 
for the parsimonious models that we explained and elaborated on in the 
introduction to this chapter—namely, that our dependent variable in the 
performance model in Equation (6.1) is a constructed variable. 
From the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1, NIH and NASA firms, 
on average, rely less on outside funding than do DoD, DOE, or NSF 
firms. In fact, NSF firms, on average, rely two to three times more on 
outside funding than do NIH and NASA firms. There is not as much 
difference among firms, by agency, in the presence of a commercial 
agreement. Near 60 percent of NASA firms are so engaged, compared 
to about 70 percent of DoD, NIH, and DOE firms, and to about 85 per-
cent of NSF firms. 
ExPLANAToRy VARIABLES AND ThE
ESTImATED EFFECTS
The estimated parsimonious performance model for each of the 
five agencies’ samples of SBIR projects is found in Table B.7 in the 
Technical Appendix. The explanatory variables in the models are vari-
ables that were not used in the growth model in Chapter 5 to make the 
predictions that we analyze here. In the specifications of this chapter, 
we explore other variables determining the part of actual employment, 
ln(emptA05), that is not predicted from the employment model in the 
previous chapter, ln(emptP05).
5 
Below, we discuss the estimated results by category of variables. 
Firm characteristics. An observed positive effect of a firm having 
prior spin-off companies from SBIR funding (spinoffs) on the trajectory 
of employment growth suggests that the firm has assembled a resource 
base capable of creating new opportunities for a commercially viable 
outcome from the SBIR Phase II project sampled. Those opportunities 
can support growth beyond what would have been predicted without 
the award. Empirically, this is the case for DoD and NIH projects. Yet 
a negative effect could, in concept, be observed. A firm with spin-off 
experience might choose to stay focused on developing new technolo-
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manufacturing using the Phase II project’s technology. However, no 
estimated negative effect was observed. 
Regarding the percentage of revenues taken by awarded funds
(percrevssbir), a negative relationship, as found for the DoD sample, 
might signal that a firm is still largely at a precommercial R&D stage 
and has not yet begun growing employment to support commercial 
sales. Although only observed for NSF projects, the relationship could, 
in concept, be positive. Perhaps the R&D of those projects had resulted 
in a commercially viable technology for which the firm was rapidly 
growing employment to support the final market development effort. 
SBIR research variables. DoD, NIH, and NSF projects in firms 
that have had previous Phase II SBIR awards related to the current 
award (rltdphII) realized employment growth greater than projected. 
This positive relationship could reflect a critical mass of developed 
technology that is complementary to the technology from the Phase II 
award sampled; such complementary technology might be expected to 
support strong commercial growth for the firm exploiting the technol-
ogy developed with the sampled project. Its effect is not negative in 
any of the samples—although, if the firm has related technology, it is 
possible that the newly developed technology from the sampled project 
would not add appreciable commercial potential for the firm, and the 
impact could then be negative. 
market variables. Only in the NASA sample is there a signifi-
cant relationship between the presence of a federal acquisition program 
(fedacq) and the firm’s employment trajectory. In this case, the SBIR 
award increases the employment growth trajectory of the firm because 
the government provides a market for the commercial results from the 
SBIR project. The effect is never negative for any of the other four 
samples. 
Intellectual property variables. When the SBIR project results in 
intellectual property (patents, copyrights, trademarks, publications), a 
positive effect on the difference between actual and predicted growth 
could be expected because such activity signals commercially valuable 
technology and such activity provides some protection of the commer-
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variables are found in the DoD, NIH, NASA, DOE, and NSF samples. 
To the extent that publications—a public good—reveal commercially 
valuable information that others (e.g., competitors) could use, the effect 
could be negative. Evidence supporting that possibility is found for just 
the NIH sample. 
Funding variables. The proportion of outside funding for the proj-
ect that comes from sources other than the SBIR program (outfintoinv) 
signals that others believe in the commercial viability of the project. 
This variable, or one of its underlying variables, is associated with a 
positive impact on extraemployment growth in the DoD, NIH, and NSF 
samples. When the effect is negative, as for some of the underlying 
outside finance variables in the NSF sample, outside funding might still 
be a signal of commercial viability but not of the need for employment 
growth above the projected level.
Economic theory predicts over time a positive relationship between 
outside funding and greater-than-predicted growth. Åstebro (2003) ar-
gues that independent inventors, who in some respects are similar to 
small entrepreneurial firms, face problems in attracting outside inves-
tors because of information asymmetries. When outside investors do 
invest in a potential technology, it is logical to conclude that at least two 
hurdles have been cleared. The first hurdle is that the firm receiving the 
research funds was selected to be scrutinized from all possible firms, 
and the second hurdle is that it was selected from all those that were 
scrutinized. The presence of outside funding suggests that the firm’s 
technology is promising, and thus one would expect the number of em-
ployees to be above what would have been predicted based on preaward 
information.6 
The firm’s own funding in the project (own-firm-funding-to-
total-investment) signals an internal commitment and one that is 
revealed in employment growth, as in the NIH, NASA, and NSF 
samples. In contrast to the use of own-firm funding, an increase in 
personal funding (personal-funds-to-total-investment) is associated 
with less-than-projected employment growth in the DoD, NIH, and 
DOE samples and does not have a statistically significant effect 
on projected employment growth for the NASA and NSF samples. 
Perhaps increases in personal funding reflect insight on the part of 
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the firm’s principal that an internal adjustment is needed to ensure 
commercial success and attract outside funding. 
If funding support from academia (colleges-or-universities-funding-
to-total-investment) is a higher proportion of investment, the underlying 
R&D might be more basic—more toward the research and less toward 
the development—and either less certain to yield commercially viable 
results in the near term or less understood by outside investors. In any 
event, those projects with a greater proportion of academic investments 
have lower-than-projected employment growth. 
Commercial agreements. A priori, the presence of commercial 
agreements regarding the technology developed with the SBIR Phase 
II award (dagreement) should be an important factor in explaining the 
broad effect of the award on the firm’s employment growth. Such firms 
that are involved in manufacturing agreements might allow their part-
ners to hire the employees. If this is the case, then the presence of such 
agreements would be negatively related to internal SBIR-induced em-
ployment growth and would suggest that the impact of SBIR funding on 
such employment growth is at least one step removed from the research-
ing firm. A negative effect for the summary commercial agreements 
variable is found in the DoD and DOE samples. The negative effect 
for some of the individual variables underlying the summary commer-
cial agreement variable is present for NIH, NASA, and NSF projects. 
In such cases, the SBIR firm may choose to focus on developing new 
technology, which means it may use its current resource base to develop 
additional technology rather than grow to meet the employment needs 
of manufacturing based on the technology already developed. This find-
ing should not be interpreted to mean that the firm’s SBIR project was 
less successful than expected. Rather, licensing the use of the technol-
ogy to others may, for example, help the SBIR firm penetrate markets 
rapidly and increase demand for its product during a window of op-
portunity that can be very short-lived in markets using rapidly evolving 
technologies. Positive effects for some of the underlying commercial 
agreement variables are found in the NASA and NSF samples. 
Commercial-type variables. The statistical models control for all 
of the commercial-type variables, even though most do not exhibit sig-
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activity are not restricted to being the same. Models of economic per-
formance for firms have typically allowed the data to show different 
performance for different types of activity, ceteris paribus. In the DoD, 
NASA, and DOE samples, when an SBIR project plans to commercial-
ize educational materials (education), employee growth is significantly 
less than what would be predicted in the absence of the project. 
INTERPRETATIoN oF ThE FINDINGS 
Because of the exploratory nature of the performance model and 
empirical analysis in this chapter, we exercise caution in interpreting 
the results from a policy perspective. It is tempting, however, to ask 
if the analysis suggests a policy lever that might be pulled prior to an 
award if an implicit goal of the SBIR program is to induce employment 
growth within the firm. Evidence of investments in intellectual property 
at the end of Phase I might therefore indicate a greater likelihood that 
the Phase II research will result in a positive employment trajectory for 
the firm, and might therefore be taken into consideration when select-
ing Phase II award recipients. However, caution is necessary, because 
the significant positive relation between intellectual property and the 
SBIR employment impact on the award-recipient firm quite likely en-
tails intellectual property developed during the Phase II project. Also, 
any such preaward policy might thwart the possibility of employment 
growth in other firms with which the SBIR firm has an after–Phase 
II commercial agreement. We are doubtful whether such a possibility 
could be predicted prior to a Phase II award. 
Notes 
1. For each agency, an initial regression included the full set of variables. Variables 
with statistically insignificant coefficients (excepting the commercial-type vari-
ables) were then dropped to leave the parsimonious specification. 
2. The definition, in terms of previously defined variables, is as follows: outfintoinv 
= non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment + U.S.-private-venture-capital-to-total-
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to-total-investment + state-or-local-government-funding-to-total-investment. The 
variables used to construct this summary variable are defined in the Glossary of 
Variables and Descriptive Statistics, Table A.1. 
3. The 11 commercial agreement variables are defined in the Glossary of Variables 
and Descriptive Statistics, Table A.1. 
4. The regression with all of the variables used the summary variable. If it was not 
significant, the initial full regression was estimated using not the summary variable 
but its underlying variables. Then, insignificant variables were dropped to reach 
the parsimonious specification. 
5. The variables used in the growth model are already present in the formulation of 
diff = [ln(emptA ) − ln(emptP )] because they determine ln(emptP ).05 05 05 
6. Related to this, Zeira (1987, pp. 204–205) argues that such outside funding 
reduces what he calls “structural uncertainty,” a situation in which the firm does 
not fully know its own profit function, which relates profits to capital stock. “The 
exact level of profits at larger amounts of capital can be discovered only by actu-
ally increasing the quantity of capital, that is, by ‘getting there.’ Investment under 
structural uncertainty creates an interaction between the accumulation of capi-
tal and the accumulation of information . . . In the face of structural uncertainty, 
investment becomes a process of learning the profit function and of searching for 





The Exploitation of SBIR-Induced 
Intellectual Capital and
Employment Growth 
Firms pursue profit maximization by relying on numerous strate-
gies. Examples of such strategies include, but are certainly not limited 
to, the development of a new technology with the expectation of selling 
or licensing it to other firms or even an expectation of being acquired 
by or merging with other firms. Alternatively, firms can pursue further 
research through R&D agreements. And, firms can attempt to realize 
more fully the profit potential of their technology by entering into joint 
ventures (all types), manufacturing/marketing/distribution agreements, 
or customer agreements. Any or all of these strategies should be viewed 
as a rational effort on the part of the firm to maximize profit. 
The empirical results in Chapter 6 show that the commercial agree-
ments reflecting the foregoing strategies are often negatively associated 
with greater-than-projected employment growth within the firm. The 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) firm develops the technol-
ogy during the Phase II project but, for example, may sell the rights 
to the technology to another domestic firm. The employment impact 
of the SBIR award will then be felt elsewhere in the economy where 
another firm has employment growth to support production using the 
technology developed in the SBIR project. Thus, relevant to the de-
scriptive analysis in this chapter, which is motivated by the commercial 
agreement variables in the analyses in Chapters 4 and 6, is the question 
of whether award-recipient firms pursue such strategies using commer-
cial agreements with other U.S. firms or investors, or even with foreign 
firms or investors. In other words, the question asked is, “Is the em-
ployment impact of the SBIR program confined to U.S. firms, or is it 
being realized to any significant extent among foreign firms?” Stated 
still another way, “Is there evidence that the technologies developed 
with funds from U.S. taxpayers allocated through the SBIR program are 
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INTERPRETATIoN oF ThE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter should be viewed 
as only a first step toward addressing these important issues. As shown 
in Table 7.1, there are similarities and differences across agencies in 
the extent to which alternative commercial agreements are in place 
among U.S. and foreign firms or investors. Regarding agreements with 
other U.S. firms or investors, the primary strategies being finalized or 
negotiated, across all agencies, are licensing agreements, marketing/ 
distribution agreements, R&D agreements, and customer alliances (but 
not necessarily in that order). 
While the NRC survey data are insufficient to quantify the mag-
nitude of any indirect employment effects, much less competitiveness 
effects, from the existence of these activities, our findings from Chap-
ter 6 do suggest that SBIR funding may leverage employment gains 
when agreements are undertaken with other firms or investors. Comple-
menting these findings, there is evidence from case studies of research 
joint-venture and R&D alliances that the parties cooperate on projects 
along a particular research path, but at the same time they pursue a re-
lated but independent research path as a diversification strategy (Link 
2006). To the extent that this happens among SBIR firms and their part-
ners, then direct and indirect employment effects might be possible. 
Four generalizations can be inferred from the descriptive statistics 
in Table 7.1. One, commercial agreements are more common among 
U.S. firms and investors than among foreign firms and investors. There 
are only two instances where finalized agreements with foreign firms or 
investors are greater than with U.S. firms or investors. Among the firms 
in the NASA sample, 8 percent had formalized a licensing agreement 
with foreign firms or investors, compared to 6.2 percent with domestic 
firms or investors. And, 1.7 percent of the firms in the NSF sample had 
formalized a merger with foreign firms or investors, compared to 0.0 
percent with U.S. counterparts. 
Two, among U.S. firms and investors, mergers and sale of the com-
pany are the least-used strategies across all of the funding agencies. 
This compares to licensing agreements being the most-used strategy 
by SBIR firms funded by the DoD, NIH, DOE, and NSF. Following 
licensing agreements by firms and investors in these four agencies are 
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Table 7.1 Agreements with other Firms or Investors: Percentage of the 
Random Sample of Phase II Projects Answering the Question, 
“As a result of the technology developed during this project, 
which of the following describes your firm’s activities with 
other firms and investors? (Select all that apply.)” 
DoD (n = 594) U.S. firms/investors Foreign firms/investors 
Finalized Ongoing Finalized Ongoing 
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Table 7.1  (continued) 
NIH (n = 338) U.S. firms/investors Foreign firms/investors 
Finalized Ongoing Finalized Ongoing 























19.2 16.0 8.9 6.2 
0.9 3.6 0.3 1.5 
2.1 4.4 0.0 0.6 
5.6 7.4 0.6 0.9 
0.3 3.0 0.0 0.6 
3.0 8.9 0.9 2.7 
21.3 10.4 12.4 6.5 
7.1 3.8 2.4 2.1 
14.8 10.7 4.1 3.0 
8.3 10.1 2.7 0.9 
2.1 2.1 0.3 0.9 
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Table 7.1  (continued) 
NASA (n = 112) U.S. firms/investors Foreign firms/investors 
Finalized Ongoing Finalized Ongoing 
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Table 7.1  (continued) 
DOE (n = 114) U.S. firms/investors Foreign firms/investors 
Finalized Ongoing Finalized Ongoing 























15.8 15.8 5.3 8.8 
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
2.6 1.8 0.0 1.8 
5.3 6.1 0.9 3.5 
0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 
2.6 7.0 0.0 2.6 
9.6 7.0 8.8 2.6 
6.1 6.1 0.9 4.4 
7.9 10.5 1.8 6.1 
7.9 13.2 4.4 5.3 
2.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 
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Table 7.1  (continued) 
NSF (n = 121) U.S. firms/investors Foreign firms/investors 
Finalized Ongoing Finalized Ongoing 























19.8 21.5 9.9 6.6 
2.5 3.3 0.0 0.8 
2.5 5.8 1.7 1.7 
5.0 15.7 4.1 3.3 
0.0 4.1 1.7 0.8 
3.3 9.9 0.8 2.5 
15.7 12.4 8.3 2.5 
8.3 9.9 3.3 2.5 
17.4 17.4 5.0 6.6 
11.6 18.2 3.3 4.1 
1.7 2.5 0.8 0.0 
NOTE: The overall percentage of projects that have agreement activities is less than 
would be the case if the percentages of projects were additive across the types of 
categories. They are not additive. Thus, for example, for the DoD, it will not in gen-
eral be the case that 16 percent of the Phase II projects have finalized U.S. licensing 
agreements while a completely different set of 14 percent have finalized U.S. R&D 
agreements and yet another distinct 13 percent have finalized U.S. customer alliances. 
To determine the percentage of the random sample of Phase II projects with U.S. 
agreements, with foreign agreements, and with both U.S. and foreign agreements, we 
constructed the qualitative variables defined in Table 7.2. Those variables are defined 
for all agencies. 
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations. 
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R&D agreements—R&D agreements rank first among NASA firms. In 
addition, licensing agreements with U.S. firms and investors are at least 
twice as common as those with foreign firms and investors, with the 
exception of the NASA sample. 
Three, licensing agreements and marketing/distribution agreements 
are the more common strategies with foreign firms or investors. 
And four, R&D agreements are significantly more common with U.S. 
firms and investors than with foreign firms and investors. Perhaps—and 
this should be viewed as a tentative hypothesis—it is easier to monitor 
information leakages that are inevitable during collaborative R&D when 
the partner firms or investors are geographically closer and within the 
same boundaries of intellectual property protection—that is, with a U.S. 
partner rather than a foreign partner. 
As shown in Table 7.2, U.S.-only agreements are more prevalent 
than U.S. and foreign firm or investor agreements. Foreign-only agree-
ments are the least prevalent. Thus, we interpret the data in Tables 7.1 
and 7.2 as preliminary evidence to conclude that U.S. SBIR funds for 
Phase II projects and the associated technologies and employment 
growth associated with those projects are not to a pronounced extent 
benefiting foreign firms through agreements with SBIR firms or inves-
tors. In that sense, there is no evidence that the technologies developed 
with funds from U.S. taxpayers are, to any significant extent, being ex-
ploited by foreign firms through agreements with SBIR firms. If there 
were such evidence of a substantial flow of SBIR technology to foreign 
firms, one could reasonably ask whether the U.S. SBIR firms captured 
a substantial part of the benefits from the applications of the SBIR tech-
nology by the foreign firms.2 But that question need not be asked. 
Finally, in Table 7.3, we examine the use of alternative strategies by 
observing the level of sales from the specific technology developed dur-
ing the Phase II project. Regardless of funding agency, the mean sales 
for those projects with no agreements—neither U.S. nor foreign agree-
ments—are less than for projects with agreements. And, mean sales are 
greater when there are agreements with foreign firms or investors than 
when there are only U.S. agreements. This finding, albeit based only on 
descriptive evidence—and in some cases descriptive evidence based 
only on a handful of observations—suggests that when such technology 
transfer does occur through commercial agreements among SBIR firms 
and foreign firms and investors, it is with projects that are relatively 
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U.S. agreement(s) 121 0.521 0.502 0 1 
only 
Foreign agreement(s) 121 0.083 0.276 0 1 
only 
U.S. and foreign 121 0.240 0.429 0 1 
agreement(s) 
NOTE: U.S. agreement(s) only: 0/1, with 1 indicating agreement(s)—finalized or ongo-
ing negotiations—with U.S. companies or investors only. Foreign agreement(s) only: 
0/1, with 1 indicating agreement(s)—finalized or ongoing negotiations—with foreign 
companies or investors only. U.S. and foreign agreement(s): 0/1, with 1 indicating 
both U.S. and foreign agreements. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Sales Categories with and without u.S. 
and Foreign Agreements 
DoD 




Sales with no 
agreements 
Sales with U.S. 
agreement(s) only 
Sales with foreign 
agreement(s) only 





































Sales with no 
agreements 
Sales with U.S. 
agreement(s) only 
Sales with foreign 
agreement(s) only 















1.01 × 107 
800,612 
4,849,109 
1.94 × 107 













NASA n Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 




Sales with no 
agreements 
Sales with U.S. 
agreement(s) only 
Sales with foreign 
agreement(s) only 
Sales with U.S. and 
foreign agreements 
112 917,510 2,313,071 0 15,100,000 
46 430,520 853,384 0 4,004,011 
41 938,914 2,375,296 0 13,500,000 
5 2,616,600 4,518,742 0 10,600,000 
20 1,568,936 3,402,045 0 15,100,000 
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Table 7.3  (continued) 
DOE 




Sales with no 
agreements 
Sales with U.S. 
agreement(s) only 
Sales with foreign 
agreement(s) only 





































Sales with no 
agreements 
Sales with U.S. 
agreement(s) only 
Sales with foreign 
agreement(s) only 















1.85 × 107 
438,816 















SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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more successful, as measured in terms of cumulative sales. Thus, this 
finding supports the belief that, for those cases, the SBIR firms are reap-
ing substantial benefits from the technologies developed with the funds 
from U.S. taxpayers. 
Notes 
1. We are defining exploitation to mean that the resulting U.S.-funded technology is 
not being entirely used within the United States and that the benefits from the SBIR 
R&D are in part captured by other countries. 
2. Of course, there is the possibility of spillovers of the technologies to foreign firms 
without any payments to the innovating SBIR firms—a possibility the NRC data-




The goals of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program, set out by Congress in the Small Business Innovation De-
velopment Act of 1982, did not include the growth of employment. In 
Chapter 2, we reviewed the legislated goals for the program, both in 
the 1982 Act and in subsequent reauthorizations. The goals include the 
stimulation of technological innovation, the use of small businesses to 
meet federal R&D needs, the encouragement of participation in techno-
logical innovation by disadvantaged persons, minorities, and women, 
and the increase in private sector commercialization of innovations de-
rived from federal R&D. Although employment growth could of course 
be a concomitant of successful attainment of the legislated goals for the 
SBIR program, such growth has never been a stated objective of the 
SBIR program. 
In this book, we analyzed, albeit in an exploratory manner within an 
original empirical framework, a rich and unique set of data collected by 
the NRC to investigate whether such public support of innovation has 
in fact stimulated employment growth for the firms that have received 
SBIR awards. Although SBIR projects are commercially successful 
roughly half of the time (Link and Scott 2010), possibly in many cases 
the employment growth that would accompany the sales from successful 
projects may not be observed in the firms performing those projects, but 
instead will occur elsewhere in the economy. Conceivably, the employ-
ment growth to support sales from technologies developed with SBIR 
funds will be realized in other firms that purchase or license the technol-
ogy or have manufacturing agreements with the firm that performed the 
SBIR program research. The NRC data do not allow us to document the 
employment growth at firms other than the award recipients, but we are 
able to ask if employment growth for the award recipients is less when 
the recipients have made commercial agreements allowing other firms 
to use the technologies created by the SBIR awards. 
Chapter 4 addressed the question of whether the technology created 
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the employment in the firm conducting the project. The evidence shows 
that typically the answer is no—on average the SBIR projects add only 
a small number of employees. The average number of employees re-
tained because of the technology developed in SBIR projects is only one 
or two for the random samples of the SBIR projects for the five agen-
cies—the DoD, NIH, NASA, DOE, and NSF. However, the range for 
employees retained because of the technology developed in the Phase 
II project is wide. Exploiting that range of outcomes, the data reveal 
that for many types of commercial agreements (regarding the Phase II 
technology) between the SBIR firm and other firms or investors, the 
number of employees retained is less, ceteris paribus, supporting the 
belief that the jobs created when the SBIR Phase II technology is used 
in production actually occur at other firms that have entered into agree-
ments to use the technology. 
Chapters 5 and 6 turned from the employment effects directly as-
sociated with the use of the SBIR project’s technology to the overall 
trajectory of the SBIR firm’s employment in order to address the dy-
namic question of whether the SBIR award helps the recipient firm 
overcome the initial hurdles that small, entrepreneurial firms face, thus 
facilitating a more permanent and possibly longer-term employment 
growth. The previous literature on entrepreneurial firms has been un-
able to address the question because of the lack of a comparison group 
to which the growth of firms receiving SBIR awards could be compared. 
We developed in Chapter 5 a model of the growth of small entrepre-
neurial firms, and with this model we estimated the growth for each of 
the SBIR award recipients using only information about each firm prior 
to when it received the SBIR Phase II award in the sample. That model 
is then used to predict the award recipient’s ultimate employment if it 
had not received the Phase II award. That predicted employment absent 
the award then provides a baseline for comparison to address the more 
dynamic question. 
The answer, as seen in Chapter 5, is that for four of the five agen-
cies’ samples of projects, there are substantial average employment 
gains that are due to the SBIR award. However, these average gains, 
despite being substantial in absolute amount, are not statistically sig-
nificant. Nonetheless, there are a number of individual cases where the 
actual employment for the firm exceeds the predicted employment by 






the outcomes for the employment gain attributable to the SBIR award. 
Chapter 6 exploited that range of outcomes to demonstrate that there are 
quite likely to be substantial employment gains from the SBIR program 
beyond those gains that we can observe using the NRC data. We expect 
those substantial employment gains are at other firms for two reasons: 
1) under commercial agreements they use the technologies developed 
by the SBIR award recipients, and 2) there are many cases where the 
presence of commercial agreements is associated with less employment 
growth attributable to the SBIR projects at the firms receiving SBIR 
awards. 
Understanding the determinants of the range in outcomes for retain-
ees or for overall employment growth suggests some policy implications. 
Chapter 4’s model of retainees provides large-sample econometric sup-
port for Nelson’s (1982) important observations—developed from case 
studies—about the success of government funding of research. Other 
things being the same, public funding of privately performed research is 
more likely to lead to commercialized results (and employment gains) 
when the government has a direct need for the products, processes, or 
services developed by the research projects. In such cases, the govern-
ment can provide the research direction and guidance of a potential 
customer for the output from a research project, and it also can provide 
a ready market for that output. The public funding of research is there-
fore more likely to stimulate employment. Chapter 6’s examination of 
the range in the growth of overall SBIR-recipient firm employment that 
is attributable to the SBIR award also shows that intellectual property is 
an indicator of significant, in a statistical sense, employment growth. As 
discussed there, this finding could potentially have policy implications 
if investments in intellectual property by the end of Phase I are used 
as a criterion for Phase II financial support. However, as explained in 
Chapter 6, such a criterion must be applied cautiously to avoid penaliz-
ing worthwhile projects that would be expected to develop intellectual 
property during the Phase II portion of the project. 
In sum, the impact of SBIR funding on firm employment specifi-
cally associated with the SBIR project is typically small—on average, 
the numbers of project-specific retainees have been small. Also, the 
impact on the firm’s overall employment growth attributed in our coun-
terfactual experiment to SBIR funding is small in the sense that the 
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For some individual observations of Phase II SBIR awards, the impact 
on retainees is large and significant. Also there are cases of large and 
significant impacts of a Phase II SBIR award on the overall employ-
ment growth of the firm. For both the actual number of retainees and the 
overall employment growth in the counterfactual experiment, there is 
a wide range of outcomes across the individual SBIR projects for each 
agency. Moreover, what impact there is varies systematically across 
agencies based on distinct project and firm characteristics. 
Just as Lerner (2010) finds that some public programs to stimulate 
high-potential business ventures have failed while others have suc-
ceeded, within the SBIR program which we study by looking at many 
of its awards we find a range of outcomes, from unsuccessful to suc-
cessful, for the program’s effects on employment. Moreover, just as 
Lerner (2010) finds that some practices favor success while others are 
associated with failure, we show that a set of variables describing the 
circumstances of the awards can significantly explain the differences in 
the outcomes.1 
Chapter 7 built on the empirically based discussion in early chap-
ters about commercial agreements. Descriptively, it appears that often 
the employment impact of SBIR funds is seen not in the SBIR award-
recipient firm, but possibly in other firms because of commercial agree-
ments allowing these other firms to use the technologies generated with 
SBIR Phase II awards. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the em-
ployment impact at times accrues to foreign firms or foreign investors 
through such commercial agreements. However, we observe only that, 
in the presence of such agreements, employment is less than it is at the 
SBIR award-recipient firms that do not have such agreements but are 
otherwise the same. It is then reasonable to assume that the firms using 
the SBIR technologies under commercial agreements will experience 
an employment impact. This is just a reasonable inference, though, be-
cause we do not directly observe the employment impact on the firms 
that reach agreements with the SBIR firms. 
In evaluating the possibility that the SBIR awards, through com-
mercial agreements, stimulate employment growth at other firms, recall 
first that employment growth is not a stated objective of the SBIR 
program, but commercialization is. Although, as we have shown, the 
employment impact, measured as project-specific retainees or overall 





nificant, the negative impact for some commercial agreement variables 
(such as the sale of technology rights) supports the idea that an im-
portant part of the employment impact of the SBIR program occurs 
elsewhere in the national and international economies. When the re-
cipient of an SBIR award creates new technology and sells the rights, 
it certainly meets the SBIR program’s goal of stimulating innovation 
and increasing commercialization, and the employment effect—which, 
again, is not a stated goal of the SBIR program—will be observed at 
other firms.2 
We have emphasized that although the average employment 
gains reported in Chapter 5 and analyzed in Chapter 6 are substantial 
in absolute amount, they are not statistically significant. However, in 
conclusion, we observe that on average, especially with respect to the 
age of the SBIR Phase II project that is sampled and studied, these are 
young firms. In many cases, enough time may not yet have passed for a 
strong surge in employment to have been caused by the SBIR Phase II 
projects that we have observed. Of course, if we had more time to ob-
serve these younger firms, they might not survive to be observed! Yet, 
through commercial agreements such as the sale of technology rights to 
other firms, the accomplishments of these young firms will live on and 
have employment effects that show up elsewhere in the U.S. economy 
and in foreign markets. 
Notes 
1. Importantly, as we have emphasized, generating retainees or overall employment 
growth of the firm is not a stated goal of the SBIR program, so an award that does 
not result in retainees or does not stimulate overall growth has not thereby failed to 
meet the SBIR program’s goals. 
2. Such spillover effects are consistent with the findings from case studies of SBIR 






Glossary of Variables and
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables defined here in Table A.1 are found in 
Table A.2. 
Table A.1  Glossary of Variables for Tables in the Book 
Variable category Definition 
Firm characteristics 
t Time from the founding of the firm until the 
Phase II award (i.e., the span of preaward 
information) 
firmage Firm’s age at the time of the Phase II award, 
measured by t 
firmrevenue Firm’s total revenue 
empt The number of employees (plus 1 for the owner/ 
manager/founder/entrepreneur) t years after the 
firm was founded 
emptA05 Actual number of employees in 2005 
diff Difference between the natural logarithms of the 
actual (A) employment in 2005 and predicted 
(P) employment in that year; the prediction for 
employment is the outcome of the counterfactual 
model estimated in Chapter 5 
tsa Amount of time since the Phase II award 
hires Current number of employees who were hired as 
a result of the technology developed during the 
Phase II project 
retainees Current number of employees who were retained 
as a result of the technology developed during 
the Phase II project 
sbirfnd a 0/1, with 1 indicating the firm was founded at 
least in part because of the SBIR program 
otherstarts The number of other firms started by the firm’s 
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Table A.1  (continued) 
Variable category Definition 
busfndrs Number of the firm’s founders with business 
backgrounds 
acadfndrs Number of the firm’s founders with academic 
backgrounds 
phIItsvy Firm’s number of Phase II awards that were 
among the population of 1992–2001 projects for 
sampling in the survey 
numsvyd Number of the firm’s Phase II projects surveyed 
percrevssbir Percentage of firm’s revenues, during its last 
fiscal year, from federal SBIR and/or STTR 
funding (Phase I and/or Phase II) 
spinoffs Number of spin-off companies that the firm has 
established as a result of the SBIR program 
SBIR research variables 
awardamt Dollar amount of the Phase II award 
prjage Age of the Phase II project (= tsa) 
univpartcptn 0/1, with 1 indicating that in executing the Phase 
II award, there was involvement by universities’
faculty, graduate students, or university-
developed technologies 
sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d Percentage of firm’s total R&D effort (man-
hours of scientists and engineers) devoted to 
SBIR activities during the most recent fiscal year 
sbirpatents Patents that have resulted, at least in part, from 
the firm’s SBIR and/or STTR awards 
rltdphI Number of the firm’s Phase I awards that are 
related to the Phase II project as of the time of 
that project 
rltdphII Number of the firm’s Phase II awards that are 
related to the Phase II project as of the time of 
that project 
prevphII Number of the firm’s previous Phase II awards 
Market variables 
fedacq 0/1, with 1 indicating that a federal system or 
acquisition program is using the technology 
from the Phase II project 
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Table A.1  (continued) 
Variable category Definition 
lateeval b 0/1, with 1 indicating the firm’s extant policy of 
late evaluation of the commercial potential for 
projects 
Commercial-type variablesc 
nocom 0/1, with 1 indicating no planned commercial 
use for project’s results 
software 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize software 
hardware 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize hardware 
process 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize process technology 
service 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize a service 
drug 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize a drug 
biologic 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize a biologic 
research 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize a research tool 
education 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned to 
commercialize educational materials 
other 0/1, with 1 indicating the project planned 
commercialization not covered in the other 
categories 
Geographic variablesd 
northeast 0/1, with 1 indicating the firm is in the Northeast 
south 0/1, with 1 indicating the firm is in the South 
midwest 0/1, with 1 indicating the firm is in the Midwest 
west 0/1, with 1 indicating the firm is in the West 
Intellectual property 
variables 
patents Patents applied for resulting from the technology 
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Table A.1  (continued) 

























Copyrights received for the technology from the 
Phase II project 
Trademarks received for the technology from the 
Phase II project 
Scientific publications resulting from the Phase 
II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from non-SBIR 
federal funds to total investment (including the 
SBIR Phase II award) in the Phase II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from U.S. private 
venture capital investment to total investment 
(including the SBIR Phase II award) in the Phase 
II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from foreign private 
investment to total investment (including the 
SBIR Phase II award) in the Phase II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from other private 
equity investment to total investment (including 
the SBIR Phase II award) in the Phase II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from other domestic 
private firm investment to total investment 
(including the SBIR Phase II award) in the Phase 
II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from state or local 
government funding of investment to total 
investment (including the SBIR Phase II award) 
in the Phase II project 
Ratio of additional developmental funding 
during the Phase II project from colleges or 
universities funding of investment to total 
investment (including the SBIR Phase II award) 
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Table A.1  (continued) 
Variable category Definition 
own-firm-funding-to- Ratio of additional developmental funding 
total-investment during the Phase II project from the SBIR firm’s 
(including borrowed funds) own investment to 
total investment (including the SBIR Phase II 
award) in the Phase II project 
personal-funds-to-total- Ratio of additional developmental funding 
investment during the Phase II project from the principals’
investment of personal funds to total investment 




licensing agreement(s) 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had one or more licensing 
agreements finalized or in ongoing negotiations 
with US companies/investors or with foreign 
companies/investors 
sale of company 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had the sale of the 
company finalized or in ongoing negotiations 
with US companies/investors or with foreign 
companies/investors 
partial sale of company 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had the partial sale of the 
company finalized or in ongoing negotiations 
with U.S. companies/investors or with foreign 
companies/investors 
sale of technology rights 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had one or more sales 
of technology rights agreements finalized or 
in ongoing negotiations with U.S. companies/ 








114  Link and Scott 
Table A.1  (continued) 
Variable category Definition 
company merger 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had a merger finalized or 
in ongoing negotiations with U.S. companies/ 
investors or with foreign companies/investors 
joint venture agreement(s) 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had one or more joint 
venture agreements finalized or in ongoing 
negotiations with U.S. companies/investors or 
with foreign companies/investors 
marketing/distribution 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
agreement(s) technology developed during the Phase 
II project, the company had one or more 
marketing/distribution agreements finalized or 
in ongoing negotiations with U.S. companies/ 
investors or with foreign companies/investors 
manufacturing 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
agreement(s) technology developed during the Phase 
II project, the company had one or more 
manufacturing agreements finalized or in 
ongoing negotiations with U.S. companies/ 
investors or with foreign companies/investors 
r&d agreement(s) 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had one or more R&D 
agreements finalized or in ongoing negotiations 
with U.S. companies/investors or with foreign 
companies/investors 
customer alliance(s) 0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had one or more customer 
alliances finalized or in ongoing negotiations 
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0/1, with 1 indicating that as a result of the 
technology developed during the Phase II 
project, the company had one or more other 
agreements, not itemized above, finalized or 
in ongoing negotiations with U.S. companies/ 
investors or with foreign companies/investors 
a The survey asked whether the firm was founded because of the SBIR program. The 
variable sbirfnd = 1 if the respondent said “Yes” or “Yes, in part.” 
b The survey asked when, as a matter of company policy, the firm would do an evalua-
tion of the potential commercial market for the product, process, or service expected 
from an SBIR project. The variable lateeval = 1 if this evaluation would be done 
during or after the Phase II award, and 0 if it would be done prior to submitting the 
Phase II project. 
c Projects for which the respondent did not provide a particular qualitative assessment 
of commercialization type are subsumed in the intercept term in the estimated models. 
d Projects in the West are subsumed in the intercept term for estimated models. The 
geographic location of each firm was determined by U.S. Census Bureau (2010) clas-
sifications. 
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation. 
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Table A.2  Descriptive Statistics for the Variables—mean, (Std. dev.), {Range} 








11.61 9.32 12.81 11.74 
(10.74) (9.13) (10.83) (11.25) 
{0–98} {0–100} {1–50} {0–97} 
1.41 × 107 8,386,375 1.64 × 107 1.12 × 107 
(2.66 × 107) (1.94 × 107) (2.93 × 107) (2.18 × x 107) 
{50,000–1.25 × {50,000–1.25 × 108) {50,000–1.25 × {50,000–1.25 × 
108} n = 389 108} 108} 
n = 754 n = 139 
35.46 20.50 45.66 33.14 
(61.51) (38.98) (78.47) (60.11) 
{1–326} {1–301} {1–376} {1–451} 
59.93 60.41 62.54 55.71 
(100.51) (293.38) (94.83) (118.51) 
{1–1,001} {1–4,001} {1–521} {1–851} 
0.1359 0.1201 0.02067 −0.1098 
(1.172) (1.338) (1.089) (1.218) 
{–5.940–4.244} {−4.158–4.942} {–3.723–4.509} {−4.008–3.193} 
7.464 7.233 8.084 7.836 
(2.810) (2.586 ) (2.923) (2.732) 





(1.46 × 107) 
{50,000–6.00 × 
107} 
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118 Table A.2  (continued) 
























34.32 30.97 33.22 
(36.29) (27.80) (33.87) 
{0–100} {0–100} {0–100} 
0.2864 0.6065 0.5000 
(0.7811) (1.430) (1.214) 
{0–6} {0–6} {0–6} 
653,972.2 567,243.1 682,761.3 
(211,411.5) (73,385.9) (104,086.4) 
{14,834–1,644,022} {350,000– {347,681–900,000} 
1,125,000} 
7.233 8.084 7.836 
(2.586) (2.923) (2.732) 
{4–13} {4–13} {4–13} 
0.5288 0.3007 0.3824 
(0.4998) (0.4600) (0.4878) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 382 n = 153 n = 136 
40.59 38.01 37.26 
(36.34) (30.20) (34.69) 
{0–100} {0–100} {0–100} 
2.982 12.75 7.779 
(6.586) (27.08) (13.19) 
































2.527 3.043 2.355 3.051 2.390 
(3.772) (5.392) (2.535) (5.904) (2.059) 
{1–83} {1–45} {1–20} {1–66} {1–13} 
n = 138 
1.870 2.141 1.748 1.935 1.794 
(1.629) (3.387) (1.527) (1.626) (1.365) 
{1–29} {1–29} {1–13} {1–13} {1–10} 
n = 138 
8.551 2.120 13.75 7.107 4.355 
(26.69) (7.241) (36.56) (18.49) (12.57) 
{0–193) {0–79} {0–222} {0–116} {0–90} 
0.1205 0.01790 0.05806 0.05714 0.04965 
(0.3258) (0.1328) (0.2346) (0.2329) (0.2180) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
0.1444 0.0486 0.09032 0.1286 0.1064 
(0.3517) (0.2153) (0.2876) (0.3359) (0.3094) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
0.02119 0.01279 0.006 0.02143 0.01418 
(0.1441) (0.1125) (0.080) (0.1453) (0.1187) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
0.2159 0.2762 0.1419 0.1357 0.2411 
(0.4117) (0.4477) (0.3501) (0.3437) (0.4293) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
(continued) 
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0.3974 0.2558 0.4323 0.4143 0.3972 
(0.4897) (0.4368) (0.4970) (0.4944) (0.4911) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
0.1563 0.09719 0.1355 0.2357 0.2128 
(0.3634) (0.2966) (0.3433) (0.4260) (0.4107) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
0.1205 0.1125 0.1226 0.1571 0.1560 
(0.3258) (0.3164) (0.3290) (0.3652) (0.3642) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
— 0.01790 — — — 
(0.1328) 
{0/1} 
— 0.03836 — — — 
(0.1923) 
{0/1} 
0.1046 0.2634 0.1484 0.1071 0.1560 
(0.3063) (0.4411) (0.3566) (0.3104) (0.3642) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
0.1457 0.1458 0.03226 0.02857 0.09220 
(0.1199) (0.3533) (0.1773) (0.1672) (0.2903) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
other 0.06225 0.07673 0.04516 0.05714 0.05674 
(0.2418) (0.2665) (0.2083) (0.2329) (0.2322) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
Geographic variables 
northeast 0.3099 0.3223 0.2903 0.2786 0.3404 
(0.4628) (0.4679) (0.4554) (0.4499) (0.4755) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
south 0.2490 0.2558 0.2323 0.1643 0.1560 
(0.4327) (0.4368) (0.4236) (0.3719) (0.3642) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
midwest 0.1250 0.1841 0.09677 0.1429 0.1560 
(0.3258) (0.3881) (0.2966) (0.3512) (0.3642) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
west 0.3205 0.2379 0.3806 0.4143 0.3475 
(0.4670) (0.4263) (0.4871) (0.4944) (0.4779) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
Intellectual property variables 
patents 0.9073 1.038 0.3226 0.8000 1.043 
(5.292) (2.218) (0.6338) (1.619) (1.599) 
{0–100} {0–25} {0–3} {0–13} {0–9} 
copyrights 0.0715 0.6368 0.04516 0.1429 0.2979 
(0.4218) (2.922) (0.4163) (0.5571) (1.423) 
{0–6} {0–49} {0–5} {0–5} {0–11} 
trademarks 0.2066 0.3990 0.07742 0.1857 0.2057 
(1.376) (0.8130) (0.3329) (0.5442) (0.5414) 
{0–35} {0–7} {0–3} {0–3} {0–3} 
(continued) 
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1.299 2.609 1.413 1.350 
(3.330) (9.889) (3.199) (2.056) 
{0–50} {0–165} {0–30} {0–11} 
0.07676 0.02170 0.03892 0.05651 
(0.1830) (0.1023) (0.1285) (0.1570) 
{0–0.9869} {0–0.8853} {0–0.7121} {0–0.8897} 
n = 389 n = 137 
0.01633 0.01337 — — 
(0.1051) (0.08459) 
{0–0.9723} {0–0.7778} 
n = 389 
0.003627 0.006172 0.001806 0.008724 
(0.03303) (0.04089) (0.02006) (0.08344) 
{0–0.4643} {0–0.3843} {0–0.2478} {0–0.9535} 
n = 389 n = 137 
0.02035 0.02306 0.003654 0.02078 
(0.09850) (0.1007) (0.03014) (0.08809) 
{0–0.8889} {0–0.8532} {0–0.3571} {0–0.4828} 
n = 389 n = 137 
0.02769 0.01849 0.02364 0.06162 
(0.09864) (0.09692) (0.08460) (0.1482) 
{0–0.7834} {0–0.8529} {0–0.4568} {0–0.7696} 























n = 137 
	
	 	
0.007888 0.007415 0.001925 0.01986 
(0.04751) (0.06995) (0.01489) (0.07613) 
{0–0.6471} {0–0.8000} {0–0.1533} {0–0.4778} 
n = 389 n = 137 n = 137 
0.0004164 0.001161 — — 
(0.003475) (0.01025) 
{0–0.04243} {0–0.09960} 
n = 389 
0.08527 0.07886 0.07310 0.06419 
(0.1618) (0.1752) (0.1525) (0.1313) 
{0–0.8813} {0–0.8096} {0–0.8571} {0–0.6281} 
n = 389 n = 137 n = 137 
0.01875 0.003100 0.004356 0.02767 
(0.06519) (0.01796) (0.02324) (0.08308) 
{0–0.5715} {0–0.1799} {0–0.2107} {0–0.5334} 
n = 389 n = 137 n = 137 
0.3787 0.2411 0.3596 0.4711 
(0.4858) (0.4297) (0.4820) (0.5012) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
0.05030 0.03571 0.03509 0.06612 
(0.2189) (0.1864) (0.1848) (0.2495) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 




















n = 594 
sale of company 0.06397 
(0.2449) 
{0/1} 
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Variable category DoD (n = 755)a NIH (n = 391)a NASA (n = 155)a DOE (n = 140)a NSF (n = 141)a 
partial sale of 
company 










0.05556 0.06509 0.02679 0.05263 0.09917 
(0.2293) (0.2470) (0.1622) (0.2243) (0.3001) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 594 n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
0.1566 0.1302 0.09821 0.1404 0.2645 
(0.3637) (0.3370) (0.2989) (0.3489) (0.4429) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 594 n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
0.03704 0.03254 0.0 0.01754 0.06612 
(0.1890) (0.1777) (0.0) (0.1319) (0.2495) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/0} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 594 n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
0.1330 0.1243 0.07143 0.1140 0.1488 
(0.3399) (0.3304) (0.2587) (0.3193) (0.3573) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 594 n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
0.2205 0.3402 0.1696 0.2018 0.3058 
(0.4150) (0.4745) (0.3770) (0.4031) (0.4627) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 594 n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
0.1498 0.1243 0.08929 0.1579 0.2066 
(0.3572) (0.3304) (0.2864) (0.3663) (0.4066) 
{0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} {0/1} 
n = 594 n = 338 n = 112 n = 114 n = 121 
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r&d agreement(s) 0.2828 
(0.4508) 
{0/1} 
















n = 121 
customer alliance(s) 0.2761 
(0.4474) 
{0/1} 
















n = 121 
other 0.0387 0.04438 0.05357 0.02632 0.04132 
(0.1931) 
{0/1} 
n = 594 
(0.2062) 
{0/1} 
n = 338 
(0.2262) 
{0/1} 
n = 112 
(0.1608) 
{0/1} 
n = 114 
(0.1999) 
{0/1} 
n = 121 
NOTE: — = data not available. 
a Smaller sample sizes (n) due to missing observations are noted in the table. 
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Table B.1 Construction of the Random Sample of Projects from Tables 3.1 and 3.2: Phase II Projects (11,214 in total) 
for All Agencies, 1992–2001 
Data reduction process DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
Total Phase II projects, 1992–2001 5,650 2,497 1,488 808 771 
Total Phase II projects for firms with 1 project 1,048 728 254 136 204 
Surveyed Phase II projects for firms with 1 project 1,047 728 254 136 204 
Did not respond 809 540 212 96 139 
Did respond 238 188 42 40 65 
Randomly sampled 1,047 728 254 136 204 
Sample weight 1.00a 1.00b 1.00c 1.00d 1.00e 
Total Phase II projects for firms with 2 projects 651 399 159 86 83 
Surveyed Phase II projects for firms with 2 projects 622 395 155 85 82 
Did not respond 470 285 127 62 57 
Did respond 152 110 28 23 25 
Randomly sampled 622 395 155 85 82 
Sample weight 1.05f 1.01g 1.03h 1.01i 1.01j 
Total Phase II projects for firms with > 2 projects 3,951 1,370 1,075 586 484 
Surveyed Phase II projects for firms with > 2 projects 1,386 555 370 218 171 
Did not respond 856 357 259 124 99 
Did respond 530 198 111 94 72 
Randomly sampled 1,357k 554l 366m 215n 170o 
Sample weight 2.91p 2.47q 2.94r 2.73s 2.85t 
NOTES: 
Total DoD projects = 1,048 + 651 + 3,951 = 5,650. 
Total DoD surveyed = 1,047 + 622 + 1,386 = 3,055. 
Total DoD randomly surveyed = 1,047 + 622 + 1,386 – 29 = 3026. 
The 238 + 152 + 530 = 920 responses minus the 29 cases added to the sample = 891 responses from the random sample. 
Total NIH projects = 728 + 399 + 1,370 = 2,497. 
Total NIH surveyed = 728 + 395 + 555 = 1,678. 
Total NIH randomly surveyed = 728 + 395 + 554 = 1,677. 
The 188 + 110 + 198 = 496 responses minus the 1 case added to the sample = 495 responses from the random sample. 
Total NASA projects = 254 + 159 + 1,075 = 1,488. 
Total NASA surveyed = 254 + 155 + 370 = 779. 
Total NASA randomly surveyed = 254 + 155 + 366 = 775. 
The 42 + 28 + 111 = 181 responses minus the 4 cases added to the sample = 177 responses from the random sample. 
Total DOE projects = 136 + 86 + 586 = 808. 
Total DOE surveyed = 136 + 85 + 218 = 439. 
Total DOE randomly surveyed = 136 + 85 + 215 = 436. 
The 40 + 23 + 94 = 157 responses minus the 3 cases added to the sample = 154 responses from the random sample. 
Total NSF projects = 204 + 83 + 484 = 771. 
Total NSF surveyed = 204 + 82 + 171 = 457. 
Total NSF randomly surveyed = 204 + 82 + 170 = 456. 
The 65 + 25 + 72 = 162 responses minus the 1 case added to the sample = 161 responses from the random sample. 
a 1,047/1,048 = 0.9990, and 1/0.9990 = 1.00. 
b 728/728 = 1, and 1/1 = 1. 
c 254/254 = 1, and 1/1 = 1. 
d 136/136 = 1, and 1/1 = 1. 
e 204/204 = 1, and 1/1 = 1. 
f 622/651 = 0.9555, and 1/0.955 = 1.05. 
g 395/399 = 0.9900, and 1/0.9900 = 1.01. 
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i 85/86 = 0.9884, and 1/0.9884 = 1.01. 
j 82/83 = 0.9880, and 1/0.9880 = 1.01. 
k After taking the random sample, 5 projects were added to the sample at the request of the firms receiving the awards, and then 24 projects 
were added by the NRC research team to ensure that known “big successes” (over $10 million in sales and subsequent investments) were 
in the sample. Hence, 1,386 − 5 − 24 = 1,357. 
l After taking the random sample, 1 project was added to the sample at the request of the firm receiving the award. Hence, 555 − 1 = 554. 
m After taking the random sample, 4 projects were added by the NRC research team to ensure that known “big successes” (over $10 million 
in sales and subsequent investments) were in the sample. Hence, 370 − 4 = 366. 
n After taking the random sample, 1 project was added to the sample at the request of the firm receiving the award, and then 2 projects were 
added by the NRC research team to ensure that known “big successes” (over $10 million in sales and subsequent investments) were in 
the sample. Hence, 218 − 3 = 215. 
o After taking the random sample, 1 project was added by the NRC research team to ensure that known “big successes” (over $10 million 
in sales and subsequent investments) were in the sample. Hence, 171 − 1 = 170. 
p 1,357/3,951 = 0.3435, and 1/0.3435 = 2.91. 
q 554/1370 = 0.4044, and 1/0.4044 = 2.47. 
r 366/1075 = 0.3405, and 1/0.3405 = 2.94. 
s 215/586 = 0.3669, and 1/0.3669 = 2.73. 
t 170/484 = 0.3512, and 1/0.3512 = 2.85. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table B.2  Negative Binomial Regression Results from Equation (4.2)a for the Larger Samples 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error) 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
SBIR research variables 
univpartcptn  0.275 −0.437 —d −0.227 −0.193 
(0.159)**** (0.164)****** (0.310) (0.313) 
sbir-r&d-to- 0.00384   0.0110 −0.00426 −0.00389  0.00566
total-r&d (0.00239)*** (0.00244)******* (0.00441) (0.00427)  (0.00486)* 
sbirpatents −0.00599 −0.0152 0.00841 −0.0199 −0.00877
(0.00323)**** (0.0119)**  (0.00479)**** (0.0152)** (0.00736)* 
rltdphII  0.159 −0.0435 0.0855 0.190 0.278
(0.0723)***** (0.0340)** (0.0757) (0.0735)******  (0.117)***** 
Market variables 
fedacq  0.433 0.262 −0.0577 0.594  0.837
(0.159)****** (0.529) (0.467)  (0.345)****  (0.519)*** 
lateeval  0.212 −0.241 −0.367 −0.701 −0.0836 
(0.185)* (0.552) (0.349) (0.596)* (0.312) 
Commercial-type variables 
nocom  0.158 −0.489 —e —  1.41
(0.433) (0.745) (0.545)****** 
software  0.778 0.194 0.274 0.554 0.143 
(0.181)******* (0.206) (0.277) (0.417)** (0.415) 
(continued) 
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Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error) 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
hardware  0.712 0.141 0.801  0.684  0.568
(0.142)******* (0.197)  (0.293)******  (0.376)****  (0.377)*** 
process  0.501 0.192 0.701 −0.0657 0.776
(0.153)******* (0.218) (0.378)**** (0.369)  (0.326)***** 
service  0.461 −0.0776 0.639 −0.501  0.980
(0.284)*** (0.240)  (0.333)**** (0.327)***  (0.326)****** 
drug —  1.35 —e — — 
(0.470)****** 
biologic — −0.246 —e — — 
(0.308) 
research −0.267 0.204 0.836 −0.494 0.0379 
(0.181)*** (0.160)*  (0.354)***** (0.528) (0.413) 
education −1.15 0.478 −2.10 −1.25 −0.950
(0.434)****** (0.211)***** (0.701)****** (0.388)******* (0.604)*** 
other  0.280 0.361 0.227 1.34 −0.280 
(0.203)** (0.334) (0.665)  (0.524)****** (0.607) 
Geographic variables 
northeast −0.357 0.242 −1.31 −0.00212 0.769
(0.176)***** (0.257) (0.363)******* (0.337)  (0.338)***** 
south  0.128 0.246 0.372 0.470 0.0388 
(0.204) (0.254) (0.297)* (0.553) (0.472) 
midwest −0.489 0.309 0.740 −0.166 0.264 
(0.249)***** (0.237)** (0.535)** (0.527) (0.373) 
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Intellectual property variables 
patents  0.0307 0.0412 0.299 −0.108 0.230
(0.00592)******* (0.0344)* (0.243)* (0.0957)  (0.127)**** 
copyrights  0.0403 −0.00338 0.415 0.626 0.0271 
(0.0743) (0.0132) (0.0888)******* (0.237)****** (0.0981) 
trademarks −0.0264 0.376 0.267 −0.106 0.377 
(0.0279) (0.122)****** (0.820) (0.243) (0.361) 
publications  0.0173 −0.00140 −0.00160  0.0422 0.106
(0.0191) (0.00343) (0.0320) (0.0625)  (0.0338)****** 
Funding variables 
non-SBIR- 1.35 1.59 1.71 0.278 0.613 
federal- (0.278)******* (0.709)***** (1.32)** (0.776) (0.865) 
to-total-
investment
U.S.-private- 0.207 3.31 —
e — −2.57




foreign- 2.73 2.94 −4.53  3.25 −2.27
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Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error) 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
other-private- 1.70 1.25 −6.80 −0.205 −0.831 




other-domestic- −0.380 1.19 −1.25 2.34  0.224 




state-or-local- −0.700 2.85 −3.58  9.05 –0.733 




colleges-or- −0.714 −4.46 −8.92 — — 







own-firm- 1.16 3.24 0.253 1.55  1.45 
funding- (0.365)****** (0.476)******* (0.668) (0.534)****** (0.926)*** 
to-total-
investment
personal- 1.54 1.76 10.3 4.14 3.19 
funds- (0.974)*** (0.943)**** (7.06)*** (9.86) (2.31)** 
to-total-
investment
Constant −3.03 −2.89 −2.92 −2.81 −3.71
(0.243)******* (0.276)******* (0.412)******* (0.505)*******  (0.411)******* 
Auxiliary para- 1.10 0.761 0.878 5.91 × 10
−7 1.05 
meter: alphab (0.170) (0.138) (0.245) (7.86 × 10−6) (0.313) 
n  744  382  155 134  135 
Log pseudo −2526.97 −971.83 −431.01 −360.36 −397.73 
likelihood 
Wald chi- 1,052.74*******  344.86*******  137.99******* 1,868.76*******  247.27******* 
squared (df)c
NOTE: — = data not available. Exposure = prjage. Significance levels (two-tailed excepting chi-squared): ******* = 0.001; ****** = 
0.01; ***** = 0.05; **** = 0.10; *** = 0.15; ** = 0.20; * = 0.25. (df) = degrees of freedom. 
DoD 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 478 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.811 to 1.49), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 30. 
NIH 
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b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.533 to 1.09), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 32. 
NASA 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 123 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.507 to 1.52), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 27. 
d univpartcptn not included because including the variable—the only one that constrained the size of the sample—precluded using the 
full sample of respondents, and the variable did not have a significant effect in the subsample for which the model including it could be 
estimated. 
e Occasionally variables are excluded because there are insufficient nonzero observations in the context of the many variables with small 
numbers of nonzero observations for estimation of the model statistics. For example, nocom was excluded and the effect left in the 
intercept; there was just a single observation in the sample, with nocom equal to 1. For another example, drug is omitted because it 
equaled zero in all 155 observations for the NASA sample. These types of cases appeared in the three smaller samples—NASA, DOE, 
and NSF—and even in the large DoD sample for the variables drug and biologic. 
DOE 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 104 clusters by firm. 
b With the relatively large standard error, the 95% confidence interval for alpha ranges from 2.85 × 10−18 to 122,785.7, so the more general 
negative binomial rather than the Poisson estimator is appropriate. Alpha is not well estimated, but we certainly cannot assume that it 
is zero. 
c df = 27. 
NSF 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 121 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.584 to 1.88), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 29. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table B.3  Negative Binomial Regression Results from Equation (4.2)a for Smaller Samples with Commercial 
Agreement Variables 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error) 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
SBIR research variables 
univpartcptn 0.385 −0.476 — −0.289 −0.341 
(0.167)***** (0.165)****** (0.353) (0.354) 
sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d 0.00260 0.0106 −0.00484 0.000279 0.000568 
(0.00228) (0.00250)******* (0.00481) (0.00477) (0.00551) 
sbirpatents −0.00437 −0.0189 0.00922 −0.0292 −0.0265 
(0.00342)* (0.0124)*** (0.00503)**** (0.0119)***** (0.0109)***** 
rltdphII 0.132 −0.0644 −0.0419 0.114 0.269 
(0.0730)**** (0.0316)***** (0.131) (0.0732)*** (0.105)****** 
Market variables 
fedacq 0.429 −0.124 0.109 0.647 1.50 
(0.139)****** (0.484) (0.482) (0.367)**** (0.723)***** 
lateeval 0.178 0.0782 −0.371 − 0.480 −0.745 
(0.187) (0.612) (0.475) (0.676) (0.318)***** 
Commercial-type variables 
nocom −0.669 −0.632 — — 0.880 
(0.433)*** (0.931) (0.865) 
(continued) 
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Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error) 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
software 0.629 0.0433 0.131 0.127 0.283 
(0.185)******* (0.204) (0.314) (0.405) (0.393) 
hardware 0.379 −0.148 0.515 0.232 −0.221 











service 0.275 −0.174 0.565 −0.458 0.959 
(0.264) (0.240) (0.352)*** (0.299)*** (0.328)****** 
drug — 0.942 
(0.442)***** 
— — — 
biologic — −0.572 
(0.318)**** 
— — — 
research −0.356 0.118 0.822 −1.13 −0.0754 
(0.171)***** (0.168) (0.343)***** (0.886)* (0.403) 
education −0.15 0.342 −0.136 −1.11 −1.38 
(0.365)****** (0.219)*** (0.803) (0.752)*** (0.638)***** 
other 0.0876 0.0477 0.219 0.693 0.109 
(0.192) (0.314) (0.638) (0.679) (0.509) 
Geographic variables 
northeast −0.142 0.418 −2.00 0.163 1.36 

























































































































140 Table B.3  (continued) 
Variable DoD 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error) 
NIH NASA DOE NSF 
other-domestic- −0.204 1.19 0.674 2.30 −1.21 
private-firm-
investment-to-
(0.513) (0.925)** (1.43) (0.806)****** (0.809)*** 
total-investment 




















Commercial agreement variables 
licensing −0.309 
agreement(s) (0.136)***** 











































partial sale of −0.228 0.207 −0.0496 −0.121 0.368 
company (0.222) (0.360) (0.834) (0.732) (0.627) 
sale of technology 0.198 −0.410 −1.27 −0.942 −0.515 
rights (0.197) (0.272)*** (0.803)*** (0.858) (0.364)** 
company merger 0.492 0.683 — — 0.184 
(0.321)*** (0.598) (0.950) 
joint venture −0.185 0.530 1.94 0.558 −1.25 
agreement(s) (0.182) (0.271)**** (0.783)***** (0.519) (0.579)***** 
marketing/distribution 0.305 0.146 0.110 −0.112 0.967 
agreement(s) (0.123)***** (0.193) (0.456) (0.370) (0.398)***** 
manufacturing 0.249 −0.0715 1.33 −0.379 0.699 
agreement(s) (0.161)*** (0.282) (0.950)** (0.428) (0.412)**** 
r&d agreement(s) −0.0294 0.0867 −1.00 0.852 −0.0163 
(0.140) (0.178) (0.422)***** (0.369)***** (0.330) 
customer alliance(s) –0.160 0.176 −1.26 0.188 0.565 
(0.136)* (0.184) (0.506)***** (0.339) (0.344)**** 
other −0.464 −0.759 −1.51 0.228 −2.69 
(0.266)**** (0.347)***** (0.680)***** (0.505) (0.691)******* 
Constant −2.56 −2.56 −1.81 −2.41 −3.33 
(0.278)******* (0.303)******* (0.519)******* (0.559)******* (0.480)******* 
Auxiliary parameter: 0.862 0.647 0.375 1.23 × 10−8 0.533 
alphab (0.151) (0.126) (0.184) (7.26 × 10−9) (0.151) 
n 552 307 109 104 106 
Log pseudo likelihood −2,144.89 −829.37 −318.70 −295.24 −328.84 
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Table B.3  (continued) 
NOTE: — = data not available. Exposure = prjage. Significance levels (two-tailed excepting chi-squared): ******* = 0.001; ****** = 
0.01; ***** = 0.05; **** = 0.10; *** = 0.15; ** = 0.20; * = 0.25. (df) = degrees of freedom. 
DoD 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 392 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.612 to 1.21), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 41. 
NIH 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 240 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.443 to 0.947), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 43. 
NASA 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 94 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.144 to 0.980), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 36. 
DOE 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 86 clusters by firm. 
b Because alpha is essentially 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 3.88 ×10–9 to 3.91×10–8), the Poisson estimator would do just as 
well as the negative binomial. The Poisson distribution is a special case of the negative binomial distribution with alpha equal to zero. 
c df = 37. 
NSF 
a Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 95 clusters by firm. 
b Significantly different from 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.306 to 0.929), so the negative binomial rather than the Poisson 
estimator is appropriate. 
c df = 40. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
   
    
   
   
   
    
    
    
   
    
    
   
   
   
    
   
   
    
    
   
    
  
  
Appendix B 143 
Table B.4  Percentage Change in retainees, for Statistically Significant 
Changes, Given Change in the Explanatory Variable, other
Things Being the Same 
Explanatory variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
SBIR research variables 
univpartcptn 47.0  −37.9 
sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d 11.2 
sbirpatents −2.9 −2.6 
rltdphII −6.2 30.9 
Market variables 





process 40.1 194.0 
service 161.0 
drug 157.0 
research −30.0 128.0 
education −68.3 −74.8 
Geographic variables 
northeast −86.5 290.0 
midwest 186.0 
Intellectual property variables 
patents 2.9 24.2 








foreign-private-investment- 47.6 41.2 −23.3 
to-total-investment 
other-private-equity-invest- 13.4 12.4 −21.7 
ment-to-total-investment 
(continued) 
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Commercial agreement variables 
licensing agreement(s) −26.6 
sale of company 

















NOTE: Blank = not applicable. The qualifying phrase ‘Given Change in the Explana-
tory Variable’ in the table’s title means a change of 1.0 unit in the explanatory variable. 
There are two exceptions. The first is sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d, which is a percentage 
and ranges from 0 to 100. For this table we consider the impact of changing it by 10 
units—i.e., an increase of 10 percentage points. A second exception is made for the 
funding variables. These are measured as proportions and are observed in the range 
between 0 and 1. For this table we consider the impact of changing them by 0.1—i.e., 
each funding variable is increased to take 10 percent more of the total funding. Only 
changes significant at the 0.05 level or higher for a two-tailed test are shown. The 
changes are based on the estimations in Table B.3. Holding constant all variables ex-
cept xi , given a change in xi , the expected number of retainees relative to the expected 
number without that change is the base for the natural logarithms raised to the power 
of the product of the coefficient for xi and the change in xi . For a unit change in xi , 
the expression is called the incident rate ratio and is simply the base for the natural 
logarithms raised to the power equal to the coefficient for variable xi . Subtracting 1.0 
from the incident rate ratio and multiplying by 100 gives the percentage change shown 
in this table, excepting the cases noted above, for which the change in xi differed from 
1.0 (being 10 in one case and 0.1 in the others). Two caveats: 1) To understand fully 
the magnitude of the effect from changing an explanatory variable, the reader should 
consult the Glossary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics, Table A.1, to find the 
units in which each of the explanatory variables is measured as well as the standard 
deviation for each. The percentage change shown in this table is for a one-unit change 
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Table B.4  (continued) 
in the explanatory variable, excepting the cases noted above. Following the proce-
dure outlined in this note, one can readily compute the percentage change for various 
amounts of change (for example, a standard deviation) in the explanatory variable. 2) 
Because only those changes at the 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test are 
shown, the additional detail in Table B.3 reveals other important effects that are not 
quite statistically significant at the 0.05 level but that should not be ignored for a full 
understanding of the factors affecting the employment impact of the SBIR program. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table B.5  Descriptive Statistics for the Complete Sample of Respondents 
and Nonrespondents for the Employment Growth model and 
Probability of Response model 
Panel A: Complete DoD Sample: Respondents and Nonrespondents 
Variable n Mean Std. dev. Range 
awardamt 3,026 697,105.9 327,073 50,000– 
6,190,970 
ln(awardamt) 3,026 13.38 0.3905 10.82–15.64 
phIItsvy 3,026 7.602 16.84 1–127 
ln(phIItsvy) 3,026 1.101 1.167 0–4.884 
numsvyd 3,026 2.746 3.779 1–31 
prjage 3,026 8.167 2.873 4–13 
NOTE: n = number of respondents providing information on all variables. Of the 891 
projects for which completed or partially completed responses were available (see 
Table B.1), 136 projects were missing one or more of the explanatory variables in the 
prediction model, leaving 755 (891 − 136) uncensored observations to estimate the 
econometric model in Table B.6. Of the 136 projects not among the 755 uncensored 
observations but among the 891 with complete or partially complete responses, there 
were 104 that did not provide a response about their employment—the focal variable 
of this study—and therefore for purposes of the econometric model are in the sample 
as censored observations. Among the 136 projects, there were 32 cases where the 
respondents did provide the dependent variable (empt and hence its natural logarithm) 
for the employment model but for which one or more of the explanatory variables 
were missing. Those 32 cases were not censored in the sense of the 2,239 projects for 
which there was no response about the dependent variable here, and the econometric 
model is estimated with 2,994 observations (the 3,026 observations in the random 
sample of DoD projects minus the 32 cases that were not censored, because they 
responded with the dependent variable, but cannot be used in the econometric model 
because of missing explanatory variables). Thus, to estimate the econometric model 
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Table B.5  (continued) 
Panel B: Complete NIH Sample: Respondents and Nonrespondents 
Variable n Mean Std. dev. Range 
awardamt 1,677 623,792.2 232,029.2 7,050– 
2,948,097 
ln(awardamt) 1,677 13.26 0.4461 8.861–14.90 
phIItsvy 1,677 3.537 7.212 1–120 
ln(phIItsvy) 1,677 0.7221 0.8442 0–4.787 
numsvyd 1,677 1.884 1.746 1–27 
prjage 1,677 7.688 2.849 4–13 
NOTE: n = number of respondents providing information on all variables. Of the 495 
projects for which completed or partially completed responses were available (see 
Table B.1), 104 projects were missing one or more of the explanatory variables in the 
employment model, leaving 391 (495 − 104) uncensored observations to estimate the 
econometric model in Table B.6. Of the 104 projects not among the 391 uncensored 
observations but among the 495 with complete or partially complete responses, there 
were 71 that did not provide a response about their employment—the focal variable of 
this study—and therefore for purposes of the econometric model are in the sample as 
censored observations. Among the 104 projects, there were 33 cases where the respon-
dents did provide the dependent variable (empt and hence its natural logarithm) for 
the employment model but for which one or more of the explanatory variables were 
missing. Those 33 cases were not censored in the sense of the 1,253 projects for which 
there was no response about the dependent variable here, and the econometric model 
is estimated with 1,644 observations (the 1,677 observations in the random sample of 
NIH projects minus the 33 cases that were not censored, because they responded with 
the dependent variable, but cannot be used in the econometric model because of missing 
explanatory variables). Thus, to estimate the econometric model in Table B.6, there are 
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Table B.5  (continued) 
Panel C: Complete NASA Sample: Respondents and Nonrespondents 
Variable n Mean Std. dev. Range 
awardamt 775 554,673.6 101,767.2 1–1,982,676 
ln(awardamt) 775 13.19 0.5176 0–14.50 
phIItsvy 775 8.610 19.04 1–127 
ln(phIItsvy) 775 1.154 1.21 0–4.844 
numsvyd 775 2.919 4.169 1–31 
prjage 775 9.019 2.759 4–13 
NOTE: n = number of respondents providing information on all variables. Of the 177 
projects for which completed or partially completed responses were available (see 
Table B.1), 22 projects were missing one or more of the explanatory variables in the 
employment model, leaving 155 (177 − 22) uncensored observations to estimate the 
econometric model in Table B.6. Of the 22 projects not among the 155 uncensored 
observations but among the 177 with complete or partially complete responses, there 
were 18 that did not provide a response about their employment—the focal variable 
of this study—and therefore for purposes of the econometric model are in the sample 
as censored observations. Among the 22 projects, there were 4 cases where the re-
spondents did provide the dependent variable (empt and hence its natural logarithm) 
for the employment model but for which one or more of the explanatory variables 
were missing. Those 4 cases were not censored in the sense of the 616 projects for 
which there was no response about the dependent variable here, and the econometric 
model is estimated with 771 observations (the 775 observations in the random sample 
of NASA projects minus the 4 cases that were not censored, because they responded 
with the dependent variable, but cannot be used in the econometric model because of 
missing explanatory variables). Thus, to estimate the econometric model in Table B.6, 
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Table B.5  (continued) 
Panel D: Complete DOE Sample: Respondents and Nonrespondents 
Variable n Mean Std. dev. Range 
awardamt 436 666,741.3 108,160.5 247,838– 
900,000 
ln(awardamt) 436 13.39 0.1814 12.42–13.71 
phIItsvy 436 8.287 15.87 1–120 
ln(phIItsvy) 436 1.222 1.206 0–4.787 
numsvyd 436 2.933 3.562 1–27 
prjage 436 8.046 2.824 4–13 
NOTE: n = number of respondents providing information on all variables. Of the 154 
projects for which completed or partially completed responses were available (see 
Table B.1), 14 projects were missing one or more of the explanatory variables in the 
employment model, leaving 140 (154 − 14) uncensored observations to estimate the 
model in Table B.6. Of the 14 projects not among the 140 uncensored observations but 
among the 154 with complete or partially complete responses, there were 8 that did 
not provide a response about their employment—the focal variable of this study—and 
therefore for purposes of the econometric model are in the sample as censored obser-
vations. Among the 14 projects, there were 6 cases where the respondents did provide 
the dependent variable (empt and hence its natural logarithm) for the employment 
model but for which one or more of the explanatory variables were missing. Those 
6 cases were not censored in the sense of the 290 projects for which there was no 
response about the dependent variable here, and the econometric model is estimated 
with 430 observations (the 436 observations in the random sample of DOE projects 
minus the 6 cases that were not censored, because they responded with the dependent 
variable, but cannot be used in the econometric model because of missing explana-
tory variables). Thus, to estimate the econometric model in Table B.6, there are 430 
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Table B.5  (continued) 
Panel E: Complete NSF Sample: Respondents and Nonrespondents 
Variable n Mean Std. dev. Range 
awardamt 456 350,413 78,787.13 6,000–500,001 
ln(awardamt) 456 12.73 0.3209 8.700–13.12 
phIItsvy 456 5.963 12.63 1–120 
ln(phIItsvy) 456 0.9074 1.117 0–4.787 
numsvyd 456 2.342 2.735 1–27 
prjage 456 7.667 2.624 4–13 
NOTE: n = number of respondents providing information on all variables. Of the 161 
projects for which completed or partially completed responses were available (see 
Table B.1), 20 projects were missing one or more of the explanatory variables in the 
employment model, leaving 141 (161 − 20) uncensored observations to estimate the 
econometric model in Table B.6. Of the 20 projects not among the 141 uncensored 
observations but among the 161 with complete or partially complete responses, there 
were 10 that did not provide a response about their employment—the focal variable 
of this study—and therefore for purposes of the econometric model are in the sample 
as censored observations. Among the 20 projects, there were 10 cases where the re-
spondents did provide the dependent variable (empt and hence its natural logarithm) 
for the employment model but for which one or more of the explanatory variables 
were missing. Those 10 cases were not censored in the sense of the 305 projects for 
which there was no response about the dependent variable here, and the econometric 
model is estimated with 446 observations (the 456 observations in the random sample 
of NSF projects minus the 10 cases that were not censored, because they responded 
with the dependent variable, but cannot be used in the econometric model because of 
missing explanatory variables). Thus, to estimate the econometric model in Table B.6, 
there are 446 observations, of which 305 are censored and 141 are uncensored. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table B.6  Results from the Firm Employment Growth model, Equation (5.4), with Control for Responsea 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error)b 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
Regression model for ln(empt) 
t 0.02896 0.18547 0.15927 0.14967 0.10812 
(.0404) (0.0558)***** (0.0740)*** (0.0509)**** (0.0385)**** 
firmage × t 0.00351 −0.00853 −0.00447 −0.00408 −0.00138 
(0.0026) (0.0053)* (0.0042) (0.0024)** (0.0018) 
firmage × t2 −0.00013 0.00018 0.00004 0.00002 4.20×10−6 
(0.00006)*** (0.0001) (0.00006) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
firmage × t3 8.99 × 10−7 −1.14 × 10−6 – – – 
(3.46 × 10−7 )**** (9.99 × 10−7 ) 
sbirfnd × t 0.00405 −0.0672 −0.06520 0.01489 −0.05108 
(0.0174) (0.0166)***** (0.0338)** (0.0240) (0.0263)** 
otherstarts × t −0.00152 0.00085 −0.00023 −0.00016 0.01237 
(0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0016) (0.0040) (0.0042)**** 
prevphII × t 0.00013 0.00091 −0.00011 0.00063 −0.00056 
(0.00008)* (0.0006)* (0.0002) (0.0004)* (0.0005) 
busfndrs × t 0.00937 −0.00360 0.00180 −0.00287 0.02846 
(0.0024)***** (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0118) (0.0193)* 
acadfndrs × t 0.00530 0.01595 0.01058 0.01346 0.03217 
(0.0026)*** (0.0057)**** (0.0055)** (0.0090)* (0.0086)***** 
lateeval × t 0.01871 −0.01982 −0.04907 −0.00136 0.01771 











      
   
 
   
 
		   
      
       
      
   
      
152 Table B.6  (continued) 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error)b 
Variable DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
northeast × t 0.00889 −0.01398 0.01176 −0.01109 −0.02783 
(0.0010) (0.0246) (0.0163) (0.0180) (0.0153)** 
south × t	 0.03410 −0.03447 0.08332 −0.02988 −0.05539 
(0.0103)***** (0.0245) (0.0295)**** (0.0399) (0.0332)** 
midwest × t 0.02223 −0.02065 0.03441 0.05006 −0.00853 
(0.0137)* (0.0268) (0.0398) (0.0326)* (0.0293) 
Constant 3.228 2.5344 3.09273 2.1893 3.1811 
(0.2143)***** (0.3680)***** (0.4408)***** (0.3761)***** (0.3433)***** 
Probit model for “Response to the Survey” 
ln(awardamt) −0.01558 0.13469 0.20504 0.66435 0.83227 
(0.0670) (0.0839)* (0.2222) (0.4057)* (0.5015)** 
ln(phIItsvy) 0.13862 0.24769 0.04407 0.09363 0.18444 
(0.0482) **** (0.0886)**** (0.0638) (0.1122) (0.0497)***** 
numsvyd 0.03768 −0.00254 0.06455 0.01059 0.01142 
(0.0142)**** (0.0369) (0.0181)***** (0.0391) (0.0139) 
prjage −0.04888 −0.03562 −0.03182 0.00253 0.00367 
(0.0100)***** (0.0132)**** (0.0194)** (0.0310) (0.0359) 
Constant −0.33888 −2.4513 −3.52892 −9.4935 −11.38831 
(0.9180) (1.0990)*** (2.97564) (5.5423)** (6.6563)** 
Rho −0.85080 −0.72823 −0.88485 −0.68498 −0.97940 
(0.0343)***** (0.1005)***** (0.0518)***** (0.1766)*** (0.0218)***** 
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Sigma 1.5095 1.2730 1.6128 1.18964 1.90361 
(0.1059)***** (0.1629)** (0.2330)***** (0.1832) (0.2436)***** 
n 2,994 1,644 771 430 446 
Censored 2,239 1,253 616 290 305 
Uncensored 755 391 155 140 141 
Wald chi-squared (df)  313.23 (13)***** 149.61 123.24 (12)***** 280.55 (12)***** 341.60 (12)***** 
(13)***** 
Log pseudo likelihood −5,481.05 −2,237.56 −1,213.99 −904.88 −811.24 
Wald chi-squared (1) test of 102.51***** 18.69***** 34.33***** 6.35*** 18.16***** 
independent equations 
(rho = 0) 
NOTE: — = data not available. The NASA, DOE, and NSF samples have too few uncensored observations on different ages to sensibly 
fit the firmage × t3 term. (df) = degrees of freedom. 
a Explanation of the total number of observations and the number of uncensored observations is given in Table B.1 and in Table B.5. 
Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors is adjusted for clusters by firm, respectively. The 
significance levels for rho and sigma are the significance levels for the estimated ancillary parameters from which rho and sigma were 
derived. 
b Significance levels (two-tailed excepting chi-squares): ***** = 0.001, **** = 0.01, *** = 0.05, ** = 0.10, * = 0.15. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table B.7  Coefficients from the Performance model in Equation (6.1) 
Variable DoDb 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error)a 



























publications 0.0255 −0.00730 0.0417 
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U.S.-private- 2.23 −3.91 
venture- (0.651)******* (1.38)****** 
capital-to-total-
investment 
colleges-or- −2.10 −46.4 −9.90 















own-firm-funding- 1.34 0.732 2.61 





   
	 	    
	 	 	     
	 	     
	
    
	     
	     
    
156 Table B.7 (continued) 
Coefficient, by agency (robust standard error)b 
Variable DoDb NIHc NASAd DOEe NSFf 
personal-funds-to- −4.08 −1.71 −4.31 
total-investment (1.19)******* (0.804)***** (2.17)***** 
Commercial agree-
ment variables 
dagreement −0.258 −0.734 
(0.102)***** (0.227)****** 
sale of company −0.748 −1.35 
(0.317)***** (0.410)******* 
sale of technology −0.552 
rights (0.218)***** 












    
    
  
Commercial-type variables 
nocom 0.175 −0.192 0.647 −0.370 
(0.265) (0.438) (0.382)**** (0.412) 
software 0.103 −0.185 −0.371 0.234 0.473 
(0.120) (0.221) (0.233)*** (0.332) (0.370)* 
hardware −0.0460 −0.292 −0.0866 0.342 0.941 











service 0.0393 −0.0437 −0.249 0.472 0.280 





research −0.140 0.300 0.105 −0.382 −0.901 
(0.139) (0.232)** (0.256) (0.220)**** (0.292)****** 
education −0.973 0.313 −1.16 −0.839 −0.374 
(0.346)****** (0.307) (0.391)****** (0.347)***** (0.462) 
other −0.0383 0.0810 −0.0930 0.158 −0.812 
(0.180) (0.224) (0.311) (0.280) (0.365)***** 
Constant 0.495 0.00360 0.170 0.0725 −1.86 
(0.145)******* (0.238) (0.208) (0.229) (0.432)******* 
n 562 312 109 106 107 
F (df)g 15.54(17)******* 4.07(20)******* 7.15(15)******* 7.56(11)******* 6.77(19)******* 
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NOTE: Blank = not applicable. 
a Significance levels (two-tailed excepting F): ******* = 0.001, ****** = 0.01, ***** = 0.05, **** = 0.10, *** = 0.15, ** = 0.20, * = 0.25. 
b Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 400 clusters by firm. 
c Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 245 clusters by firm. 
d Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 94 clusters by firm. 
e Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 88 clusters by firm. 
f Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights) and standard errors adjusted for 96 clusters by firm. 
g In this row, the first number is the F statistic, and the number in parentheses is the number of degrees of freedom for the numerator. The 
number of degrees of freedom for the denominator equals the number of clusters minus 1. 
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52–53, 57, 111t–112t, 133t, 139t,
143t 
investments in, 88, 105 
as parsimoniously constructed 
variable category, 85–86, 154t 
Invention, 3, 6 
See also Patents 
Investment, 2 
outside, as financing variable, 82–83, 
83t, 86, 88–89n2, 89n4, 89n6 
public sector, and market failure, 9, 
15–16n16 
technology and, 1, 3, 15n9 
types of (see Funding variables) 
Investors, 13 
commercial agreements with, 92, 
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Job creation, 10 
ARRA and, 1, 14n4 
no guarantee of, with innovation, 
11–12 
small businesses and, 19–20, 30nn4–5 
vision for, 2, 29, 104 
Job skills, technological progress and, 5 
Knowledge, 3, 6, 30n9 
Large businesses, 29, 43n6 
small vs., and creativity, 3–4, 15nn9–
12 
small vs., and innovation, 4, 15nn9–
10, 30n8 
Licensing agreements, 91–92, 93t–97t 
Manufacturing sector 
flexible automation in, and market 
entry, 20–21 
innovation by small vs. large firms in, 
4, 15n10 
managed, vs. entrepreneurial 
economy, 20–21 
R&D in, and technological progress, 
3–4 
Market failure, 5 
correction of, and technology policy, 
6–9, 15nn14–15, 15–16n16, 
16n17, 16–17n18 
public sector investment and, 8f, 24, 
26t 
sources of, 7, 14 
Market variables 
as econometric category, 51, 
110t–111t, 131t, 137t, 143t 
as parsimoniously constructed 
variable category, 85 
Maryland, firms awarded SBIR grants 
in, 38t 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
programs of, 19–20 
Minorities, technological innovation by, 
and SBIR funding, 21, 103 
NASA. See National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
National Academy of Sciences, reports 
by, 14n4 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) 
commercial agreements with, based 
on SBIR-developed technologies, 
92, 95t, 98, 99t, 100t 
as current SBIR participant, 24, 34t 
descriptive statistics constructed by 
NRC from, projects, 83–84, 83t,
89nn3–4 
descriptive statistics gathered by 
NRC from, projects, 35, 35t, 41t,
116t–125t, 148t 
employee growth-rate factors and, 
projects, 67, 70f, 73, 74t, 75tt, 76, 
77t 
number of employees retained by, 
after Phase II projects, 45, 46t,
57n2, 131t–136t, 137t–142t 
random sample of Phase II projects 
for, 128t–130t 
SBIR awards to, 10–11, 12, 25t, 33, 
36, 39t, 85–86, 87–88 
National Association of Seed and Venture
Funds, 79n13 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), economic downturns 
dated by, 1, 14n1 
National Cooperative Research Act, 2, 
15n7 
National Economic Council, 1–2 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
commercial agreements with, based 
on SBIR-developed technologies, 
92, 94t, 99t, 100t 
as current SBIR participant, 24, 34t 
descriptive statistics constructed by 
NRC from, projects, 83–84, 83t,
89nn3–4 
descriptive statistics gathered by NRC































   
 
  









































National Institutes of Health (NIH), cont.	 
employee growth-rate factors and, 
projects, 67, 69f, 73, 74t, 75tt, 76, 
77t 
number of employees retained by, 
after Phase II projects, 45, 46t,
57n2, 131t–136t, 137t–142t 
random sample of Phase II projects 
for, 128t–130t 
SBIR awards to, 10, 12, 23, 33, 36, 
38t, 58n8, 84, 85–86, 87 
National Research Council (NRC) 
agency descriptive statistics gathered 
by, 116t–125t 
evaluation of SBIR economic benefits
by, 33–35, 42, 42nn1–2, 60, 103 
sample selection bias and cross-
agency analysis of, 35–37, 
38t–40t, 154t–158t 
SBIR changes recommended by, 
10–11 
survey database of, 12, 14, 33–42, 
78n1 
variables and questions posed by, 
34–35, 37, 41t, 42n3, 42–43n5, 
109t–115t 
National Science Foundation (NSF), 21 
commercial agreements with, based 
on SBIR-developed technologies, 
92, 97t, 99t, 101t 
as current SBIR participant, 24, 34t 
descriptive statistics constructed by 
NRC from, projects, 83–84, 83t,
89nn3–4 
descriptive statistics gathered by 
NRC from, projects, 35, 35t, 41t,
116t–125t, 150t 
employee growth-rate factors and, 
projects, 67, 72f, 73, 74t, 75tt, 76, 
77t 
number of employees retained by, 
after Phase II projects, 45, 46t,
131t–136t, 137t–142t 
random sample of Phase II projects 
for, 128t–130t 
reports by, 4, 30n8 
SBIR awards to, 10–11, 25t, 33, 36, 
40t, 43n7, 85–86, 87 
Natural-gas drilling devices, 39t 
NBER (National Bureau of Economic 
Research), 1, 14n1 
NIH. See National Institutes of Health 
NRC. See National Research Council 
NSF. See National Science Foundation 
Obama, Pres. Barack, 1, 29 
Ohio, firms awarded SBIR grants in, 39t 
OMB. See U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries), 19 
Orszag, Peter, OMB program evaluation 
and, 13–14, 17n22 
Partnerships, public/private, 10–14, 21, 
30n11 
Patents, 2, 5, 30n2 
small vs. large firms and, 4, 19, 49–50 
Private sector, 30n1 
investment by, and R&D, 2, 103 
partnership of public and, as SBIR 
program, 10–14, 21 
R&D rate of return to, 7–9, 8f, 24, 
26–28, 26f, 27f, 32n26, 37 
types of intellectual property in, 52 
(see also Patents) 
Productivity. See Economic growth 
Productivity slowdown, 2 
culprits of, 14n5, 19, 30n6 
periods of, 19, 30n1 
See also Recessions 
Public sector, 6, 52 
investment by, and market failure, 2, 
9, 15–16n16 
partnership of private and, as SBIR 
program, 10–14 
R&D rate of return to, as social 
benefits, 7–9, 8f, 24 
Publications, as a public good, 52 
Radar warning devices, 38t 
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R&E (research and experimentation) 
activity, tax credits for, 2, 15n6 
Rate of return, R&D and private vs.
social, 7–9, 8f, 24, 26–28, 26f, 27f,
32nn25–26, 37, 43n8 
Recessions, 1–2, 14n2 
See also Productivity slowdown 
Recovery Act. SeeAmerican Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
Remote sensing devices, 39t 
Research and development (R&D), 5 
firm’s effort on, and retained 
employees, 48–49 
high market risk in, 9, 16n17, 
16–17n18 
investments in, 2, 3, 4, 15nn11–12, 
19, 21, 103 
private vs. social rate of return for, 
7–9, 8f, 24, 26f 
SBIR-funded, and exploitation, 91–
92, 98, 102, 102nn1–2 
See also Innovation 
Research and education, 3 
Research and experimentation (R&E) 
activity, tax credits for, 2, 15n6, 19 
Rising above the Gathering Storm
(National Academy of Sciences), 
14n4 
Risk taking, 5, 31–32n24 
R&D and, 9, 16n17, 16–17n18 
reduction in, 26–28, 27f, 31n23, 
32nn27–28, 89n6 
SA Photonics (firm), DoD Phase II award
to, 38t 
SBA (U.S. Small Business 
Administration), 4, 15n10, 23, 
30n8, 31n12 
SBIR program. See Small Business 
Innovation Research program 
Schumpeterian process, 30n7 
Science and engineering research, global 
competitiveness and, 29 
Science and Technology: Shaping the 
Twenty-First Century (Executive 
Office of the President), 6 
Science in the National Interest (Clinton 
and Gore), 6 
Small Business Act (1953), 31n14 
Small Business Innovation Development 
Act, 31n12 
mitigation of productivity slowdown 
and, 2, 103 
reauthorizations of, 22–23, 31nn18–
19 
Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) funding, 23, 81–88 
explanatory variables and estimated 
effects, 84–88 
long-term impact on employment 
from, 12–13, 37 
model for, employment growth, 
81–82, 89n5 
new summary variables for, 82–84 
project-specific employment effects 
from, 45–57 
Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program 
creation of, 2, 21–24, 103 
economic role of, 24–28, 42 
employment growth and, 10–14, 29, 
37, 45–46, 46t, 56, 57n2, 81–88, 
103 
exploitation of, 91–92, 98, 102, 
102nn1–2 
NRC evaluation of, economic 
benefits, 33–35, 42nn1–2 (see also
Econometric variable categories) 
Phase I awards, 22, 23, 25t, 31n15, 
88, 105 
Phase II awards, 10–11, 12, 17n20, 
22, 23–24, 25t, 31n16, 31n20, 
31n22, 33, 35t, 47–48, 50–52, 
54–57, 65–66, 79n14, 82, 84–85, 
88, 104, 105–106, 107, 128t–130t 
Phase III awards, 22, 23, 31n17, 54 
R&D competitive awards from, 
21–23, 31n13 
Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) research variables 
as econometric category, 48–51, 110t,
131t, 137t, 143t 
 
 
   
 










	 	 	 	   
 



























   
 
  



















   
 
       













Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) research variables, cont. 
as parsimoniously constructed 
variable category, 85, 154t 
Small businesses, 1, 2, 15n10, 29, 55 
creativity in large vs., 3–4, 15nn9–12,
30n8 
criteria for, and SBIR awards, 22, 23 
innovation in, and policy emphasis, 
19–21, 103 
job creation by, 19–20, 30nn4–5 
Smith, Adam, technology premise of, 3 
Social benefits, R&D rate of return to 
public sector as, 6, 7–9, 8f, 24, 26f 
Spectra Research Inc., NASA Phase II 
award to, 39t 
Strategy for American Innovation, A
(National Economic Council), 1–2 
Structural uncertainty. See Risk taking 
Survey of Industrial Research and 
Development (NSF), 4 
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program), 
1 
Tax credits 
legislation for, 19, 30n3 
mitigation of productivity slowdown 
with, 2, 15n6 
Tax policies, encouraging risk-taking 
with, 5 
Technology, 3, 5 
goals of, policy, 6, 19, 21 
investments in, 1, 3–4, 15n9, 103 
rights to, and sales, 14, 56, 87, 91, 
107 
Trademarks, as private good, 52 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
bank assets purchased through, 1 
Unemployment rates, 1, 10, 14n2 
United States, 3, 10, 29 
law and legislation, 1, 2, 14n4, 21, 
30n3, 31n12 
See also names of specific states 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
SBIR awards to, 24, 25t, 34t, 35t 
U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), 
SBIR awards to, 24, 25t, 34t, 35t 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
commercial agreements with, based 
on SBIR-developed technologies, 
92, 93t, 99t, 100t 
as current SBIR participant, 24, 34t 
descriptive statistics constructed by 
NRC from, projects, 83–84, 83t,
89nn3–4 
descriptive statistics gathered by 
NRC from, projects, 34, 35t, 41t,
116t–125t, 146t 
employee growth-rate factors and, 
projects, 67, 68f, 73, 74t, 75tt, 76, 
77t 
number of employees retained by, 
after Phase II projects, 45, 46t,
131t–136t, 137t–142t 
random sample of Phase II projects 
for, 58n8, 128t–130t 
SBIR awards to, 10, 17n20, 25t, 31n21, 
33, 36, 38t, 84–86, 87, 88 
U.S. Department of Education (ED), 
SBIR awards to, 24, 25t, 34t, 35t 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
commercial agreements with, based 
on SBIR-developed technologies, 
92, 96t, 99t, 101t 
as current SBIR participant, 24, 34t 
descriptive statistics constructed by 
NRC from, projects, 83–84, 83t,
89nn3–4 
descriptive statistics gathered by NRC
from, projects, 35, 41t, 116t–125t,
149t 
employee growth-rate factors and, 
projects, 67, 71f, 73, 74t, 75tt, 76, 
77t 
number of employees retained by, 
after Phase II projects, 45, 46t,
131t–142t 
random sample of Phase II projects 
for, 128t–130t 
SBIR awards to, 10–11, 12, 17n20, 




	 	  	 	   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 



























176 Link and Scott 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) 
SBIR awards to, 24, 25t, 34t, 35t 
See also component agencies, e.g.,
National Institutes of Health 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), SBIR awards to, 24, 25t,
34t, 35t 
U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DoT), SBIR awards to, 24, 25t,
34t, 35t 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), SBIR awards to, 24, 25t,
34t, 35t 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) 
market failure policy and, 15n14, 
15–16n16 
program evaluation and, 13–14, 
17n22, 29 
U.S. Office of Science and Technology, 6 
U.S. Small Business Administration 
(SBA), 4, 15n10, 23, 30n8, 31n12 
U.S. Technology Policy (U.S. Office of 
Science and Technology), 6 
University and Small Business Patent 
Procedures Act. See Bayh-Dole 
Act 
University participation. See Colleges 
and universities 
USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture), 
24, 25t, 34t, 35t 
Venture capitalists 
employment growth and, 53, 65, 
79n13 
SBIR reauthorizations and, 23, 32n22 
Wages, competitiveness and, 5 
Washington, Pres. George, inventions 
policy of, 6 
Wealth of Nations, The (Smith), 3 
Women, technological innovation by, and
SBIR funding, 23, 103 
 
 
About the Institute 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit re-
search organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employment-
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns. 
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unem-
ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of pub-
lications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a re-
search program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the In-
stitute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in 
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which man-
ages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the 
local area. 
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems. 
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic de-
velopment and local labor markets. 
177 


